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We introduce novel techniques to achieve a wide range of functional encryption
schemes. For our work, we explore a number of functional encryption schemes and
observe their techniques to achieve adaptive security. Based on our observations, we
develop several techniques to enable functional encryption schemes. Particularly, we
utilize encoding frameworks to generalize our contribution which is applicable to a
number of functional encryption schemes. We utilize the pair encoding framework
(Eurocrypt’14) for our work, but we also introduce a new encoding framework to
achieve efficient functional encryption schemes.
Firstly, using the pair encoding framework, we show that functional encryption
schemes can be converted into their dual conversion without any efficiency loss. The
dual conversion means the conversion of any scheme into the symmetric scheme in
which the roles are swapped between private keys and ciphertexts (e.g ciphertext
policy attribute based encryption and key policy attribute based encryption). Ad-
ditionally, we provide a new construction in prime order groups for pair encodings.
This construction improves the efficiency of previous constructions for pair encod-
ings since it realizes functional encryption schemes which were only suggested in
composite order groups into prime order groups.
As a new encoding framework, we introduce a tag based encoding which is more
efficient than previous encodings when the size of predicate is large. It supports a
number of functional encryptions. Also, generic constructions for tag based encod-
ings are provided. In particular, they are adaptively secure in prime order groups
under the standard assumption or static assumptions. Moreover, key policy at-
tribute based encryption schemes are followed. These schemes share the technique
of the tag based encoding but these schemes provide semi-adaptive security which is
weaker than adaptive security. However, these schemes show many desirable prop-
erties such as multi-use of attribute, short ciphertexts and support large universe
under the standard assumption in prime order groups. Therefore, those schemes
complement tag based encoding.
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Functional encryption (FE) is a public key cryptographic system which offers a
fine-grained access control. Functional encryption is rooted to Identity Based En-
cryption (IBE) [Sha84, BF01, Coc01] and achieves access controls based on various
types of functions using public keys. Subsequently, more complicated functions, such
as boolean functions [SW05, GPSW06, LOS+10], inner products [KSW08, OT09,
AFV11], deterministic finite automata [Wat12] and turing machine [AS16] are em-
bedded into functional encryption to support complex systems. One of the applica-
tions of functional encryption is a large scale IT systems (e.g. cloud storage). In a
large scale IT system, efficiency and flexibility remain as critical issues, which are
difficult to achieve concurrently using traditional public key encryption.
In a functional encryption, a user does not own a unique key. Instead, multiple
key elements are created based on the user’s properties. Then, ciphertexts can be
decrypted using not a single key element but the combination of those key elements
as inputs of the function which the encryption schemes aims for. Therefore, in a
functional encryption, key elements can appear in both keys that the adversary
possesses and the other keys that decrypt the challenge ciphertext at the same
time. It means that key spaces to simulate compromised keys are not well separated
from the keys which are secure. In detail, private keys which decrypt the challenge
ciphertext must be excluded from the other keys that the adversary can obtain in
traditional partitioning techniques [BB04a, CHK03, BF01, BBG05].
There exists functional encryption scheme which is secure from the adaptive
adversary where the adaptive adversary implies the adversary who can collect keys
before and after it decides the target ciphertext. Also, some of those adaptively
secure functional encryptions are proved via these partitioning technique [BB04b,
Wat05, GW09]. However, with the partitioning technique, selective security of func-
1
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tional encryption was more often considered due to the difficulty of proving adaptive
securities of functional encryption schemes. In a selective security model, the ad-
versary declares its target only before a system sets up. In this model, since the
simulator always knows the target of the adversary, it can separate a key space
in which keys decrypt the target from the other key spaces when it creates public
keys. This allows traditional partitioning techniques to be applicable to functional
encryption schemes.
Nevertheless, when functions which encryption schemes employ are complicated,
proving adaptive security of those encryptions using the traditional partitioning
techniques becomes very daunting. A well-known example of functional encryp-
tion is Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) [SW05]. ABE has refined as two prim-
itives Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext Policy
Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) based on where an access policy is located
in [GPSW06]. In KP-ABE, a user has a policy and ciphertexts are created for a
set of attributes. In CP-ABE, a user’s key created based on his/her attributes and
the ciphertext employs a policy. Attribute based encryption shows the difficulty
of proving adaptive security of functional encryption. For example, in CP-ABE,
keys are created based on a user’s attributes. Therefore, each user has multiple key
elements which represent the user’s attributes. In CP-ABE, ciphertexts are created
based on the policy allowing access to the encrypted message. Therefore, if a user
has attributes satisfying a policy of some ciphertexts, the messages encrypted in
the ciphertexts are revealed to the user. However, other users who cannot meet the
policy also may have some attributes that appear in the ciphertexts. For instance,
a user possesses attributes ”A” and ”B” and a ciphertext created for a boolean for-
mula ”A AND C”. Although ”A” appears both in the user’s key and the ciphertext,
the ciphertext must not be revealed any information about the encrypted message
to the user. Therefore, attribute ”A” cannot be belonging to any key spaces when
the simulator separates key space. This makes proving CP-ABE scheme based on
traditional partitioning technique more difficult.
Waters [Wat09] introduced the dual system encryption which provides a break-
through technique of proving adaptive security of functional encryption. An adap-
tive security model is more realistic than the selective security model. In the adap-
tive security model, the adversary does not declare its target in advance. To achieve
adaptive security, the dual system encryption implements auxiliary types of keys and
ciphertexts, namely semi-functional keys and semi-functional ciphertexts, appear-
ing only in the security proof. Subsequently, it mus be proved that a security game
consisting only of semi-functional keys and semi-functional ciphertexts is indistin-
guishable from the original security game which uses only normal keys and normal
ciphertexts. Since semi-functional keys cannot decrypt semi-functional ciphertexts,
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the security analysis of the transformed game becomes much easier than that of
the original game. Waters showed that the dual system encryption is a powerful
tool in public key encryptions and signatures by introducing a number of adaptive
encryption schemes.
More recently, Lewko and Waters [LW12] introduced another break-through
technique combining the traditional partitioning techniques and Waters’ dual system
encryption [Wat09]. In the dual system encryption, all keys and ciphertexts have
two types, i.e. normal and semi-functional, and proving the invariance of both types
of keys is critical. In the proof of the invariance, a semi-functional key correlates
with the ciphertext to hide its type to the simulator, but at the same time, this
correlation must be hidden to the adversary. Originally, Waters solved this problem
by information theoretic arguments. Therefore, the correlation is hidden perfectly
to the adversary. However, Lewko and Waters showed that this paradox is also
achievable using two selective security proofs which are reduced to computational
assumptions. The technique is often known as doubly selective securitya [Att14a,
AY15] because computational assumptions are originated from their selective and
co-selective security. The doubly selective security allows FE to have more desirable
properties and support to more complicated functions. For example, it achieves
adaptively secure ABE scheme allowing multi-use of attributes in [LW12].
1.2 Encodings for Functional Encryption
In this work, we present new techniques to achieve adaptive security of functional
encryption. In particular, we utilize encoding frameworks [Att14a, Wee14] to present
our contribution to functional encryption.
Encoding frameworks provide a new direction of proving security since one can
prove an adaptive security of functional encryption schemes by only showing that the
schemes satisfy the properties required by the encodings. Therefore, the encoding
frameworks reduce an effort of proving the securities of functional encryptions, and
also provide a new insight of properties leading to adaptively secure encryption
schemes. Simply speaking, checking a few properties of schemes can result in the
full proof of adaptive security of an encryption scheme when the encoding framework
used to construct a new scheme.
Moreover, utilizing encoding frameworks is a very efficient way to describe func-
tional encodings because a contribution to an encoding framework takes effects on
all functional encryption schemes described as encodings. For example, in Chapter
aIt also called as computational hiding [Att14a, Wee14] since it hides the correlation computa-
tionally
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Table 1.1: Comparison of Encoding Frameworks
Composite Order Groups Prime Order Groups
Perfect hidinga Wee [Wee14], CGW [CGW15] CGW [CGW15], AC [AC16]
Computational hidingb
Attrapadung [Att14a] Attrapadung [Att15]c
(Doubly Selective Security)
aIf the correlations are hidden by information theoretic arguments as Waters’ dual system encryp-
tion, it is known as perfect hiding since the correlation is hidden perfectly.
bEncodings for computational hiding are also applicable to perfect hiding when computational
assumptions can be replaced by information theoretic arguments such as pair-wise independence.
c This work introduced concurrently and independently with out works.
4, we introduce a new compilerb for pair encodings. In this chapter, we suggest
only one compiler but this compiler implies multiple new schemes which are listed
in table 4.1.
The dual system encryption and the doubly selective security are utilized as
main tools to construct a number of functional encryption schemes. To utilize those
techniques, functional encryption schemes are enforced to some common structures
and properties. This causes coupling of functional encryption schemes, naturally.
Encoding frameworks are introduced to observe those requirements of the dual sys-
tem encryption (and doubly selective security) and formalize them using encodings.
Two independent works [Att14a, Wee14] have been proposed by formalizing those
common features of functional encryptions introduced. In particular, the pair encod-
ing framework [Att14a] includes functional encryption schemes of which the adaptive
securities are proved using doubly selective security.
More recently, several works [CGW15, AC16, Att15] improved the efficiency of
compilers of encodings. They suggested compilers for existing encodings in prime
order groups. Because previous compilers of the encodings are only suggested in
composite order groups and composite order groups were significantly inefficient
compared with prime order groups [LW12, Fre10, Gui13], those encoding make
functional encryption more efficient and practical. Table 1.1 is provided to ex-
plain current achievements of encoding frameworks. Computational hiding implies
the doubly selective security in the table.
The efficiency of functional encryption is an important issue since functional
encryption is developed to support large systems which have complicated access
policies. To support the large systems, encryption and decryption process should be
performed rapidly. Therefore, achieving more efficient functional encryption schemes
is important on-going problems. In particular, improving efficiency of functional
bIt should be noted that the term ”compiler” implies generic construction of encodings
[CGW15]. It is named because of the role of a generic construction in encoding frameworks.
It compiles encodings to encryption schemes.
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encryption schemes using encoding framework is more meaningful since it can affect
a number of functional encoding schemes at the same time.
The compilers from CGW [CGW15] and AC [AC16] show good efficiency in
prime order groups but applying their techniques for doubly selective security is not
clear. Therefore, encodings utilizing doubly selective security remains feasible only in
composite order groups.c Also, those compilers in prime order groups for encodings
commonly have a certain limitation in an efficiency. Particularly, they require at
least two prime order group elements to feature a composite order group element
in schemes of Wee [Wee14] and Attrapadung [Att14a]. Breaking this limitation is a
interesting and meaningful problem.
1.3 Contribution
In this work, we introduce techniques to construct efficient functional encryption
schemes via encoding frameworks. In Chapter 3, we suggest a way to convert one
FE scheme to its dual scheme without an efficiency loss where a dual scheme is
the symmetric conversion in which the locations of predicates and descriptions of
an original scheme are exchanged between keys and ciphertexts (e.g. KP-ABE and
CP-ABE). Since the previous technique [AY15] requires an efficiency loss for this
conversion, our technique instantly improves the efficiencies of the schemes which
are derived by the previous technique. In Chapter 4, we introduce a new technique
which is applicable to an existing encoding framework for doubly selective security.
Using this technique, several existing schemes in composite order groups are featured
into prime order groups which are about 254 times faster in computations [Gui13].
In Chapter 5, we suggest a new efficient encoding framework which can works with
compilers breaking the previous efficiency boundaries. In Chapter 6, we describe
that the technique in Chapter 5 is also applicable to more wider class of functional
encryption. Since the techniques in this thesis are based on encodings, they are
applicable to a number of functional encryptions. We summarize the encryption
schemes achievable through our works in Table 1.2.
1.3.1 Applications
Since functional encryption supports a fine-grained access control. It can be widely
used for real applications. Cloud storage service is popular and practical applica-
tion since it provides more reliable storage with affordable price and mobility. Data
in cloud storages can be shared easily with the other. However, the cloud service
provider is basically a third party and often untrusted. Relying on the security of
cThere is an independent and concurrent work [Att15] in this claim.
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Table 1.2: Comparison between Previous Works and Ours
FEs Contributions Comparisons
Ch. 3 CP-Doubly Spatial Encryption
CP-ABE with short keys
[Att14a] (+ [AY15])∗
Dual FE for Regular Language Improved efficiency
Unbounded CP-ABE
KP-ABE in a small universe [LW12] (+ [AY15])∗
Ch. 4 Doubly Spatial Encryption
FE for regular language Composite to Prime1 [Att14a] (+[AY15])∗
CP-ABE with short keys
Unbounded ABE
Multi-use [OT12]
Composite to Prime [Att14a] (+[AY15])∗





KP-ABE with short ciphertexts Composite to Prime [Att14a]
Ch. 5 IPE with short keys Improved efficiency [CGW15]
Dual SE2 with short keys New primitive
HIBE with short ciphertexts Symmetric Bilinear maps [CW14b]
Ch. 6 KP-ABE for small universe Given to explain the technique in Ch 6.
KP-ABE with short ciphertexts Composite to Prime [Att14a]
Improved efficiency [Tak14]
(+[AY15])∗: [AY15] introduces a technique to convert one scheme to its dual (i.e. symmetric
conversion). We compare our scheme to the schemes which are converted from original schemes
suggested in the literature where this symbol attached by [AY15].
Composite to Prime1: This means that our scheme features a scheme into prime order groups
while it is originally in composite order groups in the comparisons.
SE2: Spatial Encryption
data to an untrusted third part causes a risk to personal users or organisations.
One of promising ways to protect data in untrusted cloud is encryption. In partic-
ular, functional encryption (e.g. ABE) is used to protect the data in cloud storage,
but still maintain conveniences of the cloud services [WMZV16, LYZ+13, BBS+09,
ZM13, NJM+]. One of good examples is O-Auth [Har12, TG11] which is an widely
used open source authentication platform. It internally uses a functional encryp-
tion scheme for a complex access control. Functional encryption is also used for an
access control of cloud storages. In those practical works, the efficiency and capabil-
ity of functional encryption schemes are considered important since computational
burden of functional encryption is the biggest obstacle to make them in practical
applications. Therefore, making efficient functional encryption is critical issue in
those practical applications.
1.4 Thesis Organization
In this thesis, we improve functional encryption schemes in three ways. First, we
enhance the efficiency of encodings by themselves in Chapter 3. Next, we provide a
generic construction which features encoding schemes in composite order groups into
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prime order groups in Chapter 4. Finally, we introduce a new encoding framework
which breaks current theoretic boundary of efficiency in Chapters 5 and 6.
In Table 1.2, one can see that the instances given in Chapter 3 also appear in
Chapter 4. This is because we target to improve the pair encoding instances given
in [Att14a, LW12] but with the different ways. We directly reduce the length of
each encoding schemes in Chapter 3, but in chapter 4 we suggests a new compiler
in prime order groups although the previous compliers are secure only in composite
order groups.
Instances in Chapter 5 are quite different from those in Chapters 3 and 4 since
we are suggesting a new encoding framework rather than using a existing encoding
framework as in Chapters 3 and 4. The compiler in our new encoding is more
efficient than that we suggested in Chapter 4, but it is only applicable to the subclass
of encoding instances where the technique in Chapter 4 is applicable. However, we
show that our technique can be extended to more complicated scheme such as KP-
ABE under a weaker security model in Chapter 6.
1.4.1 Refined Duality of the Pair Encoding Framework
In Chapter 3, we introduce a new symmetric conversion technique for functional en-
cryption schemes. In particular, our technique does not incur any loss in efficiency
while it is converted and is applicable when an adaptive security of a functional
encryption scheme is proved by the doubly selective technique. Because functional
encryption schemes that were proved by doubly selective technique were mostly
introduced as pair encoding schemes, we also present our results using the pair en-
coding framework. To describe our conversion more clearly, we newly introduce a
masked form of pair encoding frameworks. A masked form requires specific struc-
tures for pair encoding schemes, but all pair encodings of which the adaptive se-
curities were proved using doubly selective security exhibit this structure. In other
words, all of them have their own masked forms, to the best of our knowledge. Using
a masked form, one pair encoding scheme can be converted into its dual scheme, eas-
ily. Compared with the best conversion technique of functional encryption [AY15],
ours reduces one element in public keys, private keys and ciphertexts of converted
schemes in composite order groups [Att14a] when we apply our result to the generic
constructions of a pair encoding. Additionally, in prime order groups [Att15], our
result reduces three group elements in public keys, private keys and ciphertexts.
These savings are applicable for all functional encoding schemes proved by doubly
selective technique.
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1.4.2 The Pair Encoding in Prime Order Groups
In Chapter 4, a new construction for FE schemes is introduced in prime order
groups. To show that our construction is widely applicable and supports compu-
tational hiding, we adopt the syntax of Attrapadung’s pair encoding framework
[Att14a]. Therefore, our new construction can be considered as a new compiler of
pair encodings. Particularly, previous compilers are either only equipped with com-
posite order groups [Att14a, Wee14] or not supporting encoding schemes utilizing
doubly selective security [CGW15, AC16]. Our compiler firstly, but concurrently,
introduces a compiler of pair encoding schemes for doubly selective security in prime
order groups. There is an independent work from Attrapadung [Att15]. Compared
with [Att15], our compiler is constructed under different assumptions and requires
smaller sized public keys although the size of other parameters is almost same. In
this work, we utilize Lewko and Waters’ IBE scheme and expand it for more com-
plicated function using a nested model of the dual system encryption.
1.4.3 Tag Based Encoding
In Chapter 5, we introduce a new encoding framework for functional encryption. We
observed that common properties of functional encryptions [Wat09, AL12, CZF12,
Wee14], and generalized them as tag based encoding using tag. Three adaptively
secure generic constructions for the encoding are provided as compilers. Two con-
structions are secure under the standard decisional linear assumption. The other is
secure under static assumptions. The construction under static assumption is most
efficient but relies its security to stronger assumptions than the other constructions.
Our constructions are adaptively secure with both in asymmetric and symmetric
bilinear maps and practically improves the previous functional encryption presented
by the encoding frameworks. To the best of our knowledge, our construction provides
a first encoding framework with symmetric bilinear maps in prime order groups.
1.4.4 KP-ABE with Short Ciphertexts
In Chapter 6, we introduce new expressive semi-adaptively secure KP-ABE schemes
in prime order groups under standard assumptions. The technique to achieve those
schemes quite similar with our tag based encryption, but these schemes are semi-
adaptively secure. In semi-adaptive model, the target of the adversary declare after
system set-up. Therefore, a semi-adaptive security model is stronger than selective
model, but weaker than the adaptive model. They are also considered as special
cases of our tag based encoding achieving weaker security since the techniques resem-
bles each other. Therefore, we obtain two semi-adaptively secure KP-ABE schemes
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under the Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN) as follows:
• KP-ABE for a small attribute universe; and
• KP-ABE with short ciphertexts for a large attribute universe.
We focus more on a semi-adaptive KP-ABE with short ciphertexts since it sup-
ports many desirable properties of ABE such as allowing multi-uses of attributes
and a large attribute universe with short ciphertexts. However, we also introduce





We let G1, G2 and GT denote three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p.
Also, we let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and G2, resp., and e be a bilinear map,
e : G1 ×G2 → GT . The bilinear map e has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
We say that G1 and G2 are bilinear groups if the group operation in G1 and G2
and the bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT are both efficiently computable. If G1 6= G2,
the map e is an asymmetric bilinear map. Otherwise, we can simply denote G1 and
G2 as G and call e : G×G→ GT as a symmetric bilinear map.
2.1.2 Access Structures
We adopt the definition of Access Structure and Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes from
[Bei96].
Definition 2.1 (Access Structure) Let {P1, ..., Pn} be a set of parties. A collec-
tion A ⊂ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C: if B ∈ A and B ⊂ C, then C ∈ A.
An monotone access structure is a monotone collection A of non-empty subsets of
{P1, ..., Pn}, i.e., A ⊂ 2{P1,...,Pn} \ {}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets,
and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
Definition 2.2 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)) A secret sharing scheme
Π over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp) if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
10
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2. There exists a matrix A called the share-generating matrix for Π. The matrix
A has m rows and ` columns. For all i = 1, ...,m, the ith row of A is labelled
by a party ρ(x) (ρ is a function from {1, ...,m} to P). When we consider the
column vector v = (s, r2, ..., r`), where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and
r2, ..., r` ∈ Zp are randomly chosen, then Av is the vector of m shares of the
secret s according to Π. The share (Av)i belongs to party ρ(x).
LSSS often uses for attribute based encryption. If ρ is injective, attribute based
encryption scheme only allows one-use of attributes. It means that an attribute in
an access policy can be appear only once. Otherwise, if ρ is not necessary to be
injective, attribute based encryption allows multi-uses of attributes.
2.1.3 Complexity Assumptions
Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN) Given a group generator G, we define the
following distribution:
G = (p,G,GT , e)
R←− G, g, f, ν R←− G, c1, c2




We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking DLIN to be:
AdvDLING,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DBDH) Given a group gen-
erator G, we define the following distribution:
G = (p,G,GT , e)
R←− G, g R←− G, c1, c2, c3
R←− Zp, D = (G, g, gc1 , gc2 , gc3),
T0 = e(g, g)
c1c2c3 , T1
R←− GT
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking DBDH to be:
AdvDBDHG,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
It should be noted that DLIN implies DBDH [BW06b, CW14a].
Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SXDH) Given a group gen-
erator G, we define the following distribution:
G = (p,G1, G2, GT , e)
R←− G, g1
R←− G1, g2
R←− G2, c, d, z
R←− Zp






1 ∈ G1, g2, gc2 ∈ G2)





We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking SXDH to be:
AdvSXDHG,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
We introduce three assumptions LW1, LW2 and LW3 which originally appear
in [LW09]. It is worth noting that following assumptions utilize asymmetric bilinear
maps as the SXDH assumption although the other standard assumptions DLIN and
DBDH use symmetric bilinear maps.
Assumption 1. (LW1) Given a group generator G, we define the following
distribution:
G = (p,G1, G2, GT , e)
R←− G, f1
R←− G1, f2
R←− G2, a, c, d
R←− Zp

























We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking assumption 1 to be:
AdvLW1G,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
Assumption 2. (LW2) Given a group generator G, we define the following
distribution:
G = (p,G1, G2, GT , e)
R←− G, f1
R←− G1, f2
R←− G2, c, d, t, w
R←− Zp















We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking assumption 2 to be:
AdvLW2G,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
Assumption 3. (LW3) Given a group generator G, we define the following distri-
bution:
G = (p,G1, G2, GT , e)
R←− G, f1
R←− G1, f2
R←− G2, a, b, c
R←− Zp






1 ∈ G1, f2, fa2 , f b2 , f c2 ∈ G2)
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T0 = e(f1, f2)
abc, T1
R←− GT
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking assumption 3 to be:
AdvLW3G,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
2.1.4 Functional Encryption
We define functional encryption and its security models.
Definition 2.3 (Functional Encryption) [Att14a] A functional encryption for a pred-
icate R consists of Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen and Decrypt is as follows:
Setup (1λ, `)→ (PK,MSK): takes as input a security parameter 1λ and an integer
` allocated to a predicate. The output is a public parameter PK and a master
secret key MSK.
KeyGen (x,MSK,PK) → SK: takes as input a predicate x ∈ X , a master secret
key MSK and a public parameter PK. The output is a private key SK.
Encrypt (y,M, PK) → CT : takes as input a description y ∈ Y , a public parameter
PK and a plaintext M . The output is a ciphertext CT .
Decrypt (SK,CT )→ M : takes as input a secret key SK for x and a ciphertext CT
for y. If R(x, y) = 1, the output is either a message M . Otherwise, ⊥.
Correctness. For all M,x ∈ X , y ∈ Y such that R(x, y) = 1, if SK is the output
of KeyGen(x, MSK, PK) and CT is the output of Encrypt(y,M, PK) where PK
and MSK are the outputs of Setup(1λ, κ), then Decrypt(SK,CT ) outputs M .
Definition 2.4 (Adaptive Security of Functional Encryption) [Att14a] With qt pri-
vate key quires where qt is polynomial, a functional encryption for a predicate R
is adaptively secure if there is no PPT adversary A which has a non-negligible
advantage in the game between A and the challenge C defined below.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(1λ, κ) to create (PK, MSK). PK is sent to A.
Phase 1: The adversary requests a private key for xi ∈ X for i ∈ [1, q1]. For each
xi, the challenger returns SKi created by running KeyGen(xi,MSK,PK).
Challenge: When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for y ∈ Y such that
R(xi, y) = 0 ∀i ∈ [1, q1], and submits equal-length messages M0 and M1, the
challenger randomly selects b from {0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext
CT created by running Encrypt(y,Mb, PK).
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Phase 2: This is identical with Phase 1 except the additional restriction that xi ∈ X
for i ∈ [q1 + 1, qt] such that R(xi, y) = 0; ∀i ∈ [q1 + 1, qt].
Guess: The adversary outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b′, then the adversary wins.
We define the advantage of the adversary against a functional encryption FE as
AdvFEA (λ) := |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|.
Definition 2.5 Semi-adaptively Secure Functional Encryption [CW14c] With qt
private key quires where qt is polynomial, a functional encryption for a predicate R
is semi-adaptively secure if there is no PPT adversary A which has a non-negligible
advantage in the game between A and the challenge C defined below.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(1λ, κ) to create (PK, MSK). PK is sent to A.
Init: After all public parameters are published, the adversary chooses a target y ∈ Y
for the challenge ciphertext, and gives it to the challenger.
Phase 1: The adversary requests a private key for xi ∈ X for i ∈ [1, q1]. For each
xi, the challenger returns SKi created by running KeyGen(xi,MSK,PK).
Challenge: When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for y ∈ Y such that
R(xi, y) = 0 ∀i ∈ [1, q1], and submits equal-length messages M0 and M1, the
challenger randomly selects b from {0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext
CT created by running Encrypt(y,Mb, PK).
Phase 2: This is identical with Phase 1 except the additional restriction that xi ∈ X
for i ∈ [q1 + 1, qt] such that R(xi, y) = 0; ∀i ∈ [q1 + 1, qt].
Guess: The adversary outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b′, then the adversary wins.
We define the advantage of the adversary against a functional encryption FE as
AdvFEA (λ) := |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|.
Definition 2.6 (Selectively Secure Functional Encryption) Selectively secure func-
tional encryption is defined identically to semi-adaptively secure functional encryp-
tion except Init. In selectively secure functional encryption, Init is performed before
Setup. Therefore, the adversary declares its target y ∈ Y before it sees any public
parameters.
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2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Difficulty in Functional Encryption
Functional encryption rooted to identity based encryption [Sha84]. In an identity
based encryption, an arbitrary identity can be used as a public key. Therefore,
in an identity based encryption, there is no public key to allocated to each user.
Identities such as email addresses or staff numbers replace public keys. Although
the concept of identity based encryption was simple and straight-forward, achieving
the adaptive security of identity based encryption in standard model was remained a
difficult problem for a long time. The first identity based encryption in the standard
model was introduced by Boneh and Boyen [BB04b]. Before this work, it requires
a random oracle [BF01] or weaker security model [BB04a, CHK03] such as selective
security.
The selective security model is considered an alternative of adaptive security
model. In the selective security model, the ability of the adversary is limited since
it must declare the target ciphertext before it sees any parameters in the system.
This makes partitioning technique more suitable since the simulator can separate
the target keys before it responds any query for the other keys. In addition, a semi-
adaptive security model is also considered [CW14c, Tak14]. In semi-adaptive model,
the adversary declares the target after it sees public keys but before it queries any
private key.
Although those security models are useful to prove minimum security of the
schemes, more desirable security model for functional encryption is adaptive security
model. In the adaptive security model the adversary collects many secret keys
before and after it sets the target ciphertext which it wants to decrypt and collude
those keys to break the ciphertext as an adversary does in the real world. However,
responding this adaptive adversary is difficult, in particular if the simulator does not
know the target before the adversary declares it, because the traditional techniques
require a separation between keys which are secure from the adversary and the other
keys which are compromised to the adversary. Particularly, although the partitioning
technique is still useful for adaptive security of simple functional encryption such as
identity based encryption [BB04b, Wat05, Gen06] and hierarchical identity based
encryption [GH09], the proving adaptive security become more significantly difficult
if encryption scheme requires a more complicated functions such as identity based
broadcast encryption, predicate encryption and attribute based encryption,
We may consider broadcast encryption as an example. Broadcast encryption
[FN93] and Identity based broadcast encryption [Del07, SF07] are a public key en-
cryption system where a sender encrypts a message for multiple receivers. Intended
receivers share a ciphertext, but they can decrypt it using their own keys. In broad-
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Table 2.1: Summary of Dual System Encryption





















+ Random message Security
q: The total number of key query
cast encryption systems, a small sized ciphertext is important. Otherwise, if the size
of ciphertexts increases linearly with the number of receivers, there is no benefit that
a sender simply uses identity based encryption for each receiver for broadcasting.
The first fully collision resistant broadcast encryption with a short ciphertext
was introduced by Boneh, Gentry and Waters [BGW05], but it is only selectively
secure. Fully collision resistant implies that any users outside the target recipient
cannot decrypt the ciphertext even if all users except the users in the target cipher-
text collude. The adaptive security was achieved by Boneh and Waters [BW06a].
The size of the ciphertext in their system sub-linear to the total number of users in
the system.
For identity based broadcast encryption, the partitioning technique is utilized
for selectively secure identity based encryption [Del07]. Later, Gentry and Waters
[GW09] suggested the first adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption
scheme but still utilized partitioning technique. The size of chiphertexts in their
scheme is only sub-linear to the number of recipients. For sub-linear sized cipher-
text, they first introduced an IBBE scheme which has a linear sized Tag in the
ciphertext but allow exponentially many users in the system. Subsequently, they
suggested a way to achieve sub-linear sized ciphertext by reusing Tag in the original
scheme and increasing the size of other components in a ciphertext from constant to
sublinear. However, there is no partitioning technique which leads adaptively secure
identity based broadcast scheme with a constant sized ciphertext, to the best of our
knowledge.
2.2.2 Dual System Encryption
Waters overcame the limitation of the traditional technique by introducing dual
system encryption [Wat09]. In the dual system encryption, proving security of en-
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cryption schemes is divided multiple relatively easy proofs. The objectives of these
multiple proofs are converting keys and ciphertext in the adaptive security model
to auxiliary types which are called semi-functional keys and semi-functional cipher-
texts. After it converts all keys and the challenge ciphertext to semi-functional
ones, proving security becomes much easier since semi-functional keys cannot de-
crypt semi-functional ciphertexts. We summarize the concept of the dual system
encryption in table 2.1. In dual system encryption, the adaptive security model
denoted as GameReal. If GameReal is indistinguishable from GameFinal, the security
is proved since the message encrypted is replaced to a random message in the fi-
nal game. Therefore, it is proved that the challenge ciphertext does not reveal any
information about the message encrypted.
The critical proof of the dual system encryption is showing the semi-functional
key invariance which is the invariance between Gamek−1 and Gamek in the table. In
the semi-functional key invariance, the kth key is converted from a normal key to a
semi-functional key which cannot decrypt the (semi-functional) challenge ciphertext.
Therefore, it means that the key converted from a valid key to an invalid key for
the semi-functional ciphertext. In this proof, both semi-functional parts of the
challenge key (i.e. the kth key) and the challenge ciphertext are projected from the
normal parts. Therefore, they are strongly correlated each other. Nevertheless, since
the semi-functional parts must hinder the decryption, the correlation of the semi-
functional parts must be hidden to the adversary. Generally, hiding this correlation
is easier than the traditional partitioning proof. In the dual system encryption,
the parameters used in semi-functional parts of the challenge key and the challenge
ciphertext are isolated well from public keys and the other keys. It enables to reduce
the scope of the critical point of the security analysis. In particular, in the semi-
functional space, the relation between the challenge key and the challenge ciphertext
is considered at a time although the traditional technique requires to simulate all
keys and the challenge ciphertext and public key in the analysis.
Therefore, this breakthrough helps to overcome prior difficulty of achieving
adaptively secure functional encryption. For example, Attrapadung and Libert
[AL10] introduced the first IBBE scheme having a constant sized ciphertext using
the dual system encryption. Moreover, the first fully secure expressive ABE scheme
for a boolean function was introduced by Lewko, Okamoto, Sahai, Takashima and
Waters [LOS+10] using the dual system encryption.
2.2.3 Doubly Selective Security
The dual system encryption is very versatile to construct functional encryption
schemes but the relation between the dual system encryption and the traditional
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Table 2.2: Summary of Doubly Selective Security
Security












≈GameNk Nominally Semi-functional (= k)
Normal (> k)
Semi-functional (< k)
≈GameTk Temporary Semi-functional (= k) Semi-functional










(if ≤ q1) Semi-functional Semi-functional
(if > q1) Normal
≈Gameq1+1
(if ≤ q1 + 1) Semi-functional Semi-functional Semi-functional







q1: The number of key queries before the challenge ciphertext query (Phase I)
q: The total number of key queries (Phase I + Phase II)
partitioning technique is not obvious. The dual system encryption also needs some
computational assumptions but this is only used to project normal parts of keys to
semi-functional parts. The core part of the dual system encryption depends only on
information theoretic arguments.
Lewko and Waters [LW12] introduced a new technique which replaced the in-
formation theoretic arguments to computational assumptions as do the partitioning
techniques. This replacement made the dual system encryption even more power-
ful. For example, more desirable attribute based encryption schemes which allowed
multi-use of attributes and a large universe of attributes were introduced using
doubly selective security [Att14a]. Additionally, their technique shows that the
achievements from the traditional partitioning proofs can be utilized in the dual
system encryption. This is a versatile result since there exist a number of functional
encryption schemes of which the selective securities are proved.
We add table 2.2 to summarize the proving sequences of the dual system encryp-
tion with Lewko and Waters’ doubly selective security. There are two more types of
private keys in the table. In Waters’ dual system encryption (table 2.1), private keys
are only either normal or semi-functional. In the doubly selective security, two more
types which are nominally semi-functional keys and temporary semi-functional keys
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are defined for private keys. A nominally semi-functional key has semi-functional
parts, but these parts are correlated with the semi-functional parts of the challenge
ciphertext. Hence, they can decrypt the semi-functional ciphertexts. This is possi-
ble since the semi-functional parts of keys and ciphertexts are projected from their
the normal parts in the dual system encryption. A temporary semi-functional key
work similarly to the semi-functional keys in the original dual system encryption.
They retain some correlation as a nominally semi-functional keys, but it also con-
tains a random parts in the semi-functional parts. Therefore, they cannot decrypt
semi-functional ciphertexts.
The core idea of the doubly selective security is that the invariance between a
nominally semi-functional key and a temporary semi-functional key can be proved
computationally using two selective security proofs. As a realization of their tech-
nique, they provide CP-ABE for multi-use of attributes. In their work, the invariance
between a nominally semi-functional key and a temporary semi-functional key was
proved using the selective KP-ABE proof if the key that the simulator sought for its
type is queried before the challenge ciphertext (i.e. co-selective security). Also, if
the key was queried after the challenge ciphertext (i.e. selective security), the invari-
ance for those two type keys was showed using the selective CP-ABE proof. They
show that utilizing selectively secure KP-ABE to prove the co-selective security of
CP-ABE is possible since the order of information delivered from the adversary to
the simulator is identical in those schemes. In detail, in the co-selective proof of
CP-ABE, a set of attribute for a private key given to the simulator before an ac-
cess structure for challenge ciphertext. This order is exactly identical with that of
KP-ABE.
2.2.4 Techniques for Prime Order Groups
Many functional encryption schemes were initially introduced in composite order
groups. Moreover, compilers of encoding frameworks were also introduced initially
in composite order groups. However, composite order groups require a significant
efficiency loss to functional encryption schemes when they are implemented. Accord-
ing to Guillevic [Gui13], the minimum group orders for prime order and composite
order bilinear group are 256 and 2,644 bits, resp in a 128 bits security level. More-
over, a pairing computation in composite order groups is about 254 times slower
than that of prime order bilinear groups. Therefore, constructing an adaptively se-
cure functional encryption schemes in prime order groups is essential to ensure that
the schemes are adoptable in practice.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces (DPVS) [OT09, OT10] are often used to feature
composite order groups into prime order groups. In DPVS, orthogonal vectors which
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consist of prime order group elements are utilized to realized composite order group
elements. More recently, Lewko and Waters suggest an generic technique in [Lew12]
to transform a construction in composite order groups into prime order groups by
utilizing DPVS. However, DPVS still retains an efficiency loss caused by the size
of vectors. For example, in [Lew12], the size of vector increase linearly to the size
of predicate in a encryption scheme. This implies a significant loss in efficiency.
The disadvantage of DPVS is partially eased by sparse DPVS [OT15, OT11] which
utilizes vectors having many zeros as elements. However, it is not clear how sparse
DPVS can be utilized for generic conversions for functional encryption.
Several techniques [Fre10, HHH+14, Seo12] which convert encryption systems
from composite order groups to prime order groups have also been proposed. Never-
theless, the techniques in [Fre10, HHH+14, Seo12] are not applicable to dual system
encryption since they do not hide the values of parameters used in semi-functional
spaces information theoretically in prime order groups. It means that those tech-
niques are not applicable to encoding frameworks since they are based on the dual
system encryption.
Therefore, in order to construct functional encryption schemes in prime order
groups using encoding frameworks, new compilers [CGW15, Att15, AC16] for en-
codings were introduced. Interestingly, all compilers were introduced using the Dual
System Groups [CW13]. The dual system groups were introduced also to features
composite order groups in prime order groups. They are observed the properties
which make composite order groups be applicable to the dual system encryption.
Then, they defined new domains for groups which satisfies those properties and
showed that the groups elements from newly defined domains can be achievable us-
ing either prime order groups and composite order groups. Since the groups which
are newly defined in the dual system groups must provide more desirable properties
than ordinary bilinear prime order groups, each group elements in these defined
domains consist of multiple prime order group elements. The purpose of the dual
system groups is quite similar to that of the encoding frameworks. However, the dual
system groups focused on the properties of groups to replace composite order groups
to prime order groups. Therefore, it still needs to construct and prove an encryp-
tion scheme using properties which are similar to those of composite order groups.
However, encoding frameworks took a modular approaches. Encoding frameworks
formalize function parts as module (i.e. encodings). Since it has a generic com-
piler to interpret these modules and the security of compiler is already proved, the
frameworks only need a relatively simple requirements for encodings.
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Encodings A compiler Schemes
~kE(x ∈ X , ·), ~cE(y ∈ Y, ·) → Compiler(R,
~kE, ~cE) → Encryption Schemes
R : X × Y → {0, 1} (Denoted by encoding schemes) (ABE, PE, ...)
Figure 2.1: Concept of Encoding frameworks
2.3 Encoding Frameworks
There are specific properties required for the dual system encryption. These re-
quirements result in those functional encryption schemes share common properties,
naturally. For example, functional encryption schemes [LW09, LOS+10] in compos-
ite order groups share linear structures. In particular, private keys and ciphertexts
are linear over their randomization parameters. This common property is essential
to project the semi-functional parts of semi-functional keys from their normal parts
in the dual system encryption.
Encoding frameworks [Att14a, Wee14] were introduced by observing this cou-
pling of functional encryption schemes and formalize the common properties. Two
encoding frameworks the pair encoding framework [Att14a] and the predicate en-
coding framework [Wee14] were introduced, concurrently. Those frameworks enable
a modular approach for functional encryption schemes.
We draw a conceptual figure (Figure 2.1) which explains encoding frameworks.
In the encoding frameworks, the parameters of a functional encryption such as pub-
lic keys, private keys and ciphertexts are presented as encodings and those encod-
ings must meet properties defined in the framework. Then, they provide a generic
compiler of which the security is proved only using the properties of encodings to
interpret those encodings to functional encryption schemes. Therefore, if a new
encoding is shown that the suggested encoding scheme satisfies the properties that
encoding framework requires, the corresponding encryption scheme which is inter-
preted by the compiler is also automatically secure. This means that one can suggest
a new encryption scheme relatively easily by introducing a new encoding scheme.
The security and efficiency of the resulting encryption schemes heir exactly those of
compilers. Therefore, improving security and efficiency of a compiler takes an effect
on the whole resulting encryption schemes without any modification of encodings.
Due to this reason, introducing an improved compiler is important in the encoding
framework.
The predicate encoding framework and the pair encoding framework are almost
identical technically, but only the pair encoding framework includes Lewko and
Waters’ doubly selective security technique. Therefore, we only review one of those
encodings. Syntax and properties of the pair encoding framework [Att14a] will be
described in following subsection.
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2.3.1 Overview of the Pair Encoding Framework
We briefly summarize syntax of pair encodings [Att14a].
For a predicate R : X ×Y → {0, 1}, a pair encoding for R(X ,Y) consists of four
algorithms P(R):= (Param, Encode1, Encode2, Pair).
Param (κ) → n : An index κ is taken as input and an integer n, where n is the
length of common vector ~w shared in Encode1 and Encode2, is output. Hence,
the domain of ~w is defined as W := Znp . Additionally, it sets up domains R
and D to generate the random values and the master key.
Encode1 (α, x, ~w) → ~k(α, x, ~w;~r) : It takes (α, x, ~w) ∈ D×X ×W as input, creates
randomness ~r ∈ R, and outputs the vector ~k(α, x, ~w;~r). We let ki denote the
ith element of ~k(α, x, ~w;~r). ki is a linear combination of monomials of α, rj
and wj′rj, where rj and wj′ are the j
th coordinate of ~r = (r1, ..., rmr) and the
j′th coordinate of ~w = (w1, ..., wn), respectively. That is










where bi, bi,j′,j, bi,j for all i ∈ [1,m1], j′ ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1,mr] are coefficients to
represent the encoding if we set m1 = |~k(α, x, ~w;~r)|.
Encode2 (y, ~w) → ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s) : It takes (y, ~w) ∈ Y × W and randomness s ∈ Zp
and ~s ∈ R as input and outputs the vector ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s). ci which denotes
the ith element of ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s) is defined similarly as a linear combination of
monomials of s, sj, wj′s and wj′sj where sj and wj′ are the j
th coordinate of
~s = (s1, ..., sms) and the j
′th coordinate of ~w = (w1, ..., wn), respectively. That
is














where ai, ai,j′ , ai,j′,j, a
′
i,j for all i ∈ [1,m2], j′ ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1,ms] are coefficients
to represent the encoding if we set m2 = |~c(y, ~w; s, ~s)|.
Pair (x, y) → Mxy: It takes as input predicate x and description y and outputs
reconstruction matrix Mxy.
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Correctness If R(x, y) = 1, Pair outputs an m1 ×m2 reconstruction matrix Mxy,
where m1 = |~k(α, x, ~w;~r)| and m2 = |~c(y, ~w; s, ~s)|, such that





where ki and cj are the i
th coordinate of ~k(α, x, ~w;~r) and the jth coordinate of
~c(y, ~w; s, ~s), respectively.
In the generic construction of the pair encoding framework provided in [Att14a],
the outputs of Encode1 and Encode2 are used for private keys and ciphertexts, re-
spectively. Intuitively, ~k(α, x, ~w;~r) and ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s) are the exponents of private keys
and the ciphertexts in a generic construction; the reconstruction matrix implies that
there is a proper decryption algorithm. The security of the generic construction of
the pair encoding framework was proved only by following properties:
Property 1. (Linearity) For all (α, x, ~w) ∈ D × X ×W ,
~k(α, x, ~w;~r) + ~k(α′, x, ~w;~r′) = ~k(α + α′, x, ~w;~r + ~r′)
where ~r and ~r′ are randomly selected from R. Also, for all (y, ~w) ∈ Y ×W ,
~c(y, ~w; s, ~s) + ~c(y, ~w; s′, ~s′) = ~c(y, ~w; s+ s′, ~s+ ~s′)
when s and s′ are randomly selected from Zp and ~s and ~s′ are randomly selected
from R.
Property 2. (α privacy)a For all (x, y) ∈ X × Y such that R(x, y) = 0, there
exist two polynomially indistinguishable oracles O1AH and O
2




AH : When the oracle is requested to output an initial instance, it randomly create
g from G and ~w ∈ W . Then, it outputs {g}.
When the oracle receives a type k query for x ∈ X , it randomly generates ~r ∈ R.
If the oracle is O1AH , it sets α
′ = 0. If the oracle is O2AH , it sets α
′ as a random value
from Zp. Then, it returns as a type k response g
~k(α′,x, ~w;~r).
When a type c query is received for y ∈ Y , the oracle randomly generates ~s ∈ R
and s ∈ Zp and outputs as a type c response g~c(y,~w;s,~s). It should be noted that the
oracle only responds if R(x, y) = 0 whether type k or type c queries are requested
firstly.
aWe take α privacy from the predicate encoding framework [Wee14], which is a very similar
encoding framework to the pair encoding framework. In pair encoding, this property is defined as
security. Hence, computational security of [Att14a] is identical to computational α privacy in our
terminology. Also, computationally α hiding replaces doubly selective master key hiding of [Att14a].
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Property 3. (Parameter vanishing) There exists some element ~0 ∈ R such
that for all (α, x, ~w) ∈ D × X ×W , ~k(α, x, w;~0) is statistically independent of ~w,
that is, for all ~w′ ∈ W :
~k(α, x, ~w;~0) = ~k(α, x, ~w′;~0).
2.3.2 Computationally α hiding
In the pair encoding framework, α privacy is proved computationally using doubly
selective security. We call this computational α privacy. Doubly selective security
divides computational α privacy into selective α hiding and co-selective α hiding. We
define oracles O1SAH and O
2





selective α hiding. Each oracle returns a group generator as initial instance. Then,
they respond to a type k query by returning an output of Encode1, and a type c query
by returning an output of Encode2 for predicates x and y such that R(x, y) = 0.
O
{1,2}
SAH : When the oracle is requested to output initial instances, it randomly gen-
erates ~w ∈ W and outputs {g}. It only responds if a type c query is made before
a type k query. When a type c query for y ∈ Y is received, the oracle randomly
generates ~s ∈ R and s ∈ Zp and outputs these as a type c response g~c(y,~w;s,~s). When
it receives a type k query for x ∈ X such that R(x, y) = 0, it sets α′ = 0 if the
oracle is O1SAH . Otherwise, if the oracle is O
2
SAH , α
′ is set as a random value from




CAH : When the oracle is requested to output initial instances, it randomly gener-
ates ~w ∈ W and outputs {g}. It only responds if a type k query is made before a type
c query. When it receives a type k query for x ∈ X , the oracle randomly generates
~r ∈ R. If the oracle is O1CAH , it sets α′ = 0. If the oracle is O2CAH , it sets α′ as a
random value from Zp, then, it returns a type k response g
~k(α′,x, ~w;~r). When a type
c query for y ∈ Y is received such that R(x, y) = 0, the oracle randomly generates
~s ∈ R and s ∈ Zp and outputs, as a type c response, g~c(y,~w;s,~s).
Selective α hiding If a type c query is requested before a type k query, the adversary




AdvOSAHA (λ) = |Pr[A(O
1
SAH) = 1]− Pr[A(O2SAH) = 1]|.
Co-selective α hiding If a type k query is requested before a type c query, we
define the advantage of the adversary A to distinguish between O1CAH and O2CAH as
AdvOCAHA (λ). Formally,
AdvOCAHA (λ) = |Pr[A(O
1
CAH) = 1]− Pr[A(O2CAH) = 1]|.
In a doubly selective technique, selective and co-selective α hidings are used to
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Table 2.3: Summary of Our Notations
Notation Equivalent to
g~a (ga1 , ga2)
g~a
~b or g~a·
~b (ga1b1 , ga2b2)
(g(a1,a2))r (g(ra1,ra2)) where r ∈ Zp
e(g, g~a) e(g, ga1)e(g, ga2) or e(g, ga1ga2) = e(g, ga1)e(g, ga2)
prove the invariance of a challenge key of a functional encryption scheme where the
challenge key is the key of which the simulator seeks for the type.
2.4 Notations
We briefly summarize the meaning of our notations. We let ~a = (a1, a2) ∈ Z2p and
~b = (b1, b2) ∈ Z2p. Then, vector exponentiations of group elements imply vector
group elements. For a group element g, g~a equals to (ga1 , ga2). In addition, multipli-
cation of vectors in exponents implies component-wise product of two vectors. For
example, g~a
~b implies (ga1b1 , ga2b2) . Similarly, a scalar exponentiation to a vector of
group elements means a scalar multiplication to a vector in exponent. For example,
(g(a1,a2))r = (g(ra1,ra2)) where r ∈ Zp. Also, a multiplication of vector groups implies
an addition of vectors in their exponents (e.g. g~ag
~b = g~a+
~b). It should be noted that
this multiplication is possible only if |~a| = |~b|. When it comes to a pairing opera-
tion, a pairing with vectors implies multiple pairing computations, that is, e(g, g~a)
requires two pairing computations e(g, ga1)e(g, ga2) where ~a = (a1, a2) ∈ Z2p, but the
same result is achieved only by one pairing since e(g, ga1ga2) = e(g, ga1)e(g, ga2).
Chapter 3
Refined Duality of Pair Encoding
Schemes
In this chapter, we introduce a technique to convert functional encryption of which
adaptive security is proved using doubly selective security [LW12]. Our technique re-
fines the previous conversion technique suggested Attrapadung and Yamada [AY15].
Since our technique does not occur any efficiency loss, our technique improves the
efficiency of the schemes converted by Attrapadung and Yamada’ technique which
requires additional elements for the conversion.
In order to explain our conversion technique, we first introduce a masked form of
functional encryption. This form requires a structural assumption, but this assump-
tion is satisfied by all functional encryption using doubly selective security technique
[Att14a, LW12]. To formalize our technique, we utilize the pair encoding framework
which well describes functional encryptions.
3.1 Attrapaundg and Yamada’s Technique [AY15]
In the generic construction of pair encodings, ~k(α, x, ~w;~r) and ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s) are used
for the key generation algorithm and the encryption, respectively. In a dual scheme,
the structures of ~k(α, x, ~w,~r) and ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s) should be barely changed because the
major change of those algorithms may cause the change of the selective proofs and
assumptions. Nevertheless, because predicates x and y must be switched from the
original scheme, those algorithms are also reversely used in dual scheme. In detail,
the key generation algorithm of the dual scheme is constructed using ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s)
and the encryption algorithm uses ~k(α, x, ~w;~r).
The difficulty of the conversion occurs from this contradiction. Since ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s)
is used for the key generation in a dual scheme, α-privacy of ~k(α, x, ~w;~r) must
be transferred to ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s) without a change of the selective proofs. In [AY15],
26
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Attrapadung and Yamada observed that adding new variables as links transplants
α privacy from ~k(α, x, ~w;~r) to ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s). We let denote those links as φ̃ and s̃ and
α̃ as a new master secret. Then, in their technique, a pair encoding for the dual
scheme consists of
~k′(α̃ + φ̃s,~c(y, ~w; s, ~s)) and ~c ′ = (s̃, ~k(φ̃s̃, x, ~w;~r))
where
~k(α, x, ~w;~r) and ~c(y, ~w; s, ~s)
are the outputs of Encode1 and Encode2 of a pair encoding for the dual scheme.
Then, they show that hiding α̃ is possible by α hiding property of the original
encodings even if α of the original encodings is hiding computationally using doubly
selective security.
3.2 A Masked Form
Functional encryption schemes utilizing doubly selective security shares common
structures which can be represented as ~k(α, x, (φ, ya, ...); (u, t, ...)) = (α + φu +
yat, u, ...) and ~c(y, (φ, ya, ...); s, ~s) = (s, φs, ...). Here, α represents a master secret
and (φ, ya) acts as public parameters to protect α and φ does not appear anywhere
else in the rest of ~k and ~c. Also, (t, u) and s are randomization parameters. Infor-
mally, in the encodings, φ is always isolated from the other elements of the encodings
since it only exists to hide the value of α in α + φu + yat while computational α
privacy is proved. This common internal structure (i.e. the existence of φ) allows us
to propose a generic conversion without adopting additional parameters which was
unavoidable in [AY15]. Because φ is a well isolated parameter even inside ~k, we can
use this existing parameter φ to a link to transfer α privacy from ~k to ~c. Using this
fact, we define a masked form as follows
Definition 3.1. For a pair encoding scheme P(R), if there exists ~dk(φu, x, ~̃h; ~̃r),
~dc(y, ~̃h; s, ~s), φ and u such that
g
~k(0,x,~h;~r) = (gu, g
~dk(φu,x,~̃h;~̃r)) and g~c(y,
~h;s,~s) = (gφs, g
~dc(y,~̃h;s,~s))
where ~h = (φ,~̃h) and ~r = (u, ~̃r), we define ( ~dk, ~dc, φ, ~̃h, u, ~̃r) as a masked form of
P(R).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose there is a mask form ( ~dk, ~dc, φ, ~̃h, u, ~̃r) of a pair encoding
scheme P(R) for x ∈ X , y ∈ Y and R : X × Y → {0, 1}. Then, Dual-P(R)
which consists of ~k′(α′, y, (φ,~̃h);~r′) = (gα
′
gφs, g
~dc(y,~̃h;s,~s)) and ~c′(x, (φ,~̃h);u,~s′) =
(gu, g
~dk(φu,x,~̃h;r̃)) is also a pair encoding scheme with ~r′ = (s, ~s) and ~s′ = ~̃r.
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Proof: Linearity of Dual-P(R) holds trivially since ~dk and ~dc are also elements of ~k
and ~c which have linearity. Also, α′+φs and u which are the exponents of ~k′ and ~c′
are linear over α′, s and u. The parameter vanishing of Dual-P(R) also holds since
all elements of ~dc are linear combinations of monomials his, sj and hisj where sj
and hj are elements of ~s and (φ,~̃h), respectively by the definition of a pair encoding.
The critical part of the proof is showing computational α privacy. It will be proved
by lemmas 3.1. and 3.2. 2
To prove that computational α privacy of Dual-P(R) holds, we will show that






SAH of Dual-P(R). This will be proved
using P(R) which is the dual scheme of Dual-P(R). Since P(R) is a pair encoding
scheme and satisfies computational α privacy, there exist the oracles simulating







those oracles of P(R). Then, we will first show that O1CAH and O
2
CAH of Dual-P(R)
can be simulated using Õ1SAH and Õ
2
SAH of P(R) in lemma 3.1. Similarly, Õ
1
CAH and




SAH of Dual-P(R) in lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose there is PPT adversary A who can distinguish O1CAH and
O2CAH of Dual-P(R) with non-negligible advantage ε. Then, there exists PPT algo-
rithm B who can distinguish Õ1SAH and Õ2SAH of P(R) using A.
Proof: In this simulation, algorithm B will simulate O1CAH and O2CAH of Dual-P(R)
to distinguish between Õ1SAH and Õ
2
SAH of P(R).
When the adversary asks an initial instance, B requests the initial instance to
the oracle that it works with. If it receive {g} from the oracle, it sends the output
to A as an initial response. It should be noted that B works either Õ1SAH or Õ2SAH ,
but it does not know the type of the oracle which it actually works together.
When the adversary asks a type k response for y ∈ Y to the algorithm. To get
g~c(y,
~h;s,~s), B requests the type c response for y to the oracle that it works with. It
sends the output to A.
When the adversary requests a type c response for x ∈ X , it requests a type k
response for x to the oracle it works with to receive g
~k(α,x,~h;~r). It sends the output
to A.
If it works with Õ1SAH , α = 0. It implies that B sends
g
~k(α,x,~h;~r) = (gu, g
~dk(φu,x,~̃h;~̃r)) = g~c
′(x,(φ,~̃h);u,~s′)
to A as the type c response where ~s′ = ~̃r and ~h = (φ,~̃h).
Also, as type k response, it sends to A
g~c(y,
~h;s,~s) = (gφs, g
~dc(y,~̃h;s,~s)) = g
~k′(0,x,(φ,~̃h);~r′)
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where ~r′ = (s, ~s).
If B works with Õ2SAH , then α is a random value. The algorithm implicitly
sets φ′ = φ + α/u. This is possible because φ′ was not needed to be given to A,
deterministically. In details, it implies that the type c response to the A is
g
~k(α,x,~h;~r) = (gu, g
~dk(α+φu,x,~̃h;~̃r)) = (gu, g
~dk(φ′u,x,~̃h;~̃r)) = g~c
′(x,(φ′,~̃h);u,~s′)
where ~s′ = ~̃r.
Also, the type k response implies
g~c(y,










where ~r′ = (s, ~s). These implicitly set α′ = −αs/u. α commonly appears in φ′ and
α′, but the value of α is not revealed since φ is uniquely allocated to φ′. Hence, α′
is also uniformly random.
Therefore, if B works with Õ1SAH , it has properly simulatedO1CAH with a common
vector (φ,~̃h). Also, if B works with Õ2SAH , it has properly simulated O2CAH with a
common vector ~h′ = (φ + α/u, ~̃h). The inconsistency of the common vectors is
acceptable since B responds only once to A for each type of queries and the values
of a common vector are not given explicitly to A. 2
Lemma 3.2. Suppose there is a PPT adversary A who distinguish between O1SAH
and O2SAH of Dual-P(R) with non-negligible advantage ε. Then, there exists a PPT
algorithm B who distinguish between Õ1CAH and Õ2CAH of P(R) using A.
Proof: In this simulation, the algorithm B will simulate O1SAH and O
2
SAH of Dual-
P(R) to distinguish between Õ1CAH and Õ
2
CAH of P(R).
When the adversary asks an initial instance, B requests the initial instance to
the oracle that it works with. If it receive {g} from the oracle, it sends the output
to A as an initial response. It should be noted that B works either Õ1CAH or Õ2CAH ,
but it does not know the type of the oracle which it actually works together.
When the adversary requests a type c response for x ∈ X , it requests a type k
response for x to the oracle it works with to receive g
~k(α,x,~̃h;~̃r). It sends the output
to A.
When the adversary asks a type k response for y ∈ Y to the algorithm. To get
g~c(y,
~̃h;s,~s), B requests the type c response for y to the oracle that it works with. It
sends the output to A.
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of lemma 1. If B works with
Õ1CAH , it has simulated well O
1
SAH with a common vector (φ,
~̃h) where ~h = (φ,~̃h).
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Table 3.1: Comparison between AY’s Conversion and Ours in Composite Order
Groups
Predicates Param. AY [AY15] Ours
Ciphertext Policy Doubly Key (5 + `+
∑`
j=1 fj)|GN | (4 + `+
∑`
j=1 fj)|GN |
Spatial Encryption [Att14a] CT |GT |+ (3 + 2m+
∑m
i=1 di)|GN | |GT |+ (2 + 2m+
∑m
i=1 di)|GN |
CP-ABE Key 7|GN | 6|GN |
with short private keys [Att14a] CT |GT |+ (4 + (T + 3)m)|GN | |GT |+ (3 + (T + 3)m)|GN |
Dual Functional Encryption Key (5 + 2m)|GN | (4 + 2m)|GN |
for Regular Language [Att14a] CT |GT |+ (6 + 3`)|GN | |GT |+ (5 + 3`)|GN |
KP-ABE Key (3 + 2m)|GN | (2 + 2m)|GN |
in a small universe [LW12] CT |GT |+ (4 + `)|GN | |GT |+ (3 + `)|GN |
Unbounded CP-ABE [Att14a]
Key (5 + 2`)|GN | (3 + 2`)|GN |
CT |GT |+ (4 + 3m)|GN | |GT |+ (2 + 3m)|GN |
All works are realized using the generic construction of [Att14a] in composite order groups.
GT , GN are domains of composite order group elements of a order N = p1p2p2 for e : G
2
N → GT
where p1, p2 and p3 are distinct primes.
m and ` are the sizes of a predicate and a description, resp.
T is the maximum number of attributes that a ciphertext can include.
fj and di are the number of columns of affine matrices used in CP-DSE.
Also, if B works with Õ2CAH , it has properly simulated O2SAH with a common vector
(φ + α/u, ~̃h). Therefore, if A distinguishes between O1SAH and O2SAH with non-
negligible advantage ε, then, B can use this output to distinguish between Õ1CAH
and Õ2CAH using it. 2
3.3 Masked Forms of Existing Schemes
In this section, we provide the masked forms of the pair encoding schemes which
are introduced in [Att14a, LW12] to assist the construction of their dual schemes.
The original construction of CP-ABE with small universe is in [LW12]. The other
masked forms are extracted from pair encoding schemes in [Att14a]. Additionally,
we compare the efficiency of the dual schemes which are derived using our masked
forms with previous dual schemes from Attrapadung and Yamada (AY) [AY15]. We
compare those in both composite order groups (table 3.1) and prime order groups
(table 3.2). Our schemes exhibit savings of one element in composite order groups
and three elements in primer order groups in both private keys and ciphertexts,
when the schemes are converted via the compilers in [Att14a] (for composite order
constructions) and [Att15] (for prime order constructions). It should be noted that
names of the masked forms are based on their original schemes (e.g. Unbounded KP-
ABE), but they appear as their dual schemes in table 3.1 and 3.2 (e.g. Unbounded
CP-ABE).
Unbounded KP-ABE [Att14a]
• (φ, u, s, ~̃h) = (η, u, s, (h0, h1, φ1, φ2, φ3))
• ~dk : Let A is an m × ` access matrix. π is a map from each row of A to an
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Table 3.2: Comparison between AY’s Conversion and Ours in Prime Order
Groups
Predicates Param. AY [AY15] Ours
Ciphertext Policy Doubly Key (15 + 3`+ 3
∑`
j=1 fj)|G2| (12 + 3`+ 3
∑`
j=1 fj)|G2|
Spatial Encryption [Att14a] CT |GT |+ (9 + 6m+ 3
∑m
i=1 di)|G1| |GT |+ (6 + 6m+ 3
∑m
i=1 di)|G1|
CP-ABE Key 21|G2| 18|G2|
with short private keys [Att14a] CT |GT |+ (12 + (3T + 9)m)|G1| |GT |+ (9 + (3T + 9)m)|G1|
Dual Functional Encryption Key (15 + 6m)|G2| (12 + 6m)|G2|
for Regular Language [Att14a] CT |GT |+ (18 + 9`)|G1| |GT |+ (15 + 9`)|G1|
KP-ABE Key (9 + 6m)|G2| (6 + 6m)|G2|
in a small universe [LW12] CT |GT |+ (12 + 3`)|G1| |GT |+ (9 + 3`)|G1|
Unbounded CP-ABE [Att14a]
Key (15 + 6`)|G2| (12 + 6`)|G2|
CT |GT |+ (12 + 9m)|G1| |GT |+ (9 + 9m)|G1|
All works are realised using the generic construction of [Att15] in prime order groups.
GT , G1 and G2 are domains of prime order group elements of a prime order p for e : G1 ×G2 → GT .
m and ` are the sizes of a predicate and a description, resp.
T is the maximum number of attributes that a ciphertext can include.
fj and di are the number of columns of affine matrices used in CP-DSE.
attribute π(x), and not necessary to be injective. Then,
~dk(ηu, (A, π), (h0, h1, φ1, φ2, φ3); ~̃r) = (k0, k1, {k2,x, k3,x, k4,x; ;∀x ∈ [1,m]})
where
k0 = α + rφ1, k1 = r,
{k2,x = Ax ~~ ᵀv + rxφ3, k3,x = rx, k4,x = rx(h0 + h1π(x));∀x ∈ [1,m]}.
This implies that ~̃r = (r, r1, ..., rm, v2, ..., vk) and ~v = (rφ2, v2, ..., vk).
• ~dc: Let S = {Atti, ..., Attq}. Then,
~dc(S, (h0, h1, φ1, φ2, φ3); s, ~s) = (c0, c1, c2, {c3,y, c4,y;∀i ∈ [1, q]})
where
c0 = s, c1 = sφ1+wφ2, c2 = w, {c3,y = wφ3+sy(h0+h1 y), c4,y = sy, ;∀i ∈ [1, q]}.
This implies that ~s = (w, s1, ..., sm).
CP-ABE with small universe [LW12]
• (φ, u, s, ~̃h) = (yk, u, s, (ya, a1, ...an))
• ~dk : Let S = {Att1, ..., Attq}. Then,
~dk(yku, S, (ya, a1, .., an); ~̃r) = (k0, k1, {k2,Atti ;∀i ∈ [1, q]})
where
k0 = α + yat, k1 = t, {k2,Atti = aAttit;∀i ∈ [1, q]}.
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This implies ~̃r = t.
• ~dc : Let A is an m× ` access matrix. ρ is a map from Ax, the xth row of A to an
attribute ρ(x) for all x ∈ [1,m], and not necessary to be injective. Then,
~dc((A, ρ), (ya, a1, ..., an); s, ~s) = (c0, {c1,x, c2,x);∀x ∈ [1,m]})
where
c0 = s, {c1,x = yaAx~µ− aρ(x)sx, c2,x = sx;∀x ∈ [1,m]}.
Hence, ~s = (µ2, ..., µ`, s1, ..., sm) and ~µ = (s, µ2, ..., µ`).
KP-DSE [Att14a]
• (φ, u, s, ~̃h) = (η, u, s, (φ1, φ2, φ3,~h′))
• ~dk : For (A;X(1), ..., X(m)) where A ∈ Zm×kp and X(i) ∈ AffM(Zn×dip ). Then,
~dk(ηu, (A;X(1), ..., X(m)), (φ1, φ2, φ3,~h
′); ~̃r) = (k1, k2, {k3,i, k4,i, k5,i;∀i ∈ [1,m]})
where
k1 = α+rφ1, k2 = r, k3,i = Ai~v
>+riφ3, { k4,i = ri, k5,i = ri(~h′X(i));∀i ∈ [1,m]}.
Hence, ~̃r = (r, r1, ..., rm, v2, ..., vk) and ~v = (rφ2, v2, ..., vk).
• ~dc : Let Ω = {Y (1), ..., Y (t)} where Y (j) ∈ AffM(Zn×fjp ). Then,
~dc(Ω, (φ1, φ2, φ3,~h
′); s, ~s) = (c1, c2, c3, {c4,j, c5,j;∀j ∈ [1, t]})
where
c1 = s, c2 = sφ1+wφ2, c3 = w, {c4,j = (wφ3,~0)+sj(~h′Y (j)), c5,j = sj;∀i ∈ [1, q]}
where ~s = (w, {sj; j ∈ [1, `]}).
KP-ABE with short private keys [Att14a]
• (φ, u, s, ~̃h) = (η, u, s, (φ1, φ2, φ3, h0, ..., hT+1)) where T is the maximum number of
attributes which can be included a ciphertext.
• ~dk : Let A is an m× ` LSSS access matrix. π is a map from each row of A to an
attribute π(x), and not necessary to be injective. Then,
~dk(ηu, (A, π), (φ1, φ2, φ3, h0, ..., hT+1); ~̃r) = (k1, k2, {k3,i, k4,i, k5,i; ∀i ∈ [1,m]})
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where
k1 = α + rφ1, k2 = r, {k3,i = Ai~v> + riφ3,
k4,i = ri, k5,i = ri(h0, h2 − h1π(x), ..., hT+1 − h1π(i)T );∀i ∈ [1,m]}
Hence, ~̃r = (r, r1, ..., rm, v2, ..., vk) and ~v = (rφ2, v2, ..., v`).
• ~dc : Let S = {Atti, ..., Attq}. Then,
~dc(S, (φ1, φ2, φ3, h0, ..., hT+1); s, ~s) = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5)
where
c1 = s, c2 = sφ1 +wφ2, c3 = w, c4 = wφ3 + s̃(h0 + h1a0 + ...+ hT+1aT ), c5 = s̃
where ai is an coefficient of z
i in p(x) =
∏
y∈S(z − y). Also, this implies
~s = (w, s̃).
Functional Encryption for Regular Languages [Att14a]
• (φ, u, s, ~̃h) = (φ, u, s, (h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, φ1, φ2))
• ~dk : For the description of any DFA M = (Q,Zp, T , q0, qn−1) where n = |Q|, let
m = |T |, and parse T = {(qxt , qyt , σt)|t ∈ [1,m]}. Then,
~dk(φu,M, (h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, φ1, φ2); ~̃r) = (k1, k2, k3, k4, {k5,t, k6,t, k7,t;∀t ∈ [1,m]})
where
k1 = α + rφ1, k2 = r, k3 = r0, k4 = −u0 + r0h0,
{k5,t = rt, k6,t = uxt + rt(h1 + h2σt), k7,t = −uyt + rt(h3 + h4σt);∀t ∈ [1,m]}.
This implies un−1 := φ2r and ~̃r = (r, r0, ..., rm, {uqx}qx∈Q\{qn−1}).
• ~dc : For w ∈ (Zp)∗, let ` = |w|, and parse w = (w1, ..., w`).
~dc(w, (h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, φ1, φ2); s, ~s = (c1, c2, c3, {c4,i, c5,i; ∀i ∈ [1, `]})
where
c1 = s, c2 = −sφ1 + s`φ2, c3 = s0h0,
{c4,i = si, c5,i = si−1(h1 + h2wi) + si(h3 + h4wi);∀i ∈ [1, `]}.
This implies ~s = (s0, ..., s`).
Chapter 4
Functional Encryption in Prime
order groups
In this chapter, we introduce a new compiler for the pair encoding. The new com-
piler implies a new generic construction of the pair encoding framework. Our new
compiler is in prime order groups and adaptively secure under static assumptions.
Some structure of our new compiler resembles Lewko and Waters’ IBE [LW10], but
it is expanded for complicated functions using nested dual system encryption.
New Schemes in Prime Order Groups. Our compiler shares same encodings
with those of [Att14a, AY15] but the outputs different schemes in prime order groups
(figure 4.1). Therefore, with our construction (i.e. compiler), we realize FE schemes
of [LW12, Att14a, AY15] which were introduced in composite order groups as the
schemes in prime order groups. We provide the list of FE schemes achievable via
our construction in table 4.1. Our construction achieves adaptive security of follow-
ing functional encryption schemes in prime order groups for the first timea. They
include Doubly Spatial Encryption, FE for regular language, KP-ABE with short
ciphertexts, CP-ABE with short keys and unbounded ABE supporting multi-use of
attribute.
Refining the Notation of Pair Encoding. The existing properties of pair en-
codings in [Att14a] are insufficient to construct adaptively secure FE in prime order
groups. Therefore, we additionally define linearity over common parameters as a
new property. To support this property, we refine the notation of the pair encod-
ing framework. In our notation, common parameters are denoted as (1,~h) where
~h is a vector of common parameters of the previous notation of pair encodings. It
should be noted that this additional property does not harm the generality of the
pair encoding framework because by definition, the pair encoding framework already
aWe notice that there is a concurrent work for this claim at present. We shall describe it in
Section 1.2.
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Compiler → Unbounded ABE, FE, ...
(x, y) ∈ X × Y ~kE(x, ·), ↗ [Att14a] in composite order groups
R : X × Y → {0, 1} → ~cE(y, ·) ↘
Our Compiler → Unbounded ABE, FE, ...
in prime order groups
Figure 4.1: Results of Our Compiler
requires a linear structure.
Nested Dual System Encryption. In Waters’ dual system encryption [Wat09],
ciphertexts and private keys have two types which are normal and semi-functional
(SF). Using these types, proving adaptive security of FE is divided into several
relatively easy problems such as proving the invariance between a normal key and
a semi-functional key. Later, Lewko and Waters [LW12] and Attrapadung [Att14a]
separated this key invariance problem more specifically to apply the computational
hiding. They additionally define a Nominally Semi-functional (NSF) key and a
Temporary Semi-functional key (TSF) key and change a key from normal to SF in
sequence of
Normal key
(Step 1)−−−−→ NSF key (computational assump.)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ TSF key (Step 2)−−−−→ SF key.
Then, they reduce the invariance between NSF and TSF to computational as-
sumptions such as q-type assumptions. To apply the computational assumptions,
the semi-functional elements of NSF and TSF keys must be uncorrelated with their
normal elements as well as the other private keys. This independence is achieved
by the Chinese Remainder Theorem in a composite order group. Due to different
primes of composite order, the values in one subgroup do not correlate to those in
another subgroup. Therefore, in steps 1 and 2 in the above transition, multiple
random values are projected to different subgroup without correlation by a single
transition.
We do not use either DPVS or dual system groups which are often used to
feature composite order groups to prime order groups for our construction. Instead,
we divide the transitions of a key (steps 1 and 2) into more steps by each random
value to construct a generic construction for pair encodings in a prime order groups.
We additionally define an NEj key and a TEj key to prove the key invariance. Those
keys are special cases of NSF keys and TSF keys. An NEj key is identical to a
NSF key having (r1, ..., rj, 0, ..., 0) as a random value. That is, the first j random
values are selected randomly, but other random values are being set to 0. A TEj
key is defined similarly to an NEj key, but using a TSF key. Using these types,
we additionally localize each random value within the key and project it as semi-
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CT Key Dual -use









FE for A [Att14a]
√ √
N/A Large Composite



















ABE in LOSTW [LOS+10]
√ √
No Small Composite

























Unbounded ABE implies ABE schemes supporting a large universe of attributes and unbounded
sized policy. No in the column of Multi-use implies that each predicate (e.g. an attribute) can
appear only once in a policy.
functional elements. For example, in step 1, we prove the invariance of NEk−1 key
and NEk to show the invariance of a normal key to a NSF key. Also, we change the
TSF key to SF key using TEj. If we denote mr as the number of random values in
a key, a normal key and a TSF key change to a NSF key and an SF key, resp.
Step 1 : Normal key→ NE1 → ...→ NEmr−1 → NSF key
Step 2 : TSF key→ TEmr−1 → ...→ TE1 → SF key.
Lewko and Waters’ IBE. Since we use the nested dual system encryption, the
key invariance problem can be broken down into simpler problems by each random
value. To solve those simplified problems, we utilize the assumptions in Lewko and
Waters’ IBE [LW10]. Primarily, in their IBE, the technique to provide the key
invariance between a normal key and a semi-functional key is only applicable if FEs
have one random value to randomize their function parts. This works for IBE well
because IBE is one of the simplest form of FE. However, the way of applying their
technique to FEs having more complicated structures (i.e. multiple random values
for function parts and/or computational hiding) is unknown. In our work, since we
successfully simplify the key invariance of pair encodings as we previously described,
we can apply their technique to pair encoding framework. Informally, to prove the
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invariance between NEi key and NEi+1 in our nested model, we consider NEi key
and NEi+1 key as a normal key and an SF key of Lewko and Waters’ IBE scheme.
Except the ith random value, other random values are generated randomly or fixed
as 0, we fit our problem to the semi-functional key invariance of their IBE.
4.1 Our Construction (Compiler)
For a pair encoding P (R, p), a functional encryption FE(P ) comprises four ran-
domized algorithms employing prime order groups G1, G2 and GT of order p. In the
construction, we use the subscripts of group elements to denote the group generators
to be used to generate those elements (e.g. g1, f1 ∈ G1 and g2, f2 ∈ G2).
• Setup(λ)→ PK,MSK : The setup algorithm selects a bilinear group G1, G2, GT
of order p. The algorithm randomly selects g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2. Then, it
runs Param(κ) to derive n where κ is the index allocated to the function R.
It randomly generates α, a, b, yu, yv, h1, .., hn ∈ Zp and sets τ = yv + a · yu and











1 , e(g1, g2)
α}.
It also sets MSK as {g2, gα2 , g
~h
2 , v2 = g
b·yv
2 , u2 = g
b·yu
2 , f2 = g
b
2}.
• Encrypt(M, y, PK) → CTy : The encryption algorithm randomly chooses (s, ~s)
∈ Zp ×Rs and runs Enc2 to get ~c(y, (1,~h); s, ~s)b. It sets the ciphertext as
C = M · e(g1, g2)αs, ~C0 = g~c(y,(1,
~h);s,~s)
1 , ~C1 = g
a·~c(y,(1,~h);s,~s)
1 , ~C2 = g
τ ·~c(y,(1,~h);s,~s)
1 .
• KeyGen(x,MSK,PK) → SKx : The key generation algorithm chooses a ran-
dom vector ~r ∈ Rr and runs Enc1 to get ~k(α, x, (1,~h);~r)c . Then, it randomly












• Decrypt(PK, x, y, SKx, CTy) → M If R(x, y) = 1, the algorithm computes a
reconstruction matrix Mxy such that ~k(α, x, (1,~h);~r)Mxy~c(y, (1,~h);~s)= αs by
bThe algorithm only knows the values of x and ~r. Therefore, ~c(y, (1,~h); s,~s) is a multivariate
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Pair. It computes
e(g1, g2)




Finally, the message can be recovered as C/e(g1, g2)
αs.
Correctness We letA1 := e(~C0, ( ~K0)
Mxy), A2 := e(~C1, ( ~K1)
Mxy) andA3 := e(~C2, ( ~K2)
Mxy).
Then, we can calculate























αs · e(g1, g2)byv~zMxy~c(y,(1,
~h);s,~s)

















Therefore, the correctness of decryption algorithm holds since
e(g1, g2)
α·s = A1 · A2 · A3.
4.2 Security Analysis
We prove adaptive security of our construction in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. (Informal) For all pair encodings P (R, p) where R is a function and
p is a prime. our construction FE(P ) is adaptive secure.
Proof: Theorem 4.1 is proved by Lemmas 4.1 to 4.3. 2
To prove adaptive security of our construction, we define several types of keys
and ciphertexts, which are only used in security analysis. In following definitions,
( ~K ′0, ~K
′
1,
~K ′2) and (C
′, ~C ′0,
~C ′1,
~C ′2) denote a normal key for x ∈ X and a ciphertext
for y ∈ Y which are generated using KeyGen and Encrypt.
Semi-functional (SF) Ciphertext The algorithm randomly selects (~h′, s′, ~s′) ∈
H × Zp ×Rs. It sets f1 = gb1. For a predicate y ∈ Y , it outputs a semi-functional
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CT as











Semi-functional (SF) Key The algorithm randomly selects α ∈ Zp. For a









2 , ~K2 = ~K
′
2.
Ej Ciphertext The algorithm creates a normal ciphertext {C, ~C ′0, ~C ′1, ~C ′2} and se-
lects s′ ∈ Zp. If j = 0, the algorithm set ~s′0 = ~0. Otherwise, the algorithm randomly
selects s′1, ..., s
′
j from Zp and it sets ~s′j = (s′1, ..., s′j, 0, ..0) and f1 = gb1. It outputs the
Ej ciphertext as
C = C, ~C0 = ~C
′








It should be noted that Ems ciphertext is identical to the semi-functional ciphertext
by definitions if we write Rs = Zmsp .




~K ′2) using KeyGen. Then
it randomly selects r′1, ..., r
′
j from Zp and sets ~r′j = (r′1, ..., r′j, 0, ..0) ∈ Rr. Finally, it









2 , ~K2 = ~K
′
2.
An NE0 key is identical to a normal key since ~k(0, x, (1,~h
′); (0, ..., 0)) = ~0 by the
definition of pair encodings. Additionally, we call NEmr key as a Nominally Semi-
functional (NSF) Key if we write Rr = Zmrp .




~K ′2) using KeyGen.














2 , ~K2 = ~K
′
2.
A TE0 key is identical to an SF key since ~k(α
′, x, (1,~h′);~0)= ~k(α′, x, (0,~0);~0)
by parameter vanishing. Additionally, we call TEmr key as a Temporary Semi-
functional (TSF) Key where ~0 = (0, ..., 0).
All NEj key including an NSF key can decrypt both normal and semi-functional
ciphertexts by sharing ~h′ in semi-functional elements with semi-functional cipher-
texts. However, TEj keys only decrypt normal ciphertexts. If they decrypt semi-
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functional ciphertexts, e(f1, f2)
α′s prevents the decryption even if they share ~h′ with
semi-functional ciphertexts.
We define security games consisting of different types of keys and ciphertexts.
We will prove that all games are indistinguishable through our analysis.
GameReal This game is identical with the adaptive security model. All keys and the
challenge ciphertext are normal in this game.
GameNi This game is identical with GameReal except the types of the first i keys and
the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the first i − 1 keys and the challenge
ciphertext are semi-functional and the ith key is an NSF key.
GameTi This game is identical with Game
N
i except the type of the i
th key. In this
game, the ith key is a TSF key.
Gamei This game is identical with Game
T
i except the type of the k
th key. In this
game, the ith key is semi-functional.
GameFinal This game is identical with Gameqt except the message encrypted in the
challenge ciphertext where qt is a total number of queries from the adversary.
In this game, the message encrypted is replaced a random.
4.2.1 Semi-functional Ciphertext Invariance
First, to prove the invariance between GameReal and Game0 (i.e. semi-functional
ciphertext invariance), we additionally define GameReal,j;∀j ∈ [0,ms] using Ej ci-
phertext if we write Rs = Zmsp .
GameReal,j This game is identical with GameReal except the type of the challenge
ciphertext. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is Ej. It should be noted that
GameReal,ms is identical with Game0 since a Ems ciphertext is identical with a semi-
functional ciphertext by the definitions.
We first show that GameReal and GameReal,0 are invariant in lemma 4.1.1. Then,
in lemma 4.1.2, it is proved that GameReal,i−1 and GameReal,i is indistinguishable for
all i ∈ [1,ms]. We provide table 4.2 to summarize these processes.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary who distinguishes GameReal
and Game0 with a non-negligible advantage ε, then an algorithm which breaks As-
sumption 1 (LW1) can be built with the advantage ε using the adversary.
Proof: This lemma is proved by lemmas 4.1.1. and 4.1.2. 2
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Table 4.2: Summary of Semi-Functional Ciphertext Invariance
Exponents of semi-functional Type of the
Games Remarks
elements of the chanllenge CT for y challenge CT
~c(y, (1, h′); 0, (0, ..., 0)) Normal GameReal GameReal ≈GameReal,0
~c(y, (1, h′); s′ , (0, ..., 0)) E0 GameReal,0 by lemma 4.1.1
~c(y, (1, h′); s′, ( s′1 , 0, 0, ..., 0)) E1 GameReal,1 GameReal,i ≈
... ... ... GameReal,i+1






ms )) NSF (=Ems) Game0
∗ by lemma 4.1.2
∗:Game0 is equal to GameReal,ms by the definitions.
Lemma 4.1.1. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A who distinguishes GameReal
and GameReal,0 with a non-negligible advantage ε, then an algorithm which breaks
Assumption 1 (LW1) can be built with the advantage ε using A.
Proof: In this proof, we will show that the hardness to distinguish GameReal and
GameReal,0 is reduced to LW1 assumption. Therefore, using the given instance from
LW1


















1 , T ∈ G1, f2, f c2 ∈ G2},
B will simulate GameReal and GameReal,0 depending on the value of T using A to
break the assumption.












































2 = f2, v2 = f
c
2 , u2 = f
yu
2 .
The values of ~h are set implicitly since the simulator does not know the value of c2.




































Phase I and II: B randomly selects ~z′ ∈ Zmkp and ~r ∈ Rr wheremk = |~k(α, x, (1,~h′);~r)|.
Then, it implicitly sets
~z = ~z′ − ~k(αc, x, (c, c · ~h′);~r).
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~z is randomly distributed due to ~z′. To create normal keys, B sets
~K0 = f
~k(αyg ,x,(yg ,~h′′);~r)













Using f c2 , ~K0, ~K1 and ~K2 can be calculated. ~K0 is properly distributed since
~K0 = f
~k(αyg ,x,(yg ,~h′′);~r)


















The equalities (4.1) and (4.2) hold because of linearity over common parameters.
Challenge: When the adversary asks the challenge ciphertext with messages M0 and
M1. B randomly chooses β from {0, 1} and ~s from Rs and sets s = d. The value of
d does not used anywhere else. Therefore, this setting is hidden to the adversary.
The algorithm calculates the challenge ciphertexts as follows:







































1 are given. If T = f
ac2d
1 , the challenge
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The equalities (4.4) and (4.6) hold due to linearity over common parameters.
Also, the equalities of (4.3) and (4.5) hold due to linearity over random values.




1 , then f
~c(y,(1,~h′);γ,~0)
1 is multiplied










Therefore, ~C1 is either a normal ciphertext or an E0 ciphertext depending on the
value of T . Therefore, if T = fac
2d
1 , the algorithm has properly simulated GameReal.
Otherwise, it has simulated GameReal,0. 2
In lemma 4.1.2, we will show that the invariance of GameReal,0 and Game0.
Game0 is identical with GameReal,ms because Ems ciphertext is identical with a semi-
functional ciphertext by the definitions if we write Rs = Zmsp . Therefore, we can
show the invariance of two games by showing GameReal,i−1 and Gamei for all i ∈
[1,ms].
Lemma 4.1.2. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A who distinguishes GameReal,k−1
and Gamek with a non-negligible advantage ε, then an algorithm B which breaks As-
sumption 1 (LW1) can be built with the advantage ε using A.
Proof: Using the given instances from LW1 assumption, B will simulate GameReal,k−1
and GameReal,k depending on the value of T using A who breaks the assumption with
non-negligible advantage.
Setup and Phase I and II are simulated identically to those of lemma 4.1.1.
Challenge: When the adversary asks the challenge ciphertext with messages M0 and
M1. B randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1} and s, s1, ..., sk−1, sk+1, ...sms , s′, s′1, ..., s′k−1 ∈ Zp.






k−1, 0, ..., 0). The value
of d has never been revealed. Therefore, ~s is uniformly random to the adversary. It
calculates the challenge ciphertext as




































1 where ~1k is a vector of which only the k
th coordinate is 1 and
all other coordinates are 0. It should be noted that ~s−d·~1k is equal to (s1, ..., sk−1, 0,
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sk+1, ..., sms). Hence, it does not have d as an coordinate. Therefore, ~C0 and ~C1 can









are given in the instance.
If T = fac
2d































1 . Then, f
~c(y,(1,~h′);0,γ·~1k)






















k−1, γ, 0, ...0).
If T = fac
2d
1 , the type of the challenge ciphertext is Ek−1 and the algorithm has
properly simulated GameReal,k−1. Otherwise, the type is Ek and GameReal,k has been
simulated. 2
4.2.2 Semi-functional Key Invariance
To prove the invariance between Gamei−1 and Gamei, we define the security games
GameNi,j and Game
T
i,j for j ∈ [0,mr] using NEj and TEj keys.
GameNi,j This game is identical with Game
N
i,j−1 except the types of the i
th key. In
this game, the ith key is an NEj key.
GameTi,j This game is identical with Game
T
i except the types of the i
th key. In this
game, the ith key is a TEj key.
It should be noted that GameNi,0 and Game
N
i,mr are identical to Gamei−1 and
GameNi resp. by the definitions of keys. Also, due to the same reason, Game
T
i,0 is
equal to Gamei and Game
T
i,mr is equal to Game
T
i . To prove this invariance, the type
of the ith key changes as table . The invariance between GameNi,j−1 and Game
N
i,j)
are proved in lemma 4.2.1. Also, the invariance between GameNi and Game
T
i key
is proved by lemmas 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 using computational α hiding. Finally, the
invariance between GameTi,j and Game
T
i,j−1 is showed in lemma 4.2.4.
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Table 4.3: Summary of Semi-functional Key Invariance
Exponents of semi-functional Type of
Games Remarks
elements of the ith key for x the ith key










~k(0, x, (1, h′); (r′1, r
′





... ... ... by lemma 4.2.1

































~k(α′, x, (1, h′) ; (r′1, ..., r
′





... ... ... by lemma 4.2.4





∗ : α′ is projected by computational α hiding in lemmas 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
Lemma 4.2. (Semi-functional Key Invariance) Suppose there exists a PPT
adversary who distinguishes Gamek−1 and Gamek with a non-negligible advantage ε,
then an algorithm which breaks Assumption 2 (LW2) or computational α hiding can
be built with the advantage ε using the adversary.
Proof: This lemma is proved by lemmas 4.2.1. to 4.2.4. 2
Lemma 4.2.1. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A who distinguishes GameNk,j−1
and GameNk,j with a non-negligible advantage ε, then an algorithm B which breaks As-
sumption 2 (LW2) can be built with the advantage ε using A.








1 ∈ G1, f2, f c2 , fd2 , fw2 , T ∈
G2}, B will simulate either GameNk,j−1 or GameNk,j using A to break LW2 assumption.






















2 , u2 = f
w
2 , f2. This sets
































~h′′ , e(g1, g2)




Phase I and II: The algorithm knows all MSK. Therefore, it can create the normal
keys for (> k). For the first k − 1 key (< k), B first generates a normal key. Then,
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it randomly selects α′ from D and creates an SF key. This is possible since B knows
a, α′, x and f2.
For the kth key, it randomly selects ~z′ from Zmkp where mk = |~k| and sets
~z = ~z′ + ~k(0, x, (1,~h′), c · ~1j) where ~1j is a vector of which only the jth coordinate
is 1 and all other coordinates are 0. Then, it randomly chooses ~r′′ from Rr and
sets ~r = ~r′′ − c · ~1j. ~z and ~r are randomly distributed because of ~z′ and ~r′′. It also
generates r′1, ..., r
′


































If T = f cw2 , then this is a properly distributed NEj−1 key by linearities over
common parameters and random values. Otherwise, if T is a random and we let
f cw+γ2 denote T , this is the properly distributed NEj key since this implicitly sets
~r′j = ~r
′
j−1 + γ · ~1j. It is worth noting that ~r′j is uniformly random because γ is
randomly distributed.
Challenge: When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext with two message
M0 and M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. Then, it randomly selects s′′, s̃ ∈ Zp
and ~s′′, ~̃s ∈ Rs. Then, it implicitly sets s = wts̃ + s′′, s′ = −d2ts̃, ~s′ = wt~̃s + ~s′′
and ~s′ = −d2t~̃s. Because of s′′, s̃, ~̃s and ~s′′, they are randomly distributed. B sets
C = Mβ · e(fdwt1 , fd2 )αs̃e(fd1 , fd2 )αs
′′





























This is the properly distributed challenge ciphertext (see the analysis following).
Analysis of equations:
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This implicitly sets ~r = ~r′′ − c · ~1j and ~z = ~z′ + ~k(0, x, (1,~h′); c · ~1j). The second
equality (4.7) in above equation holds by the linearity of random values because
(fd2 )










The third equality (4.8) holds because of the definition of ~r (= ~r′′ − c · ~1j) and






















If T is random in lemma 4.2.1. and we let fwc+γ2 denote it, This is properly dis-
tributed NEj since (f
γ
2 )
−a~k(0,x,(1,~h′);·~1j) is multiplied to ~K1. By linearity over random
values, this implicitly sets ~r′j = ~r
′
j−1 + γ ·~1j. ~r′j is still randomly distributed since γ
is a random value.
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The equalities of (4.11) and (4.14) hold by linearity of common parameters.
Also, those of (4.12) and (4.13) hold by linearity of random values. The equalities


























It is worth noting that all equality above holds by linearity of random values. The
last equalities in ~C0 ~C1 and ~C2 holds because of s
′ = −d2ts̃, ~s′ = −d2t~̃s and the
definitions of public parameters. s̃ and ~̃s are randomly distributed to the adversary.
They are also appear in s = wts̃+ s′′, ~s = wts̃+~s′′, but their values are not revealed
because of s′′ and ~s′′. 2
Lemma 4.2.2. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary who distinguishes GameNk and
GameTk with a non-negligible advantage ε for k ≤ q1 where q1 is the number of key
queries in Phase I, then an algorithm which breaks co-selective α hiding can be built
with the advantage ε using the adversary.
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Proof: Since k ≤ q1, a type k query is queried before the type c query, since the kth
key is requested in advance of the challenge ciphertext. Hence, B breaks co-selective
α hiding (i.e. B distinguishes whether the oracle it works with is O1CAH and O2CAH .)
using the adversary A who distinguishes between GameNk and GameTk .
Setup: B makes an initial query to the oracle it works with. The oracle replies
{f1, f2}. Then, B randomly selects α ∈ D, yg, a, b, yu, yv, h1, .., hn ∈ Zp and set
τ = yv + a · yu, ~h = (h1, .., hn), b = y−1g , g1 = f
yg
1 and g2 = f
yg
2 . It publishes










1 , e(g1, g2)
α}. It sets MSK as {g2, gα2 , g
~h
2 , v2 =
f yv2 , u2 = f
yu
2 , f2}.
Phase I and II: For the first k-1 keys, B generates a normal key ( ~K ′0, ~K ′1, ~K ′2) using









2 , ~K2 = ~K
′
2. For the rest of keys
except the kth key (> k), the algorithm responds to the key queries by sending a
normal key. This is possible since B knows all PK and MSK.
When the adversary requests the kth key, the algorithm creates a normal key
( ~K ′0, ~K
′
1,
~K ′2) and requests a type k response to the oracle it works with. We let
f
~k(α′′,x,(1,~h′);~r′)
2 denote the response from the oracle. B does not know whether α′′ is










2 , ~K2 = ~K
′
2.
Finally, it sends the key to the adversary. It is worth noting that kth key is
queried only in phase I since k ≤ q1. Therefore, if α′′ = 0, the oracle which B works
with is O1CAH . If α
′′ is a random, it works with O2CAH .
Challenge: When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext with two message
M0 and M1, the algorithm randomly selects β from {0, 1}, the algorithm first creates
a normal ciphertext (C ′, ~C ′0, ~C
′
1,
~C ′2). Then, it requests a type c response to the oracle
it works with. We let f
~c(y,(1,~h′);s′,~s′)
1 denote the response from the oracle. It sends to
the adversary














Lemma 4.2.3. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary who distinguishes GameNk
and GameTk with a non-negligible advantage ε for k > q1 where q1 is the number of
key queries in Phase I, then an algorithm which breaks selective α hiding can be built
with the advantage ε using the adversary.
Proof: This proof is almost identical with lemma 4.2.2. except the type of the
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oracle the algorithm works with and the kth key is simulated in phase II (k > q1). In
this proof, B works with either O1SAH or O2SAH depending on the value of α′′ since
it queries a type c in advance of a type k. 2
Lemma 4.2.4. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary who distinguishes GameTk and
Gamek with a non-negligible advantage ε, then an algorithm which breaks Assumption
2 (LW2) can be built with the advantage ε using the adversary.
Proof: This proof is identical with the proof of lemma 4.2.1 except the kth key.
For the kth key, it randomly selects α′ ∈ D and ~z′ ∈ Zmkp and sets ~z = ~z′ +
~k(α′, x, (1,~h′), c · ~1j). Then, it chooses ~r′′ from Rr and sets ~r = ~r′′ − c · ~1j. ~z and ~r
are randomly distributed because of ~z′ and ~r′′. It also generates r′1, ..., r
′
j−1 from Zp






































If T = f cw2 , this is the properly distributed TEj−1 key. Therefore, B has well
simulated GameTk,j−1. If T is random and we let f
cw+γ
2 denote T , This is the properly




j−1+γ ·~1j. Due to γ, ~r′j is properly
distributed. Hence, B has simulated GameTk,j. 2
4.2.3 Semi-functional Security
We prove the semi-functional security by showing that Gameqt and GameFinal are
indistinguishable.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary who distinguishes Gameqt and
GameFinal with a non-negligible advantage ε, then an algorithm which breaks As-
sumption 3 (LW3) can be built with the advantage ε using the adversary.
Proof: Using a given instance {f1, fa1 , f c1 , fd1 ∈ G1, f2, fa2 , f c2 , fd2 ∈ G2, T ∈ GT}, B
will simulate either Gameqt or GameFinal depending on the value of T .
Setup: B randomly selects yg, yu, yv ∈ Zp,~h ∈ Znp and sets α = ac, a = a,
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It also sets gα2 = f
acyg





yg~h, v2 = f
yv
2 , u2 = f
yu
2 , f2. It should be noted
that gα2 sets implicitly since f
ac
2 is not given. The other elements can be cacluated
since f2 is given.
Phase I and II: B randomly selects α′′ ∈ D, ~z ∈ Zmkp and ~r ∈ Rs and sets















2 , ~K2 = f
−~z′
2
















The equality of (4.17) holds due to linearity of random values. Also, (4.18) holds by
parameter vanishing.
Challenge: When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertexts with two mes-
sages M0 and M1. B randomly selects β ∈ {0, 1}, s′′ ∈ Zp, ~s, ~s′′ ∈ Rs and ~h′′ ∈ Znp
and sets s = d, s′ = −ygad + as′′ and ~s′ = a · ~s′′. d appears both in s and s′.
However, s′ does not reveal the value of d because of s′′. Therefore, setting s = d is
hidden to the adversary. It calculates the challenge ciphertexts as follows:







































The equalities of (4.19) and (4.20) holds by linearity of random values. The equality
of (4.21) holds because of linearity of common parameters. It should be noted that
~h′′ does not appear anywhere else, it only used in the challenge ciphertext. Therefore,
due to ~h′′, ~h′ is randomly distributed. If T is e(f1, f2)
acd, this has simulated Gameqt
properly. Otherwise, if T is a random, a randomness will be added to M . Therefore,
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this has simulated GameFinal. 2
Chapter 5
Tag Based Encoding
In this chapter, we introduce a new encoding framework which is a tag based encod-
ing. Tag based encoding provides functional encryption schemes which are adap-
tively secure under the standard decisional linear Assumption (DLIN). Compared
with other encoding frameworks, it improves efficiency of resulting schemes when
the sizes of predicates used in the schemes are large.
Tag based encoding. We introduce a tag based encoding. For a function R
which takes as inputs X and Y and outputs a binary (R : X × Y → {0, 1}), there
are two algorithms ~kE and ~cE with common values ~h ∈ Z`p where ` is a value
allocated for each function R and p is a prime. We let ~kE(x,~h) and ~cE(y,~h) denote
the outputs of ~kE taking as inputs x ∈ X and ~h and ~cE taking as inputs y ∈ Y
and ~h, resp. The tag based encoding must satisfy three essential properties, namely
Reconstruction, Linearity and ~h-hiding. Instances of our encoding are interpreted
as FE schemes via our constructions. These constructions are often called compilers
since they compile encodings to form FE schemes (Fig 5.1).
Efficiency improvement Prior to our work, the most efficient compiler in prime
order groups was suggested by CGW [CGW15]. It was suggested for the predicate
encoding [Wee14]. Multiple compilers under the generalized k-linear assumption
[EHK+13] were included in CGW’s frameworks. The number of group elements that
a compiler in CGW’s framework uses to represent a tuple of an encoding scheme
depends on assumptions the compiler is from. In detail, each tuple of an encoding
Predicates Encodings Constuction Schemes
Setup
(x, y) ∈ X × Y →
~kE(x, ·) → KeyGen → FE
R : X × Y → {0, 1} ~cE(y, ·) Encryption (IBE, HIBE, ...)
Decryption
Figure 5.1: Encoding Frameworks for FE
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Table 5.1: Efficiency Comparison between Our Compiler and CGW’s
Assump. PK SK CT
CGW SXDH 2(`+1)|G1| + |GT | 2(mk+1)|G2| 2(mc+1)|G1|+ |GT |
[CGW15] DLIN 6(`+1)|G1| + 2|GT | 3(mk+1)|G2| 3(mc+1)|G1|+ |GT |
Ours DLIN (`+ 11)|G1| + |GT | (mk+7)|G2| + mk|Zp|
(mc+8)|G1|
+mc|Zp|+ |GT |
Assump. PK (by bits) SK (by bits) CT (by bits) Decryption
CGW SXDH 3584 + 512 ` 1024 + 1024 mk 3584 + 512 mc 4P + 2 ` E
[CGW15] DLIN 7680 + 1536 ` 1536 + 1536 mk 3840 + 768 mc 6P + 3 ` E
Ours DLIN 5888 + 256 ` 3584+ 768 mk 5120 + 512mc 8P+ ` E
`: the size of predicates, mk and mc: the size of encoding schemes used for keys and ciphertexts,
Bits are calculated based on 128 bits security level [Gui13]
(|G1| = |Zp| = 256 bits, |G2| = 512 bits, |GT | = 3072 bits)
scheme is represented by k+1 group elements in private keys and ciphertexts. Also,
in public keys, k(k+ 1) elements are required for each predicate. The most efficient
compiler is under the SXDH assumption (i.e. when k equals to 1). Two group
elements are used for a tuple of encoding schemes in this compiler. Other encod-
ings [Att15, AC16] were also suggested, independently, but they are similar with
CGW’s framework from an efficiency perspective. Therefore, we mainly compare
our compiler with CGW’s compilers to highlight our contribution.
In our compiler, one group element represents each predicate in pubic keys.
If the size of a predicate is large, our compiler reduces the size of public key to
50 percent compared with CGW’s compiler. Also, it reduces decryption time by
50 percent when the decryption process under the same condition. For the other
parameters such as private keys and ciphertexts, our compiler needs a group element
and an integer for one tuple of an encoding scheme. Because the size of an integer
is as small as the size of a group element of G1 but much less than that of G2 due
to embedding degree of asymmetric bilinear maps, our compiler reduces the size of
either private keys or ciphertexts depending on where G2 is used for. For example,
in 128 bits security level, G2 requires at least 512 bits. It is twice of the size of Zp
[Gui13]. It means that only 768 bits are required to represent a tuple in our compiler.
This outperforms CGW’s compiler which requires 1024 bits for a tuple. Therefore,
our compiler saves the size of private keys or ciphertexts by 25 percent compared to
their compiler under the SXDH assumption when the size of an encoding is large.
Moreover, CGW’s framework is also realized under the weaker assumption,
DLIN, as our compilera. Also, 6 group elements are required for public keys. It
implies that our compiler more outperforms their compiler. In comparison with
aThe DLIN assumption with asymmetric bilinear maps can be featured in various forms since
it expanded from the DLIN assumption originally equipped with symmetric paring. The DLIN
assumption of CGW’s compiler has a slightly different from our assumption. In particular, it has
two less group elements in G2.
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Table 5.2: Efficiency Comparison of IPE Schemes Based on Encodings
Scheme Assumption PK SK CT Decryption
Wee [Wee14] SDs `|GN | +|GN,T | 2|GN | (`+ 1)|GN | + |GN,T | 2P + `E
CGW [CGW15] SXDH (2`+ 4)|G1| +|GT | 4|G2| 2(`+ 1)|G1|+ |GT | 4P + 2`E
DLIN (6`+ 8)|G1| +2|GT | 6|G2| 3(`+ 1)|G1|+ |GT | 6P + 3`E
Ours DLIN (11 + `)|G1| +|GT | 8|G2|+ |Zp|
(7 + `)|G1| + 8P + `E
(`− 1)|Zp|+ |GT |
`: the size of a predicate vector, P : Pairing computation, E: Exponentiation over a group element,
|GN | and |GN,T |: the size of group elements of a composite order N ,
|G1|, |G2| and |GT |: the sizes of group elements of order p of e : G1 ×G2 → GT
Table 5.3: Efficiency Comparison of PA-IPE Schemes Based on Encodings
Scheme Assumption PK SK CT Decryption
CGW [CGW15] SXDH (2`+ 4)|G1| +|GT | (2`+ 4)|G2| 4|G1|+ |GT | 4P + 2`E
DLIN (6`+ 8)|G1| +2|GT | (3`+ 6)|G2| 6|G1|+ |GT | 6P + 3`E
Ours, AL [AL12] DLIN (11 + `)|G1| +|GT |
(6 + `)|G2| 9|G1|+ |Zp|+ |GT | 8P + `E+(`− 1)|Zp|
`: the size of a predicate vector, P : Pairing computation, E: Exponentiation over a group element,
|G1|, |G2| and GT : the sizes of group elements of order p of e : G1 ×G2 → GT
their compiler under the same assumption with a 128 bits security level, our com-
piler saves 83 percent in a public key, 50 percent in private keys, 33 percent in
ciphertexts and 66 percent in decryption time if the size of encoding is large. We
provide table 1 for the details.
To compare the efficiency in practice, we compare our inner product encryption
with short keys and public attribute inner product encryption to those of other
encodings. The instance of Public Attribute Inner Product Encryption (PAIPE)
is taken from [AL12] but it also explained as tag based encodings. It should be
noted that encodings for our IPE schemes are slightly different from those of CGW
[CGW15] and Wee [Wee14]. Our instances require one or two less elements.
A compiler with symmetric bilinear maps. We additionally provide a new
compiler with symmetric bilinear maps. Prior to our work, with symmetric bilinear
maps, all encodings [Att14a, Wee14, CGW15] are secure only in composite order
groups. It is because all prior encodings [CGW15, Att15, AC16] in prime order
groups are based on dual system groups [CW13] which require asymmetric parings
to feature different properties of left-hand groups and right-hand groups in pairings.
To the best of our knowledge, our construction is the only compiler that provides
adaptive security for encodings with symmetric pairings in prime order groups. This
gives our framework an additional flexibility when the encryption scheme is imple-
mented under a special requirement of the pairing type.
Efficiency Improvement under Static Assumptions. We additionally provide
a compiler which improves the efficiency of our compiler with asymmetric bilinear
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maps. This compiler reduces the size of parameters by constant amounts. As a
result, it reduces 7 elements in public parameters, 4 elements of secret keys and
ciphertexts from the previous compiler. As a compensation of efficiency improve-
ments, this compiler requires non-standard assumptions, but those assumptions are
still simple and static.
New schemes. We introduce a number of new schemes as instances. Inner
Product Encryption with short keys, Dual Spatial Encryption with short keys and
Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption with short ciphertexts are newly introduced.
Particularly, dual spatial encryption is a new primitive. It is a symmetric conver-
sion of a spatial encryption [Ham11]. Therefore, an affine space and an affine vector
are taken to generate ciphertexts and keys, respectively. Moreover, we describe as
encodings a number of existing schemes such as IBE [Wat09], (Public Attribute) In-
ner Product Encryption [AL12], Spatial Encryption and Doubly Spatial Encryption
[CZF12] to show the versatility of our framework.
5.1 Complexity Assumptions
We expand both the DLIN and the DBDH into asymmetric bilinear maps. We use
subscripts to denote the type of groups. For example, g1 denotes a generator of G1,
and g2 denotes a generator of G2.
(Asymmetric) Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption
Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
G = (p,G1, G2, GT , e)
R←− G, g1
R←− G1, g2
R←− G2, c1, c2, c3
R←− Zp




1 ∈ G1, g2, gc12 , gc22 ∈ G2)
T0 = e(g1, g2)
c1c2c3 , T1
R←− GT
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking (Asymmetric) DBDH to be:
AdvADBDHG,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
(Asymmetric) Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumption Given a group genera-
tor G, we define the following distribution:
G = (p,G1, G2, GT , e)
R←− G, g1
R←− G1, g2
R←− G2, yf , yν , c1, c2
R←− Zp




1 ∈ G1, g2, f2, ν2 ∈ G2)
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where f1 = g
yf
1 , ν1 = g
yν
1 , f2 = g
yf







We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking (Asymmetric) DLIN to be:
AdvADLING,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
It should be noted that (Asymmetric) DBDH assumption also reduced to (Asym-
metric) DLIN assumption.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists an algorithm A which breaking (Asym-
metric) DBDH with non-negligible advantage ε. Then, we can build an algorithm B
which breaks (Asymmetric) DLIN assumption with advantage ε.
Proof: B takes {g1, f1, ν1, gc11 , f c21 , T, g2, f2, ν2} as an instance from (Asymmetric)
DLIN assumption. B will simulate (Asymmetric) DBDH from the instance using A
who breaks (Asymmetric) DLIN assumption with non-negligible advantage.
If the adversary requests a instance of (Asymmetric) DBDH
{g̃1, g̃c̃21 , g̃c̃31 , g̃2, g̃c̃12 , g̃c̃22 , T̃}
to break (Asymmetric) DLIN, the algorithm sets
g̃1 = g1, g̃
c̃2
1 = f1, g̃
c̃3
1 = g1
c̃1 , g̃2 = g2, g̃
c̃1
2 = ν2, g̃
c̃2
2 = f2, T̃ = e(T, f2)/e(f
c2
1 , ν2).
This implicitly sets c̃1 = yν , c̃2 = yf and c̃3 = c1 where yν and yf are the discrete
logarithms of ν1 and f1 to the base g1 modulo p, respectively. If T is ν
c1+c2
1 , then
T̃ = e(T, f2)/e(f
c2
1 , ν2) = e(ν1, f2)
c1 = e(g̃c̃11 , g̃
c̃2
2 )
c̃3 = e(g̃1, g̃2)
c̃1c̃2c̃3 . Otherwise, if T
is a random element from G1, T̃ is randomized by T .
2
Simple LW2 Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
G = (p,G1, G2, GT , e)
R←− G, f1
R←− G1, f2
R←− G2, a, c, d, z
R←− Zp











We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Simple LW2 to be:
AdvSimpleLW2G,A (λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]|
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The generic security of Simple LW2 holds trivially since we only remove tuples
in instances of the original LW2 assumption [LW10]. We emphasize that Simple
LW2 assumption is still simple and static although it is not a standard assumption.
5.2 Tag based encoding
For a predicate R : X × Y → {0, 1} and ` which is an integer allocated for a
predicate R (e.g. the size of a universe of attributes in ABE, the dimension of
an affine space in spatial encryption), tag based encoding TE(R) consists of two
deterministic algorithms ( ~kE, ~cE) where ~kE(x,~h) takes as inputs x ∈ X and ~h ∈ Z`p,
and ~cE(y,~h′) also takes as inputs y ∈ Y and ~h′ ∈ Z`p. We let `k and `c denote
| ~kE(x,~h)| and | ~cE(y,~h′)|, resp.
Property 1. (Reconstruction) For all (x, y) such that R(x, y) = 1, there exists
an efficient algorithm to compute non-zero vectors ~mx ∈ Z`kp and ~my ∈ Z`cp such that
~mx ~kE(x,~h) = ~my ~cE(y,~h), ∀~h ∈ Z`p.
Property 2. (Linearity) For all (x, y,~h′,~h′′) ∈ X × Y × Z`p × Z`p,
~kE(x,~h′) + ~kE(x,~h′′) = ~kE(x,~h′ + ~h′′) and ~cE(y,~h′) + ~cE(y,~h′′) = ~cE(y,~h′ + ~h′′).
Property 3. (~h-hiding) For all (x, y) ∈ X × Y such that R(x, y) = 0 and for all
~h,~h′ ∈ Z`p, following two joint distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
(x, y, ~kE(x,~h), ~cE(y,~h)) and (x, y, ~kE(x,~h), ~cE(y,~h′))
Remark 5.1. Reconstruction is necessary for the correctness of our construction. In
our construction, ~kE(x,~h) and ~cE(y,~h) cancel each other out. Hence, the property
implies that there exists an efficient algorithm to make both tuples identical.
Remark 5.2. Linearity of ~kE(x,~h) and ~cE(x,~h) implies that ~kE and ~cE are linear
functions over ~h when x and y are given. Therefore, g
~kE(x,~h) and g
~cE(y,~h) can be
efficiently computed from g
~h if x and y are given.
An example of tag based encodings. We provide a simple IBE scheme as an
instance of our encoding. This encoding results in an adaptively secure IBE scheme
via our compiler introduced in the next section.
Let X = Y := Zp. For all ID ∈ X and ID′ ∈ Y , R(ID, ID′) = 1 iff ID = ID′.
• ~kE(ID, (yu, yh)) := (yuID + yh) ∈ Zp where ~h = (yu, yh) ∈ Z2p
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• ~cE(ID′, (yu, yh)) := (yuID′ + yh) ∈ Zp
• Reconstruction: This is an exact cancellation. Therefore, ~mx = ~my = 1.








h + ỹuID + ỹh
= ~kE(ID, (y′u + ỹu, y
′
h + ỹh)).
The linearity of ~cE(ID′, (y′u, y
′




• h-hiding: yuID+yh and yuID′+yh are pair-wise independent sinceR(ID, ID′) =
0 (i.e. ID 6= ID′). Therefore, it is not distinguishable from y′uID′ + y′h where
(y′u, y
′
v) is randomly selected from Z2p.
5.3 Our Compiler
Our compiler is quite similar to those of Waters’ IBE [Wat09]. To be more precise,
the main differences between Waters’ IBE and ours are the way of generating Tags
in KeyGen and Encrypt; and the type of bilinear maps with which the scheme is
equipped. In particular, tags in our construction have structures although tags of
Waters’ IBE are created randomly.
5.3.1 The Construction
For a tag based encoding TE for a predicate R where R : X × Y → {0, 1}, with `
which is an integer to associated with R, FEA(TE) is constructed by four algorithms
following:
• Setup(λ): The algorithm randomly generates three groups G1, G2 and GT from
G(λ, p). Next, it generates g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 and exponents α, yu, yv, y′v, yw,
a1, a2, b, h1, . . ., h` ∈ Zp. Let τ1 = gyu+a1·yv1 , τ ′1 = g
yu+a2·y′v
1 and
~h = (h1, ..., h`).























1 , e(g1, g2)
α·a1·b)






2, u2 = g
yu










• Keygen(MSK, PK, x): The algorithm chooses randomly r1, r2, z1, z2, h′1, ..., h′` ∈
Zp and sets r = r1 + r2 and ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h′) where ~h′ equals to (h′1, ..., h′`).
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2 , D3 = (g
b
2)











r2 , D7 = g
r1






It sets SK = (D1, ..., D7, ~K, ~Tagk).
• Encrypt(PK, M , y): The algorithm selects s1, s2, t, h′′1, ..., h′′` ∈ Zp and set s =
s1 + s2, and ~Tagc = ~cE(y,~h
′′) where ~h′′ equals to (h′′1, ..., h
′′
` ). It creates the
ciphertext, CT as follows
C = M ·(e(g1, g2)αa1·b)s2 , C1 = (gb1)s, C2 = (g
b·a1
1 )
s1 , C3 = (g
a1
1 )

















)s2w−t1 , C8 = g
t






It sets CT = (C,C1, ..., C8, ~E, ~Tagc).
• Decrypt(SK, CT , PK): First, the algorithm calculates
A1 = e(C1, D1)e(C2, D2)e(C3, D3)e(C4, D4)e(C5, D5), A2 = e(C6, D6)e(C7, D7).
Since R(x, y) = 1, there exist reconstruction vectors ~mx and ~my such that
~mx ~kE(x,~h) = ~my ~cE(y,~h). If ~mx ~Tagk − ~my ~Tagc is 0, it aborts. Otherwise,
A3 = e(C8, ~K
~mx)/e( ~E ~my , D7) = e(g1, g2)
ywr1t(~mx ~Tagk−~my ~Tagc).
Therefore, M = C · A2/(A1 · A1/(~mx
~Tagk−~my ~Tagc)
3 ).
Correctness. Calculating A1/A2 is trivial and can be found in [Wat09]. We
only point out that A1/A2 = e(g1, g2)
αa1·bs2e(g1, w2)
−r1t. For ~mx and ~my such that
~mx ~kE(x,~h) = ~my ~cE(y,~h), the correctness of A3 is calculated as follows
A3 = e(C8, ~K



















Therefore, M = C · A2/(A1 · A1/(~mx
~Tagk−~my ~Tagc)
3 ).
Remark 5.3. Alternatively, to reduce the number of pairing computations, we set
~m′x = ~mx/(~mx ~Tagk − ~my ~Tagc) and ~m′y = ~my/(~mx ~Tagk − ~my ~Tagc).
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Then, the decryption can be done by calculating
A′1 := e(C1, D1)e(C2, D2)e(C3, D3)e(C4, D4)e(C5, D5)/e(C6, D6),
A′2 := e(C8, ~K
~m′x/a1)/e( ~̃E,D7).
where ~̃E := (C7, ~E
~m′y). Finally, M is retrieved since M = C/(A′1 · A′2).
Theorem 5.1. (Informal) Suppose there exists a tag based encoding TE, then our
FEA(TE) is adaptively secure under the (Asymmetric) DLIN assumption.
Proof: This is proved by lemmas 5.1 to 5.3. 2
5.3.2 Security Analysis
Semi-functional Ciphertext. By running Encrypt algorithm for a message M
and an input y, the algorithm generates a normal ciphertext






Then, it randomly selects κ ∈ Zp and sets
C = C ′, C1 = C
′
1, C2 = C
′
2, C3 = C
′



















a2bκ, C8 = C
′
8, ~E = ~E
′, ~Tagc = ~Tag
′
c.
Semi-functional Key. By running Keygen algorithm for an input x, the algo-
rithm generates a normal key















2 , D3 = D
′







5, D6 = D
′
6, D7 = D
′
7,
~K = ~K ′, ~Tagk = ~Tag
′
k.
It should be noted that e(g1, g2)
a1a2bκγ will be added to the message to be encrypted
if the semi-functional key is used to decrypt the semi-functional ciphertext.
Security Games
Gamereal: This game is a real game. It is identical with the adaptive security model.
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Gamei: This game is identical with Gamereal except the challenge ciphertext and
the first i keys. In this game, the challenge ciphertext and the first i keys are
semi-functional.
Gamefinal: This game is identical with Gameqt except the challenge ciphertext where
qt is the total number of key queries. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is
still semi-functional, but it is an encryption on a random message.
First, we prove that Gamereal and Game0 are indistinguishable (semi-functional
ciphertext invariance) in lemma 5.1. Then, we show that Gamek−1 is also indistin-
guishable from Gamek (semi-functional key invariance) in lemma 5.2. Finally, in
lemma 5.3, we prove the invariance between Gameqt and Gamefinal (semi-functional
security).
Lemma 5.1. (Semi-functional Ciphertext Invariance) Suppose that there
exists an algorithm A which distinguishes Gamereal and Game0 with non-negligible
advantage ε. Then, we can build an algorithm B which breaks (Asymmetric) DLIN
assumption with advantage ε.
Proof: Firstly, B takes an {g1, f1, ν1, gc11 , f c21 , T, g2, f2, ν2} as an instance from (Asym-
metric) DLIN assumption. Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gamereal
or Game0 to take an advantage from A which can distinguish both games with
non-negligible advantage ε.
Setup The algorithm, B, chooses exponents α, b, yu, yv, y′v, yw, h1, ...h` randomly






1 . Then, it publishes public
parameters as:
PK := {g1, gb1, g
a1
1 = f1, g
a2
































αba1 = e(g1, f2)
αb}.
This implicitly sets a1 = yf and a2 = yν where yf and yν are the discrete
logarithms of ν1 and f1 to the base g1 modulo p, respectively. It sets MSK :=






2, u2 = g
yu










2 , ..., g
h`
2 }.
Phase I and II Because B knows the public parameters and the master secret
key, it can generate normal keys using Keygen.
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for
y∗ with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. B runs the encryption







Mβ. We denote the random exponents of CT
′ as s′1, s
′
2, t
′. Then it sets the challenge
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ciphertext as:
C = C ′ · (e(gc11 , f2) · e(g1, f c22 ))b·α, C1 = C ′1 · (g
c1
1 )













b, C5 = C
′
5 · T, C6 = C ′6 · (g
c1
1 )








yu · (f c21 )−yv · T y
′
v)b, C8 = C
′
8,
~E = ~E ′, ~Tagc = ~Tag
′
c.
This implicitly sets s1 = −c2 +s′1, s2 = s′2 +c1 +c2 and s = s1 +s2 = c1 +s′1 +s′2.
If T = νc1+c21 , the challenge ciphertext is a normal ciphertext, and Gamereal has
been simulated properly. Otherwise, if T is a random, and is denoted as νc1+c21 ν
κ
1 ,
this is a properly distributed semi-functional key, and Game0 has been simulated
properly.
2
We present the semi-functional key invariance of our construction similar to
that of Waters’ IBE, but using encodings. In Waters’ IBE, tags are used to hide
the type of the challenge key (i.e. the kth key in lemma 5.2). If the simulator try
to distinguish the type of this key by generating a valid semi-functional ciphertext
to be decrypted only if the key is normal, tags hinder the simulator’s trial. To do
this, tags in a ciphertext and a private key are correlated but this correlation is
information theoretically hidden to the adversary. It means that tags remain ran-
domly distributed to the adversary. Our framework basically follows this strategy.
However, in our framework, tags have structures. Tags are constructed by the en-
codings ~kE and ~cE and take random values instead of public parameters. To prove
semi-functional key invariance, the random values as inputs of tags in both the chal-
lenge key and the challenge ciphertext must be identical because those tags must
restrict the simulator’s ability. At the same time, sharing random values also must
be hidden to the adversary to hide the correlation caused by sharing random values.
In lemma 5.2, we will show that these requirements are satisfied by ~h-hiding and
linearity properties.
Lemma 5.2. (Semi-functional Key Invariance) Suppose that there exists an
algorithm A which distinguishes Gamek−1 and Gamek with a non-negligible advantage
ε. Then, we can build an algorithm B which breaks (Asymmetric) DLIN assumption
with ε.
Proof: G1 and G2 of (Asymmetric) DLIN are reversed. Therefore, B takes an
{g1, f1, ν1, g2, f2, ν2, gc12 , f c22 , T} as an instance from (Asymmetric) DLIN assumption.
Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gamek−1 or Gamek to take an advantage
from A which can distinguish. It should be noted that T is in G2 in the reversed
assumption.
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Setup Algorithm B chooses exponents α, a1, a2, yv, y′v, yw, h′1, ...h′`, h̃1, ...h̃`, randomly
from Zp. Then, it sets
g1 = g1, g
b





















1 , τ1 = uv




















1 , e(g1, g2)
α·a1b = e(f1, g2)
α·a1 .








1 ;∀i ∈ [1, `]}.





















1 , e(g1, g2)
α·a1·b)




2 = f2, u2 = ν
−a1a2

















2 ;∀i ∈ [1, `]}}.
In the setting, ~h is implicitly set by ~̃h − yf~h′ where ~h′ = (h′1, ...h′`) and ~̃h =
(h̃1, ...h̃`) if we write f1 = g
yf
1 . B calculates g
~h because it knows g1, f1, ~̃h,~h
′. It
should be noted that the values of {h′i;∀i ∈ [1, `]} are not revealed. It means that
they are initially information theoretically hidden because, for all i ∈ [1, `], h̃i is
uniquely added where h′i appears.
Phase I and II For the first k− 1 semi-functional keys, B generates a normal key
and selects γ randomly from Zp. It then adds semi-functional parts to the normal
key . This is possible because B knows a1, a2 and MSK. Similarly, for the rest
keys except kth key (i > k), B can generate normal keys using the key generation
algorithm, KeyGen, for the same reason.
For the kth key, B sets ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h′). Then, with ~Tag
′
k, it generates a
normal key SK ′ = (D′1, ..., D
′
7,
~K ′, ~Tagk) using the key generation algorithm. Then,































2 ), ~K = ~K
′(gc12 )
~kE(x,~̃h+yw~h′), ~Tagk.






2 denote the random exponents of SK
′. Then, it implicitly
sets z1 = z
′














Therefore, the value of ~K ′ can be represented as follows:
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If T equals to νc1+c22 , then the k
th key is a normal key with r1 = r
′
1 + c1 and
r2 = r
′




2 , which means a random group element,
then, the kth key is a properly distributed semi-functional key.
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext
for y∗ with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. With ~Tagc =
~cE(y∗,~h′), B runs the encryption algorithm to generate a normal ciphertext CT ′ =
(C ′, C ′1, ..., C
′
8, ~E
′, ~Tagc) for y





′ denote the random expo-
nents of CT ′. To make the semi-functional challenge ciphertext, it randomly selects









1 , C6 = C
′
6 · v′1











1 , ~E = ~E








1 . It should be noted that ν1
a1a2bκ of v′1
a2bκ is
cancelled out by w−t1 in C7. The fact that ~Tagc and ~Tagk share the same vector
~h′
is hidden to the adversary by h-hiding property since R(x, y∗) = 0. Also, ~E is valid
since













The second equality of the above equation holds by linearity property.
B cannot test whether the kth key is normal or semi-functional by creating a
ciphertext which can be decrypted only by a normal key because ~Tagk and ~Tagc
share ~h′. It means that ~mx ~Tagk − ~my∗ ~Tagc equals to 0 if the simulator creates a
semi-functional ciphertext such that R(x, y) = 1. Hence, the decryption algorithm
will abort. 2
Lemma 5.3. (Semi-functional Security) Suppose that there exists an algorithm
A which distinguishes Gameqt and Gamefinal with non-negligible advantage ε. Then,
we can build an algorithm B which breaks (Asymmetric) DBDH assumption with
advantage ε.
Proof: B takes an {g1, gc21 , gc31 , T, g2, gc12 , gc22 } as an instance from (Asymmetric)
DBDH assumption. Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gameqt or Gamefinal
to take an advantage from A which can distinguish both games.
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It implicitly sets u1 = g
yu , v1 = g
yv , v′1 = g
y′v , α = c1 · c2, a2 = c2. It should be noted
that MSK cannot be explicitly calculated because B does not know gα1 .
Phase I and II For semi-functional keys, if the adversary requests a private key for
x, it randomly generates r1, r2, z1, z2, γ
′, h′1, ..., h
′
` from Zp and sets ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h′)
where ~h′ = (h′1, .., h
′









2 , D3 = (g
b
2)













−z2 , D6 = g
r2·b
2 , D7 = g
r1






where ~h = (h1, .., h`). This implicitly sets γ = c1 + γ
′ and r = r1 + r2.
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for
y∗ with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. Then it generates




` from Zp and sets ~Tagc = ~cE(y∗,~h′′) where ~h′′ =
(h′′1, ...h
′′
` ). It, then, creates the challenge ciphertext as follows:
C = MβT





b, C2 = g
b·a1·s1
1 , C3 = g
a1·s1


























This implicitly sets s2 = c3 and κ = κ
′ − c3.
If T = e(g1, g2)
c1c2c3 , this has properly simulated Gameqt . Otherwise, if T is ran-
dom, a random value is added into Mβ. Hence, it has properly simulated Gamefinal.
2
5.4 Our Compiler with Symmetric Bilinear Maps
5.4.1 The Construction
For a tag based encoding TE for a predicate R where R : X × Y → {0, 1}, with `
which is an integer to associated with R, FE(TE) is constructed by four algorithms
following:
• Setup(λ): The algorithm randomly generates two groups G and GT from G(λ, p).
Next, it generates g, v, v1, v2, w ∈ G and exponents α, a1, a2, b, h1, . . ., h` ∈ Zp.
Let τ1 = vv
a1
1 , τ2 = vv
a2
2 and
~h = (h1, ..., h`). It publishes the public parameters
PK as follows




2 , w, g
~h, e(g, g)α·a1·b)
CHAPTER 5. TAG BASED ENCODING 67
The MSK consists of (gα, gα·a1 , v, v1, v2).
• Keygen(MSK, PK, x): The algorithm chooses randomly r1, r2, z1, z2, h′1, ..., h′` ∈
Zp and sets r = r1 + r2 and ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h′) where ~h′ equals to (h′1, ..., h′`).
Then, it creates SK as follows
D1 = g
α·a1vr, D2 = g
−αvr1g
z1 , D3 = (g
b)−z1 , D4 = v
r
2g
z2 , D5 = (g
b)−z2 ,
D6 = g
r2·b, D7 = g
r1 , ~K = (g
~kE(x,~h)w
~Tagk)r1 .
It sets SK = (D1, ..., D7, ~K, ~Tagk).
• Encrypt(PK, M , y): The algorithm selects s1, s2, t, h′′1, ..., h′′` ∈ Zp and set s =
s1 + s2, and ~Tagc = ~cE(y,~h
′′) where ~h′′ equals to (h′′1, ..., h
′′
` ). It creates the
ciphertext, CT as follows
C = M ·(e(g, g)αa1·b)s2 , C1 = (gb)s, C2 = (gb·a1)s1 , C3 = (ga1)s1 , C4 = (gb·a2)s2 ,
C5 = (g








s2w−t, C8 = g
t, ~E = (g
~cE(y,~h)w
~Tagc)t
It sets CT = (C,C1, ..., C8, ~E, ~Tagc).
• Decrypt(SK, CT , PK): First, the algorithm calculates
A1 = e(C1, D1)e(C2, D2)e(C3, D3)e(C4, D4)e(C5, D5), A2 = e(C6, D6)e(C7, D7).
Since R(x, y) = 1, there exist reconstruction vectors ~mx and ~my such that
~mx ~kE(x,~h) = ~my ~cE(y,~h). If ~mx ~Tagk − ~my ~Tagc is 0, it aborts. Otherwise,
A3 = e(C8, ~K
~mx)/e( ~E ~my , D7) = e(g, w)
r1t·(~mx ~Tagk−~my ~Tagc).
Therefore, M = C · A2/(A1 · A1/(~mx
~Tagk−~my ~Tagc)
3 ).
The correctness of our construction is almost identical with that of the con-
struction with asymmetric pairing in the previous section. It should be noted that
the number of pairing computations of this construction also can be reduced as the
construction with asymmetric pairing does.
Theorem 5.2. (Informal) Suppose there exists Tag based Encoding TE, then our
FE(TE) is adaptively secure under DLIN assumption.
Proof: This is proved by lemmas 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. 2
CHAPTER 5. TAG BASED ENCODING 68
5.4.2 Security Analysis
Semi-functional Ciphertext. By running Encrypt algorithm for a message M
and an input y, the algorithm generates a normal ciphertext






Then, it randomly selects κ ∈ Zp and sets
C = C ′, C1 = C
′
1, C2 = C
′
2, C3 = C
′















2 , C8 = C
′
8, ~E = ~E
′, ~Tagc = ~Tag
′
c.
Semi-functional Key. By running Keygen algorithm for an input x, the algo-
rithm generates a normal key










−a1a2γ, D2 = D
′
2g
a2γ, D3 = D
′






5, D6 = D
′
6, D7 = D
′
7, ~K = ~K
′, ~Tagk = ~Tag
′
k.
It should be noted that e(g, g)a1a2bκγ will be added to the message to be encrypted
if the semi-functional key is used for decrypting the semi-functional ciphertext.
Security Games The definitions of security games and the strategy to prove adap-
tive security are identical with those of the compiler in symmetric paring.
Lemma 5.4. (Semi-functional Ciphertext Invariance) Suppose that there
exists an algorithm A which distinguishes Gamereal and Game0 with non-negligible
advantage ε. Then, we can build an algorithm B which breaks DLIN assumption
with advantage ε.
Proof: Firstly, B takes an {g, f, ν, gc1 , f c2 , T} as an instance from DLIN assumption.
Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gamereal or Game0 to take an advantage
from A which can distinguish both games with non-negligible advantage ε.
Setup Algorithm B chooses exponents α, b, yv, yv1 , yv2 , yw, h1, ...h` randomly from
Zp and group elements w, g. Then, it publishes public parameters as:
PK := {g, gb, ga1 = f, ga2 = ν, gb·a1 = f b, gb·a2 = νb, w = gyw , gh1 , ..., gh` ,
τ1 = g
yvf yv1 , τ2 = g
yvνyv2 , τ b1 , τ
b
2 , e(g, g)
αba1 = e(g, f)αb}
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it implies that v = gyv , v1 = g
yv1 , v2 = g
yv2 . It sets MSK := {gα, gα·a1 = fα}.
Phase I and II Because B knows the public parameters and the master secret
key, it can generate normal keys using Keygen.
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for
y∗ with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. B runs the encryption







Mβ. We denote the random exponents of CT
′ as s′1, s
′
2, t
′. Then it sets the challenge
CT as:




b, C5 = C
′
5 · T, C6 = C ′6 · (gc1)yv · (f c2)−yv1 · T yv2 ,
C7 = C
′
7 · ((gc1)yv · (f c2)−yv1 · T yv2 )b, C8 = C ′8, ~E = ~E ′, ~Tagc = ~Tag
′
c.
This implicitly sets s1 = −c2 +s′1, s2 = s′2 +c1 +c2 and s = s1 +s2 = c1 +s′1 +s′2.
If T = νc1+c2 , the challenge ciphertext is a normal ciphertext, and Gamereal has
been simulated properly. Otherwise, if T is a random, and is denoted as νc1+c2νκ,
this is a properly distributed semi-functional key, and Game0 has been simulated
properly.
2
Lemma 5.5. (Semi-functional Key Invariance) Suppose that there exists an
algorithm A which distinguishes Gamek−1 and Gamek with a non-negligible advantage
ε. Then, we can build an algorithm B which breaks DLIN assumption with ε.
Proof: Firstly, B takes an {g, f, ν, gc1 , f c2 , T} as an instance from DLIN assumption.
Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gamek−1 or Gamek to take an advantage
from A which can distinguish between both games with non-negligible advantage.
Setup Algorithm B chooses exponents α, a1, a2, yv1 , yv2 , yw, h′1, ...h′`, h̃1, ...h̃`, ran-
domly from Zp. Then, it sets
g = g, gb = f, gb·a1 = fa1 , gb·a2 = fa2 , v = ν−a1a2 , v1 = ν




yv1a1 , τ2 = vv
a2
1 = g
yv2a2 , τ b1 = f
yv1a1 , τ b2 = f
yv2a2 ,
w = fgyw , ghi = f−h
′
igh̃i∀i ∈ [1, `], e(g, g)α·a1b = e(f, g)α·a1 .
It publishes the public parameters following




2 , w, g
~h, e(g, g)α·a1·b)
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~̃h = (h̃1, ...h̃`) if we write f = g
yf . Because B does not know yf , it
cannot calculate the values of ~h, but it calculates g
~h because it knows g, f, ~̃h,~h′.
It should be noted that the values of {h′i;∀i ∈ [1, `]} are not revealed initially. It
means that they are initially information theoretically hidden because, for all i, h̃i
is uniquely added where h′i appears. B knows all MSK = (gα, gα·a1 , v, v1, v2) since
it knows α and a1.
Phase I and II For the first k− 1 semi-functional keys, B generates a normal key
and selects γ randomly from Zp. It then adds semi-functional parts to the normal
key . This is possible because B knows all public parameters and MSK. Similarly,
for the rest keys except kth key (i > k), B can generate normal keys using the key
generation algorithm, KeyGen, as the same reasons.
For the kth key, B sets ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h′). Then, with ~Tag
′
k, it generates a
normal key SK ′ = (D′1, ..., D
′
7,
~K ′, ~Tagk) using the key generation algorithm. Then,




−a1a2 , D2 = D
′
2T
a2(gc1)yv1 , D3 = D
′
3(f







c2)yv2 , D6 = D
′
6f
c2 , D7 = D
′
7(g
c1), ~K = ~K ′(gc1)
~kE(x,~̃h+yw~h′), ~Tagk.






2 denote the random exponents of SK
′. Then, it implicitly
sets z1 = z
′








Therefore, the value of ~K ′ can be represented as follows:














If T equals to νc1+c2 , then the kth key is a normal key with r1 = r
′
1 + c1 and
r2 = r
′
2 + c2. Otherwise, if T is ν
c1+c2gγ, which means a random group element,
then, the kth key is a properly distributed semi-functional key.
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext
for y∗ with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. With ~Tagc =
~cE(y∗,~h′), B runs the encryption algorithm to generate a normal ciphertext CT ′ =
(C ′, C ′1, ..., C
′
8, ~E
′, ~Tagc) for y





′ denote the random expo-
nents of CT ′. To make the semi-functional challenge ciphertext, it randomly selects
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a2·κ, C5 = C
′
5 · ga2·κ, C6 = C ′6 · v
a2κ
2 , C7 = C
′
7 · f yv2 ·κ·a2ν−a1·κ·yw·a2
C8 = g
t′ · νa1a2κ, ~E = ~E ′ · (ν ~cE(y∗,~̃h+yw~h′))a1a2κ, ~Tagc
This implicitly sets gt = gt
′ · νa1a2κ. It should be noted that νa1a2bκ of va2bκ2 is
cancelled out by w−t in C7. The fact that ~Tagc in the challenge ciphertext and
~Tagk in the k
th key share the same vector ~h′ is hidden to the adversary by h-hiding
property since R(x, y∗) = 0. Also, ~E is a valid ciphertext elements since









The second equality of the above equation holds by linearity property.
In the simulation, B cannot test whether the kth key is normal or semi-functional
by generating a ciphertext which can be decrypted only by a normal key because
~Tagk and ~Tagc must share ~h
′. In our simulation, ~mx ~Tagk − ~my∗ ~Tagc = 0 if the
simulator generates a valid semi-functional ciphertext such that R(x, y) = 1. Hence,
the decryption algorithm will abort. 2
Lemma 5.6. (Semi-functional Security) Suppose that there exists an algorithm
A which distinguishes Gameqt and Gamefinal with non-negligible advantage ε. Then,
we can build an algorithm B which breaks DBDH assumption with advantage ε.
Proof: First, B takes an {g, gc1 , gc2 , gc3 , T} as an instance from DLIN assumption.
Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gameqt or Gamefinal to take an ad-
vantage from A which can distinguish both games with non-negligible advantage
ε.
Setup B chooses exponents b, a1, yv, yv1 , yv2 , yw, h1, ...h`, randomly from Zp, and sets
g = g, gb, ga1 , ga2 = gc2 , gb·a1 , gb·a2 = (gc2)b, w = gyw , {ghi ; ∀i ∈ [1, `]}
τ1 = g
yv+yv1a1 , τ2 = g
yv(gc2)yv2 , τ b1 , τ
b
2 , e(g, g)
α·a1b = e(gc1 , gc2)ba1 .
It implicitly sets v = gyv , v1 = g
yv1 , v2 = g
yv2 , α = c1 · c2, a2 = c2. It should be noted
that MSK cannot be explicitly calculated because B does not know gα.
Phase I and II For semi-functional keys, if the adversary requests a private key for
x, it randomly generates r1, r2, z1, z2, γ
′, h′1, ..., h
′
` from Zp and sets ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h′)
where ~h′ = (h′1, .., h
′
`). It, then, creates semi-functional key as follows:
D1 = (g
c2)−γ




z1 , D3 = (g
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D5 = (g
b)−z2 , D6 = g
r2·b, D7 = g
r1 , ~K = (g
~kE(x,~h)w
~Tagk)r1 , ~Tagk.
where ~h = (h1, .., h`). This implicitly sets γ = c1 + γ
′ and r = r1 + r2.
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for
y∗ with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. Then it generates




` from Zp and sets ~Tagc = ~cE(y∗,~h′′) where ~h′′ =
(h′′1, ...h
′′
` ). It, then, creates the challenge ciphertext as follows:
C = MβT
a1b, C1 = g
s1·b + (gc3)b, C2 = g
b·a1·s1 , C3 = g

















t, ~E = (g
~cE(y∗,~h′′)w
~Tagc), ~Tagc.
This implicitly sets s2 = c3 and κ = κ
′ − c3.
In this simulation, if T = e(g, g)c1c2c3 , then this has properly simulated Gameqt .
Otherwise, if T is random, a random value is added into Mβ. Hence, it has properly
simulated Gamefinal. 2
5.5 Our Efficient Compiler under Static Assump-
tions
In this section, we introduce our construction in asymmetric bilinear maps under
SXDH, Simple LW2 and Simple LW3 assumptions. While some assumptions we
uses are shared with IBE scheme of Lewko and Waters [LW10], the underlying
technique is fairy different. Our construction with asymmetric bilinear maps is
simpler although it is created without any change of the properties of our encodings.
5.5.1 Our Construction
For a tag based encoding TE of a predicate R where R : X × Y → {0, 1}, with `
which is an integer to associated with R, FE2(TE) is constructed by four algorithms
as follows:
• Setup(λ): The algorithm sets G1, G2 and GT
R←− G(λ, p), and generates g1 ∈ G1
and g2 ∈ G2, randomly. Also, it randomly selects α, b, yv, yu, yw, h1, ..., h` from
Zp and sets v1 = gyv1 , u1 = g
yu
1 , w1 = g
yw
1 , v2 = g
yv
2 , u2 = g
yu
2 , and w2 = g
yw
2 . It









1 , ..., g
h`
1 , e(g1, g2)
α.
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It sets MSK as g2, g
α
2 , v2, u2, w2, g
h1
2 , ..., g
h`
2 .
• Keygen(MSK, PK, x): The algorithm chooses randomly r, h′1, ..., h′` ← Zp, and
sets ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h
′) where ~h′ = (h′1, ..., h
′





2, D2 = u
r
2, D3 = g
−r






It outputs SK = (D1, ..., D3, ~K, ~Tagk).
• Encrypt(PK, M , y): The algorithm chooses a, s, h′′1, ..., h′′` from Zp, and sets
~Tagc = ~cE(y,~h
′′) where ~h′′ = (h′′1, ..., h
′′
` ). It creates CT as follows







It outputs CT = (C,C1, ..., C4, ~E, ~Tagc).
• Decrypt(SK, CT , PK): First, the algorithm calculates
A1 = e(C1, D1)e(C2, D2)e(C3, D3).
Because R(x, y) = 1, there exist reconstruction vectors ~mx and ~my such that
~mx ~kE(x,~h) = ~my ~cE(y,~h). If ~mx ~Tagk − ~my ~Tagc is 0, it aborts. Otherwise,
A2 = e(C4, ~K
~mx)e( ~E ~my , D3) = e(w1, g2)
ra·(~mx ~Tagk−~my ~Tagc).
Therefore, M = C · A1/(~mx
~Tagk−~my ~Tagc)
2 /A1.
Correctness Calculating A1 is trivial. A1 = e(g1, g2)
αse(w1, g2)
ar. For ~mx and ~my
such that ~mx ~kE(x,~h) = ~my ~cE(y,~h), the correctness of A2 is calculated as follows
A2 = e(C4, ~K
~mx)e( ~E ~my , D3)





















The last equality holds since the discrete log of w1 base g1 equals the discrete log of
w2 base g2. Therefore, M = C · A1/(~mx
~Tagk−~my ~Tagc)
2 /A1.
Remark 5.4. Alternatively, to reduce the number of pairing computations, the
decryption algorithm first calculates a1 := ~mx ~Tagk − ~my. ~Tagc and sets ~̃E :=
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(C−13 , ~E
~my/a1). Then, it calculates M = C · A′2/A′1 where A′1 = e(C1, D1)e(C2, D2)
and A′2 = e(C4, ~K
~mx/a1)e( ~̃E,D3). It is worth noting that we can calculate A
′
2 only


















where Ki, Ei, mx,i and my,i are the i
th coordinate of vectors ~K, ~E, ~mx and ~my, resp.
Theorem 5.1. (Informal) Suppose there exists Tag based Encoding TE, then our
FE2(TE) is adaptively secure under SXDH, Simple LW2 and (Asymmetric) DBDH
assumptions.
Proof: This is proved by lemmas 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9. 2
5.5.2 Security Analysis
Semi-functional Ciphertext. By running Encrypt algorithm for a message M ,






it randomly selects γ ∈ Zp and sets
C = C ′, C1 = C
′








1 , C4 = C
′
4,
~E = ~E ′, ~Tagc = ~Tag
′
c.
















2 , D3 = D
′
3,
~K = ~K ′, ~Tagk = ~Tag
′
k.
It should be noted that if a semi-functional key is being used for decrypting a semi-
functional ciphertext, e(g1, g2)
γω will be added to the message encrypted.
We will prove an adaptive security of our symmetric construction using exactly
the same steps with our compiler with asymmetric pairings.
Lemma 5.7. (Semi-functional Ciphertext Invariance) Suppose that there
exists an algorithm A which distinguishes Gamereal and Game0 with a non-negligible
advantage ε. Then, we can build an algorithm B which breaks SXDH assumption
with ε.
Proof: First, from SXDH assumption, B takes as instances {g1, gd1 , gz1, T ∈ G1, g2 ∈
G2}. Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gamereal or Game0 to take an
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advantage from A which can distinguish both games with non-negligible advantage
ε.
Setup The algorithm chooses random exponents α, yv, yu, yw, h1, ...h` from Zp. Then,
it implicitly sets b = d. Also, it sets v1 = g
yv
1 , u1 = g
yu
1 , w1 = g
yw
1 and
~h = (h1, ..., h`).




















It also sets MSK {g2, gα2 , v2 = g
yv
2 , u2 = g
yu





Phase I and II Since B knows all MSK. It can generate normal keys using Keygen.
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for
y∗ ∈ Y with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects a, h′′1, ..., h′′` ∈ Zp and sets s = z
and ~Tagc = ~cE(y
∗,~h′′) where ~h′′ = (h′′1, ..., h
′′
` ). The algorithm selects β from {0, 1}
and sets the challenge ciphertexts as













Therefore, if T = gdz1 , this is a properly distributed normal ciphertext and B





It implies that γ equals to aγ′ and the challenge ciphertext is an well distributed
semi-functional ciphertext. Therefore, B has simulated properly Game0.
2
Lemma 5.8. (Semi-functional key Invariance) Suppose that there exists an
algorithm A which distinguishes Gamek−1 and Gamek with a non-negligible advantage
ε. Then, we can build an algorithm B which breaks Simple LW2 assumption with ε.









2 , T ∈ G2}. Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gamek−1
or Gamek to take an advantage from A which can distinguish both games with
non-negligible advantage ε.











Zp. It sets g1 = f1 and g2 = f2. Then, it implicitly sets yu = w, yv = −bw + y′v and


















1 ;∀i ∈ [1, `]}, e(g1, g2)α.
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Also, it sets MSK as follows
g2, g
α





2 , u2 = g
w












2 ;∀i ∈ [1, `]}.
Phase I and II For normal keys (> k), the algorithm uses the key generation
algorithm (Keygen). Since it knows all public parameters and MSK, it can properly
generate normal keys. To response the first k− 1 semi-functional key queries (< k),







k using Keygen. Then, it randomly









2 , D3 = D
′
3, ~K = ~K
′, ~Tagk = ~Tag
′
k.
To generate the kth key for a predicate x ∈ X , first, B sets r = c and ~Tagk =





y′v , D2 = T,D3 = (g
c
2)
−1, ~K = (gc2)
~kE(x,~h′′+y′w
~h′), ~Tagk
where ~h′ = (h′1, ..., h
′
`) and
~h′′ = (h′′1, ..., h
′′
` ).





















Therefore, if T = gcw2 , then this is a properly distributed normal key. Otherwise,
if T is a random, this is a proper semi-functional key if we denote T = gcw2 g
ω
2 .
Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requests the challenge ciphertext for
y∗ ∈ Y with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects t′, s ∈ Zp and implicitly sets
a = tdw + t′ and γ = −d2t. γ is randomly distributed to the adversary since the
value of t does not appear anywhere else except a, but the value is not revealed in a
due to uniquely allocated random value t′. The algorithm selects β from {0, 1} and
sets ~Tagc = ~cE(y
∗,~h′). It creates the challenge ciphertexts as
C = M · e(g1, g2)αs, C1 = gs1, C2 = gbs1 g−d
2t







































−y′w . Since R(x, y∗) = 0, sharing ~h′ between ~Tagk and ~Tagc
are statistically hidden to the adversary by ~h-hiding. It should be noted that the
values of ~h′ are initially information theoretically hidden due to the corresponding
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values of ~h′′. Therefore, if T = gcw1 , B has simulated Gamek−1. Otherwise, if T is a
random value, B has simulated properly Gamek. 2
Lemma 5.9. (Semi-functional Security) Suppose that there exists an algo-
rithm A which distinguishes Gameqt and Gamefinal with non-negligible advantage ε.
Then, we can build an algorithm B which breaks (Asymmetric) DBDH assumption
with advantage ε.
Proof: Firstly, B takes an {g1, gc21 , gc31 ∈ G1, g2, gc12 , gc22 ∈ G2, T ∈ GT} as an instance
from ADBDH assumption. Depending on the value of T , B will simulate Gameqt
or Gamefinal to take an advantage from A which can distinguish both games with
non-negligible advantage ε.
Setup Algorithm B chooses exponents yv, yu, yw, h1, ...h`, randomly from Zp and set

















α = e(gc21 , g
c1
2 ).
For MSK, it sets {g2, v2 = gyv2 , u2 = g
yu




2 , ..., g
h`
2 }. However, it
does not know gα2 of MSK since g
c1c2
2 is not given.
Phase I and II For semi-functional keys, if the adversary requests a private key
for x, it randomly generates r, w′, h′1, ..., h
′
` from Zp and implicitly sets ω = c1 + w′.
It sets ~Tagk = ~kE(x,~h













2 , D3 = g
−r






Challenge Ciphertext When the adversary requested the challenge ciphertext
for y∗ with messages M0,M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. Then it generates
random values γ′, a, h′′1, ...h
′′
` from Zp. B, then, sets s = c3 and γ = −c2c3 + γ′,
implicitly. Sharing c3 between s and γ is acceptable since the value of c3 does not
reveal from γ due to γ′ which only appears on γ. It sets ~Tagc = ~cE(y
∗,~h′′) where
~h′′ = (h′′1, ..., h
′′
` ). It creates the challenge ciphertext as follows:
C = MβT,C1 = g
c3
1 , C2 = g
γ′














In this simulation, if T = e(g1, g1)
c1c2c3 , then this has properly simulated Gameqt .
Otherwise, if T is random, A random value is added into Mβ. Hence, it has properly
simulated Gamefinal. 2
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5.6 New Schemes
In this section, we provide instances for our encoding to achieve new functional
encryption schemes. The instances of Inner Product Encryption (IPE) with short
keys, Dual Spatial Encryption (Dual SE) with short keys and HIBE with short
ciphertexts will be presented. Inner Product Encryption (IPE) with short keys and
Dual Spatial Encryption (Dual SE) are new instances. HIBE with short ciphertexts
is also found in [Wee14, CW14b], but applying this instance to our compilers results
in new schemes in both asymmetric and symmetric bilinear maps. It should be noted
that security analysis of each scheme is replaced by showing that the corresponding
instance satisfies the properties that tag based encoding requires.
Inner Product Encryption with short keys
Let define X = Y := Z`p. For all, ~x ∈ X and ~y ∈ Y , R(x, y) = 1 iff 〈~x, ~y〉 = 0.
• ~kE(~x,~h) := 〈~h, ~x〉 ∈ Zp where ~h ∈ Z`p.
• ~cE(~y,~h) := (−h1(y2/y1) + h2, ...,−h1(y`/y1) + h`) ∈ Z`−1p
• Reconstruction: ~mx = 1 and ~my = (x2, ..., x`).
• Linearity: Firstly, the linearity of ~kE holds trivially since 〈~h, ~x〉 + 〈~h′, ~x〉 =
〈~h+~h′, ~x〉. Also, ~cE(~y,~h) + ~cE(~y,~h′) = ~cE(~y,~h+~h′) since, for all i ∈ [1, `−1],
−h1(yi+1/y1) + hi+1 − h′1(yi+1/y1) + h′i+1 = −(h1 + h′1)(yi+1/y1) + hi+1 + h′i+1.
• h-hiding: In the following equation, the first `− 1 coordinates of the right hand
vector in the above equation are independent from the last coordinate by `-





















Dual Spatial Encryption with short keys
For a matrix M ∈ Z(`−1)×dp and a vector ~c ∈ Z`−1p , it defines the affine space
Aff(M,~c) = {M ~w + ~c|~w ∈ Zdp}. Then, R(~x,Aff(M,~c)) = 1 iff there exists ~w ∈ Zdp
such that M ~w + ~c = ~x.
• ~kE(~x,~h) := u0 + ~xᵀ~u ∈ Zp where ~h = (u0, ~u) ∈ Z`p.
• ~cE(Aff(M,~c),~h) := (u0 + ~cᵀ~u,Mᵀ~u) ∈ Zd+1p
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• Reconstruction: ~mx = 1 and ~my = (1, ~̃wᵀ) where ~̃w ∈ Zdp s.t. M ~̃w + ~c = ~x.
• Linearity: Since all coordinates of ~kE(~x,~h) and ~cE(Aff(M,~c),~h) are linear over
~h, linearity is proved, trivially.
• h-hiding: In the following equation, for ~x ∈ X , there is no ~w such thatM ~w+~c = ~y
since R(~x,Aff(M,~c)) = 0. Hence, the last row of the matix on the left is
linearly independent from the other rows. Hence, it is hidden that they share














HIBE with short ciphertexts [Wee14, CW14b]











d′) = 1 iff d ≤ d′ and idi = id′i ∀i ∈ [1, d].




~h) := h0 + h1(id
′
1) + ...+ hd′(id
′
d′) ∈ Zp
• Reconstruction: ~mx = (1, id′d+1, ..., id′d′ , 0, ..., 0) ∈ Z`−dp and ~my = 1.




~h) are linear over ~h.
• h-hiding: In the following equation, the first `− d+ 1 rows are linearly indepen-
dent with the last row of matrix on the left since idd 6= id′d and h0, ..., h` appear
at most twice. Therefore, the sharing ~h between the first `+ 1 coordinates of
the vector of the right hand of the equation with the last coordinate of the
vector is hidden.
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5.7 Instances from Existing Schemes
In this section, we extract instances from the literature. New instances that result
in Identity based encryption (IBE) [Wat09], Public Attribute Inner Product En-
cryption (PAIPE) with short ciphertexts [AL12], Spatial Encryption (SE) [CZF12]
and Doubly Spatial Encryption (DSE) [Wee14] are derived from previous works. It
should be noted that the schemes created by applying those instances to our com-
piler with symmetric bilinear maps are identical with the original constructions of
their literature.
Waters’ IBE is a good example to describe our framework due to its simplicity.
Identity Based Encryption [Wat09]
Let X = Y := Zp. For all ID ∈ X and ID′ ∈ Y , R(ID, ID′) = 1 iff ID = ID′.
• ~kE(ID, (yu, yh)) := (yuID + yh) ∈ Zp where ~h = (yu, yh) ∈ Z2p
• ~cE(ID′, (yu, yh)) := (yuID′ + yh) ∈ Zp
• Reconstruction: This is an exact cancellation. Therefore, ~mx = ~my = 1.








h + ỹuID + ỹh
= ~kE(ID, (y′u + ỹu, y
′
h + ỹh)).
The linearity of ~cE(ID′, (y′u, y
′




• h-hiding: yuID+yh and yuID′+yh are pair-wise independent sinceR(ID, ID′) =
0 (i.e. ID 6= ID′). Hence, for given yuID+ yh, the value of yuID′+ yh is uni-
formly distributed from Zp. Therefore, it is not distinguishable from y′uID′+y′h
where (y′u, y
′
v) is randomly selected from Z2p.
Public Attribute Inner Product Encryption with short ciphertexts and Spatial
Encryption with short ciphertexts are the symmetric conversion of IPE with short
keys and Dual SE with short keys which were introduced in the previous section.




denote the encodings of the original schemes (e.g. IPE with
short keys), then we define ~kE = ~cE
′
and ~cE = ~kE
′
. All properties are identically
proved with the schemes in previous sections.
Public Attribute Inner Product Encryption with short ciphertexts [AL12]
Let X = Y := Z`p. For all, ~x ∈ X and ~y ∈ Y , R(x, y) = 1 iff 〈~x, ~y〉 = 0
• ~kE(~x,~h) := ({−h1(xi/x1) + hi}i=2,...`) ∈ Z`−1p where ~h ∈ Z`p
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• ~cE(~y,~h) := 〈~h, ~y〉 ∈ Zp
• All properties are proved similarly with our IPE with short keys.
Spatial Encryption with short ciphertexts [CZF12]
For a matrix M ∈ Z(`−1)×dp and a vector ~c ∈ Z`−1p , it defines the affine space
Aff(M,~c) = {M ~w + ~c|~w ∈ Zdp}. Then, R(Aff(M,~c), ~y) = 1 iff there exists ~w ∈ Zdp
such that M ~w + ~c = ~y.
• ~kE(Aff(M,~c),~h) := (u0 + ~cᵀ~u,Mᵀ~u) ∈ Zd+1p where ~h = (u0, ~u) ∈ Z`p.
• ~cE(~y,~h) := (u0 + ~yᵀ~u) ∈ Zp
• All properties are proved similarly with our Dual SE with short keys.
Doubly Spatial Encryption [CZF12]
For affine matrices X ∈ AffM(Z`×dp ) and Y ∈ AffM(Z`×fp ), R(X, Y ) = 1 iff there
exist ~w ∈ AffM(Zdp) and ~z ∈ AffM(Zfp) such that ~wXᵀ = ~zY ᵀ
• ~kE(X,~h) := (Xᵀ~hᵀ) ∈ Zdp where ~h ∈ Z`p.
• ~cE(Y,~h) := (Y ᵀ~hᵀ) ∈ Zfp .
• Reconstruction:
Since ~wXᵀ = ~zY ᵀ, ~w · ~kE(X,~h) = ~z · ~cE(Y,~h) (i.e. ~mx = ~w, and ~my = ~z).
• Linearity: For all ~h and ~h′ from Z`p,
~kE(X,~h) + ~kE(X,~h′) = Xᵀ~hᵀ +X~h′ᵀ = Xᵀ(~hᵀ + ~h′ᵀ) = ~kE(X,~hᵀ + ~h′ᵀ)
~cE(Y,~h) + ~cE(Y,~h′) = Y ᵀ~hᵀ + Y~h′ᵀ = Y ᵀ(~hᵀ + ~h′ᵀ) = ~cE(Y,~hᵀ + ~h′ᵀ).
• h-hiding: In the following equation, there exist no ~w and ~z such that ~wXᵀ = ~zY ᵀ
since R(X, Y ) = 0. Hence, the last f rows of matrix on the left is linearly












KP-ABE with short ciphertexts
In this work, we introduce two KP-ABE schemes. One is in a small universe of
attributes but the other supports a large universe of attributes. The techniques
used to achieve these schemes are similar to those of tag based encryption, but the
schemes in this chapter are semi-adaptively secure. Semi-adaptive security model
is identical with adaptive security model except that the adversary must declare its
target after receiving public keys but before querying any private keys. Therefore,
semi-adaptive security model is weaker than adaptive security model but it still
stronger than selective security model. It should be noted that tag based encoding
achieves adaptively secure ABE scheme using IPE or Spatial encryption [LOS+10,
Ham11], but we introduce these specific schemes since they achieve ABE scheme
more efficiently using linear secret sharing scheme [Bei96] and also show how the
limitation of the encoding framework can be eased using weaker security notion.
Achieving ABE employing linear secret sharing scheme using our tag based en-
coding in the previous chapter is daunting since the challenge key and the challenge
ciphertext can have multiple attributes and some of them are shared between them.
But, with linear secret sharing scheme, tags of both are correlated and this cor-
relation cannot be hidden information theoretically. Therefore, the independence
requirement of tag based encoding cannot be easily satisfied.
KP-ABE in a small universe First, KP-ABE in a small universe shows how
we overcome the problem we mentioned previously. To solve the problem, we keep
key elements of attributes which appear in both without any change of type from
the normal challenge key. It means that semi-functional transformation applies
only to attributes which appear only in the challenge key, but not in the challenge
ciphertext. Therefore, in a semi-functional space of our scheme, no attribute is
shared between the challenge ciphertext and the challenge key. However, since the
challenge key and the challenge ciphertext in KP-ABE still have more than one
attribute, reusing parameters to represent attributes (e.g. reusing yu and yh for all
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attributes in Waters’ IBE) is still problem. To solve this problem, we also convert
the domain of attributes from a large universe to a small universe, and allocate an
unique random value for tag of each attribute. Although the disadvantage of the
change is obvious, it enables us to solve the problem easily.
KP-ABE with short ciphertexts in a large attribute universe Achieving KP-
ABE with short ciphertexts in a large attribute universe is more difficult because
we cannot allocate unique random values for attributes since the total number of
attributes in the system is not bounded or exponentially large. We must reuse
some values for each tag. We solve this problem by designing a nested dual system
encryption. We let semi-functional row denote a row of which corresponding key
elements have the same distribution with those of a semi-functional key. Due to the
similar reason of our KP-ABE with small universe, we convert rows in the challenge
key from normal rows to semi-functional rows such that the corresponding attributes
of rows ρ(x) are not in the set of attributes for the challenge ciphertext S∗ where ρ is
a mapping from a row of an access matrix to an attribute in the access policy of the
challenge key. For rows in the challenge key such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗, instead of changing
them from normal type to semi-functional type at once (i.e. changing the challenge
key from normal type to semi-functional type), we change a row of an access matrix
of the challenge key from normal type to semi-functional type one-by-one. In other
words, we show that the invariance between a normal key and a semi-functional key
by showing the invariance of a normal row and a semi-functional row, alternatively.
Since we isolate single row from the other rows, we do not care about tags for
the other rows because they can be generated by a normal key generated algorithm.
In other words, they can be created randomly. However, we still do not use pair-wise
independence for our construction, since the challenge ciphertext still have multiple
attributes. Therefore, we use n-wise independence [AL10] for our construction. In
detail, we let Ax denote the x
th row of A. Tags for the Ax, kTagj,x ∀j ∈ [1, n] and























where cj is coefficients of y
j of
∏
ρ(x)∈S∗(y−ρ(x)) and S∗ is the target set of attributes
for the challenge ciphertext, and h′0, ...h
′
n are values allocated to public parameters,
but information theoretically hidden to the adversary. It means that the values of
h′0, ...h
′
n are not revealed anywhere else.
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To claim n-wise independence in the matrix equation above, we must show that
ρ(x) is not in S∗ since the correlation can be detected to the adversary if ρ(x) is in
S∗ by checking
∑
i∈[1,n] cikTagi,x = cTag. Therefore, similarity with our KP-ABE
with short ciphertexts, we leave a row Ax as a normal row if ρ(x) ∈ S∗.
In a short, we overcome the barriers to construct KP-ABE using Waters’ IBE by
our technique. In KP-ABE in small attribute universe, we separate rows of an access
structure by whether their corresponding attribute is included in S∗, then changed
the elements for all Ax such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗ in a challenge key to semi-functional
type at once. Also, in KP-ABE with short ciphertexts, we additionally isolate each
Ax such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗ via nested dual system encryption, then change all rows
such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗ to semi-functional type one-by-one to permit a large attribute
universe and short ciphertexts.
Comparisons with the results of other schemes having short ciphertexts are
shown in Table 6.1. The first KP-ABE with short ciphertexts was introduced by
Attrapadung, Libert and Panafieu [ALdP11]. It is expressive but is only selec-
tively secure under q-type assumption and supports a small universe of attributes.
Later, Attrapadung [Att14a] introduced an adaptively secure KP-ABE scheme with
a constant sized ciphertext. However, it depends on several assumptions including
two q-type assumptions in composite order groups. Subsequently, Chen and Wee
[CW14c] achieved KP-ABE without q-types assumptions, but it is secure only in a
small universe of attributes in composite order groups. Currently the best scheme is
from Takashima [Tak14]. Using DPVS, it is semi-adaptively secure in prime order
groups under a standard assumption. Unfortunately, the efficiency of our scheme
cannot be directly compared to [Tak14] because Takashima’s scheme supports non-
monotone access structures, while ours supports only monotone access structures.
However, in a scenario requiring only monotone access policies, our scheme has
smaller sized private keys and ciphertexts (Table 6.1). It should be noted that the
sizes of keys and ciphertexts of [Tak14] for monotone access structures are identical
to those for non-monotone access structures.
6.1 KP-ABE in a small universe
We introduce KP-ABE in a small universe U with |U | = nt. Our construction
consists of four algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. We omit n in the
construction since it equals to nt.
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Table 6.1: Comparison of KP-ABE Schemes Having Constant Sized Ciphertexts
ALP11 A14 CW14 T14
Ours
[ALdP11] [Att14a] [CW14c] [Tak14]
Assump. q-type q-type, SDs SDs DLIN DLIN
Universe small large small large large
Security Selective Adaptive Semi-adaptive Semi-adaptive Semi-adaptive
Order of G Prime Composite Composite Prime Prime
SP NM M M NM M
PK O(n)|G| O(n)|G| O(n)|G| O(n)|G| O(n)|G|
SK O(mn)|G| O(mn)|G| O(mn)|G| (5 + 6mn)|G| (7 + n)m|G|
+nm|Zp|
CT 3|G|+ 1|GT | 6|G|+ 1|GT | 2|G|+ 1|GT | 17|G|+ 1|GT |
9|G|
+1|Zp|+ 1|GT |
n: the maximum number of attributes per ciphertext, m: the number of rows of A
NM : Non-monotone Access Structure, M : Monotone Access Structure
6.1.1 Construction
• Setup(λ, U) First, the algorithm generates G and GT
R←− G(λ, p). Then, it gen-
erates g, v, v1, v2, w ∈ G and exponents a1, a2, b, α, h1, ..., hnt ∈ Zp where
h1, ..., hnt are uniquely allocated to each attribute i ∈ [1, nt]. Let τ1 =
vva11 , τ2 = vv
a2
2 . It publishes the public parameters PK as follows




2 , w, g
h1 , ..., ghnt , e(g, g)α·a1·b)
It sets MSK as (gα, gα·a1 , v, v1, v2).
• Encrypt(PK, M , S = {Att1, ..., Attu}) The algorithm chooses s1, s2, t, cTagAtt1 ,
..., cTagAttu from Zp, and sets s = s1 + s2. It outputs the ciphertext, CT as
follows
C = M · (e(g, g)α·a1·b)s2 , C1 = (gb)s, C2 = (gb·a1)s1 , C3 = (ga1)s1 ,
C4 = (g
b·a2)s2 , C5 = (g










t, EAtti = (g
hAttiwcTagAtti )t, cTagAtti ∀i ∈ [1, u].
• KeyGen(MSK, PK, A = (A, ρ)) The algorithm chooses random values r1, r2, z1, z2
from Zp, and sets r = r1 +r2. We let Ax denote the xth row of A and ρ(x) write
the attribute associated Ax by the mapping, ρ. It randomly chooses kTagρ(x)
for all x ∈ [1,m] from Zp where A is an m × ` matrix. It randomly selects
an ` sized vector ~µ of which the first coordinate equals to 1 from Z`p, and sets
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λx = r1Ax · ~µ as the share of Ax. Then, it creates SK as follows
D1 = g
α·a1vr, D2 = g
−avr1g
z1 , D3 = (g
b)−z1 , D4 = v
r
2g
z2 , D5 = (g
b)−z2 , D6 = g
r2·b,
Lx = g
λx , Kx = (g
hρ(x)wkTagρ(x))λx , kTagρ(x)∀x ∈ [1,m].
Remark 1. kTag is uniquely allocated for each attribute in {ρ(x);∀x ∈
[1,m]}, not for each row of A. Therefore, if ρ(x1) equals to ρ(x2) but x1 6= x2,
then kTagρ(x1) equals to kTagρ(x2).
• Decrypt(SK, CT , PK, A, S) First, the algorithm calculates constants wj such
that
∑
ρ(j)∈S wjAj = (1, 0, ...0). Using wj, it calculates
W1 = e(C1, D1)e(C2, D2)e(C3, D3)e(C4, D4)e(C5, D5),



























(g)wx·r1Ax~µ = gr1 .
Then, the computations of W1 and W2 are trivial, and appear also in [Wat09]. We
only point out that W2/W1 = e(g, g)
−αa1·bs2e(g, w)r1t. We provide the rest parts of
the correctness to show that our scheme can be correctly decrypted.
e(Kx, E0) = e((g
hρ(x)wkTagρ(x))λx , gt) = e(g, g)hρ(x)λxte(g, w)kTagρ(x)λxt
e(Lx, Eρ(x)) = e(g
λx , (ghρ(x)wcTagρ(x))t) = e(g, g)hρ(x)λxte(g, w)cTagρ(x)λxt
Therefore, (
∆x
)1/(kTagρ(x)−cTagρ(x)) = e(g, w)λxt
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Because
∑






e(g, w)wxλxt = e(g, w)r1t.
6.1.2 Security Analysis
We define two semi-functional algorithms SFKeyGen and SFEncrypt which output a
semi-functional key and a semi-functional ciphertext, respectively. A semi-functional
key can decrypt a normal ciphertext, but cannot decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext
although a normal key can decrypt both.
SFKeyGen(MSK, PK, A(= (A, ρ))) The algorithm takes as input an access structure
(A, ρ). Using KeyGen, it generates a normal key
(D′1, ..., D
′
6, {L′x, K ′x, kTag′ρ(x); ∀x ∈ [1,m]})
where A is an m× ` access matrix. Then, it sets the elements of a semi-functional
key identically with those of the normal key except D1, D2, D4. Then, it randomly
selects γ from Zp and defines D1, D2, D4 as
D1 = D
′
1 · g−a1a2γ, D2 = D′2 · ga2γ, D4 = D′4 · ga1γ.
SFEncrypt(PK, M , S) For a set of attributes S, the algorithm generates a normal
ciphertext








using Encrypt. Then, it sets a semi-functional ciphertext identically with those of
the normal ciphertext except C4, ..., C7. To generate C4, ..., C7, it randomly selects
κ from Zp and sets C4, ..., C7 as
C4 = C
′
4 · gba2κ, C5 = C ′5 · ga2κ, C6 = C ′6v
a2κ





GameReal This game is identical with the semi-adaptive security model. It should
be noted that all keys and the challenge ciphertext are normal in this game.
Gameδ This game is identical with GameReal except the first δ keys and the challenge
ciphertext. In this game, the first δ keys and the challenge ciphertext are semi-
functional. In other words, SFKeyGen and SFEncrypt replace KeyGen and Encrypt
to create the first δ keys and the challenge ciphertext. It should be noted that, in
Game0, all keys are normal, but the challenge cipher is semi-functional.
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GameFinal This game is identical with Gameq except the message encrypted in the
challenge ciphertext where q is the total number of keys queried by the adversary.
In this game, the random message replaces the original message of the challenge
ciphertext.
Theorem 6.1. (Informal) Our KP-ABE scheme in a small universe is semi-adaptively
secure under DLIN.
Proof: This is proved by Lemmas 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. 2
Lemma 6.1. (Semi-functional ciphertext invariance) Suppose there exists a
PPT algorithm A to distinguish between GameReal and Game0 with a non-negligible
advantage ε. Then we can build an algorithm B breaking DLIN with the advantage,
ε, using A.
Proof: This proof is quite similar with that of Waters’ IBE [Wat09] except the
structure of the challenge ciphertext, and some elements in public keys.
B takes (g, f, ν, gc1 , f c2 , T ) as an instance from DLIN assumption. It will sim-
ulate either GameReal or Game0 based on the value of T .
Setup: The algorithm selects a1, b, yv, yv1 , yv2 , yw, h1, ..., hnt from Zp, and sets ga1 =
f, ga2 = ν. Then, it publishes the public parameters as follows
g, gb, gb·a1 = f b, gb·a2 = νb, w = gyw , gh1 , ..., ghnt ,
τ1 = g
yvf yv1 , τ2 = g
yvνyv2 , τ b1 , τ
b
2 , e(g, g)
α·a1b = e(g, f)α·b.
It also sets MSK = {gα, gα·a1 = fα, v, v1, v2}.
Init: Before it generates any private key, B requests to the adversary a target set of
attributes S∗ which will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext.
Phase I and II: To generate normal keys, B uses the key generation algorithm, KeyGen.
It is possible because B knows all public parameters and MSK.
Challenge: When A requests the challenge ciphertext for S∗ = {Att1, ..., Attu} with
two message M0 and M1, it randomly selects β from {0, 1}. Using Encrypt, B
generates a normal ciphertext,




0, {E ′Atti , cTag
′
Atti
;∀i ∈ [1, u]}.
Then, it sets the challenge ciphertext as follows:
C = C ′ ·
(











, C3 = C
′




b, C5 = C
′
5 · T, C6 = C ′6 · (gc1)yv · (f c2)−yv1 · T yv2 ,










0, {EAtti = E ′Atti , cTagAtti = cTag
′
Atti
;∀i ∈ [1, u]}
We let s′1, s
′
2, t denote the randomization parameters of the normal challenge cipher-
text. This implicitly sets s1 = −c2 + s′1 and s2 = s′2 + c1 + c2. Therefore, if T equals
to νc1+c2 , B has properly simulated GameReal. Otherwise, if T is a random value, it
has simulated Game0, also properly by letting ν
c1+c2gκ denote T . 2
For semi-functional key invariance of KP-ABE in a small universe, we use the
fact if there an access structure A = (A, ρ) and a set of attributes, S∗ such that S∗
cannot satisfy A, there exists ~µ having 1 as the first coordinate and being orthogonal
to all rows of A such that corresponding attributes of the rows of A by ρ are also
included in S∗. We use ~µ as a main tool which unlocks the values of tag in the
challenge key which is the kth key in Lemma 6.2. Using this property of ~µ, if an
attribute appears in both the challenge key and the challenge ciphertext, we can set
tag for this attribute in the challenge key as a random value by nullifying exponents
of an incalculable element (f c1 in Lemma 6.2) of the attribute although we keep
tag for the attribute in the challenge ciphertext as a value uniquely allocated to
each attribute. This makes tags in the challenge key and the challenge ciphertext
be independent (i.e. they do not correlate to each other), since they represent
attributes when it appears in either the private key or the challenge ciphertext, not
in both.
Lemma 6.2. (Semi-functional key invariance) Suppose there exists a PPT
algorithm A to distinguish between Gamek−1 and Gamek with a non-negligible ad-
vantage ε. Then we can build an algorithm B to break DLIN with advantage ε,
using A.
Proof: First, B takes in (g, f, ν, gc1 , f c2 , T ) as an instance from DLIN . It will
simulate either Gamek−1 or Gamek based on the value of T .




nt , h̃1, ..., h̃nt from Zp, and
sets
g = g, gb = f, v = ν−a1·a2 , v1 = ν
a2 · gyv1 , v2 = νa1 · gyv2 ,
w = fgyw , {ghi = f−h′igh̃i ;∀i ∈ [1, nt]}
In this setting, we do not know hi, directly, but we can calculate g
hi using g, f, h′i,
and h̃i. Then, it publishes the public parameters following
g, gb, gb·a1 = fa1 , gb·a2 = fa2 , gh1 , ..., ghnt , v, v1, v2, w,
τ1 = g
yv1a1 , τ2 = g
yv2a2 , τ b1 = f
yv1a1 , τ b2 = f
yv2a2 , e(g, g)α·a1b = e(f, g)α·a1 .
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B generates MSK = {gα, gα·a1 , v, v1, v2}. This is possible because it knows a1 and α.
We stress that B does not require any information of the target set of the challenge
ciphertext when it sets all parameters in Setup.
Init: Before B generates any private key, it requests to the adversary a target set of
attributes S∗ which will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext.
Phase I and II: For the first k − 1 keys (< k), first it generates a normal key
D′1, ..., D
′
6, {L′x, K ′x, kTag′ρ(x);∀x ∈ [1,m]}), then it selects γ from Zp and sets
D1 = D
′
1 · g−a1a2γ, D2 = D′2 · ga2γ, D3 = D′3, D4 = D′4 · ga1γ, D5 = D′5, D6 = D′6,
Lx = L
′
x, Kx = K
′
x, kTagρ(x) = kTag
′
ρ(x) ∀x ∈ [1,m]
For the rest keys except the kth key (> k), B runs the key generation algorithm
to generate normal keys. It is computable since B knows all public parameters and
MSK.




ρ(x) ∀x s.t. ρ(x) /∈ S∗
and
kTagρ(x)
R←− Zp ∀x s.t. ρ(x) ∈ S∗.
We point out that ρ is not necessary to be injective, and kTagρ(x) is allocated
uniquely to each attribute ρ(x). Then, using kTagρ(x), it generates a normal key
D′1, ..., D
′
6, {L′x, K ′x, kTagρ(x);∀x ∈ [1,m]}.







′ denote randomized parameters of the normal key. Then,
B generates an additional random vector ~µ′′ of which the first coordinate equals to
1, and Ax · ~µ′′ = 0 for all x such that ρ(x) ∈ S∗ where Ax is the xth row of A. ~µ′′
exists because S∗ cannot satisfy the access structure. It calculates λ′′x = c1Ax · ~µ′′,




−a1a2 , D2 = D
′
2T







a1(gc1)yv2 , D5 = D
′
5(f











x , kTagρ(x);∀x ∈ [1,m]}.
This implicitly sets z1 = z
′
1− yv1c2 and z2 = z′2− yv2c2. Also, it sets r2 = r′2 + c2
and r1 = r
′
1 + c1. Additionally, this implicitly sets λx = r1Ax · ~µ′ + c1Ax · ~µ′′. λx is
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if we let µ′i and µ
′′
i denote the i
th coordinate of ~µ′ and ~µ′′, respectively. ~µ is randomly
distributed because of the random vector, ~µ′.
Therefore, if T equals to νc1+c2 , this is a properly distributed normal key. Other-
wise, T is a random value and we denote it as νc1+c2gγ, this is the properly distributed
semi-functional key.
Challenge: When A requests the challenge ciphertext for S∗ = {Att1, ..., Attu}




∀Atti ∈ S∗. With Mβ and cTagAtti , it generates a normal challenge
ciphertext,
(C ′, C ′1, ..., C
′
7, E0, {EAtti , cTagAtti ;∀Atti ∈ S∗}).
Then, it randomly generates κ from Zp and sets
C = C ′, C1 = C
′
1, C2 = C
′
2, C3 = C
′
3, C4 = C
′





7 · f yv2 ·κ·a2ν−a1·κ·yw·a2 , E0 = E ′0 · νa1a2κ, EAtti = E ′Atti · (ν
ỹhAtti
+ywcTagAtti )a1a2κ.
This implicitly sets gt = gt
′ · νa1a2κ where t′ is a randomization parameter of
the normal challenge ciphertext. It should be noted that tags in the kth key and
the challenge ciphertext are not correlated because there is no shared value in tags
between the kth key and the challenge ciphertext. Also, all tags are randomly
distributed to the adversary since the values of y′hi has not been revealed, and
generated randomly. Therefore, if T equals to νc1+c2 , B has properly simulated
Gamek−1. Otherwise, it has simulated Gamek, also properly. 2
Lemma 6.3. (Semi-functional Security) Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm
A to distinguish Gameq and GameFinal with a non-negligible advantage ε. Then we
can build an algorithm B breaking DBDH with the advantage, ε, using A.
Proof: This proof is similar with that of Waters’ IBE [Wat09]. We modified their
proof to be fitted with our construction.
B takes (g, gc1 , gc2 , gc3 , T ) as an instance from DBDH assumption. It will sim-
ulate either GameReal or GameFinal based on the value of T .
Setup: The algorithm selects α, b, yv, yv1 , yv2 , yw, h1, ..., hnt from Zp, and sets
ga2 = gc2 , v = gyv , v1 = g
yv1 , v2 = g
yv2 , w = gyw
Then, it publishes the public parameters as follows
g, gb, gb·a1 , gb·a2 = (gc2)b, w, gh1 , ..., ghnt , τ1 = v1
a1 , τ2 = (g
c2)yv2 ,
τ b1 , τ
b
2 , e(g, g)
α·a1b = e(gc1 , gc2)a1b.
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This implicitly sets α = c1 · c2 and a2 = c2. In this setting, the simulator does not
know α. Hence, it cannot calculate MSK.
Init: Before it generates any private key, B requests to the adversary a target set of
attributes S∗ which will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext.
Phase I and II: To generate a semi-functional key for A = (A, ρ), It randomly gen-
erates z1, z2, r1, r2, γ
′, {kTagρ(x);∀x ∈ [1,m]} from Zp, and sets r = r1 + r2 where
A is an m × ` matrix. B selects randomly µ from Z`p of which the first coordinate
equals to 1, and other elements are random values, and sets λx = r1Axµ. It sets
semi-functional key as follows
D1 = (g
c2)−γ











, D5 = (g
b)−z2 , D6 = g
r2·b,
Lx = g
λx , {Kx = (ghρ(x)wkTagρ(x))λx , kTagρ(x);x ∈ [1,m]}
This implicitly sets γ = c1 + γ
′.
Challenge: When A requests the challenge ciphertext for S∗ = {Att1, ..., Attu} with
two message M0 and M1, first, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. It, then, randomly
generates s1, κ, cTagAtt1 , ..., cTagAttu and t from Zp and sets s2 = c3 sets κ = −c3+κ′.
It sets the challenge ciphertext as follows

















t, {EAtti = (ghAttiwcTagAtti )t, cTagAtti ; i ∈ [1, u]}
Therefore, if T equals to gc1c2c3 , B has properly simulated Gameq. Otherwise, a
random value will be added in Mβ, and it has simulated GameFinal, also properly.
2
6.2 KP-ABE with short ciphertexts in a large
universe
We introduce KP-ABE with short ciphertexts in a large universe U . In this system,
the maximum number of attributes per ciphertext is bounded by n, but the total
number of attributes in the system is not bounded. In this scheme, we achieve
short ciphertexts using a formula provided in [ALdP11]. Using the same formula,
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interestingly, we prove that our construction is semi-adaptively secure with a large
universe of attributes under a standard assumption via dual system encryption.
6.2.1 Construction
• Setup(λ, U , n) First, G and GT
R←− G(λ, p). Then, the algorithm generates
g, v, v1, v2, w, u ∈ G and exponents a1, a2, b, α, h0, ..., hn ∈ Zp. Let τ1 =
vva11 , τ1 = vv
a2
2 . It publishes the public parameters PK as follows




2 , w, u, g
h0 , ..., ghn , e(g, g)α·a1·b)
The MSK consists of the following MSK = (gα, gα·a1 , v, v1, v2).
• Encrypt(PK, M , S = {Att1, ..., Attu}) the algorithm chooses s1, s2, t and cTag
from Zp and sets s = s1 + s2. It creates a ciphertext, CT as follows
C = M · (e(g, g)αa1·b)s2 , C1 = (gb)s, C2 = (gb·a1)s1 , C3 = (ga1)s1 , C4 = (gb·a2)s2 ,
C5 = (g










t, E1 = ((g
h0)c0(gh1)c1 ...(ghn)cnwcTag)t, cTag
where c0, ..., cn are coefficients of y
0, ..., yn for
∏
Atti∈S(y − Atti), respectively.
• KeyGen(MSK, PK, A = (A, ρ)) We let Ax denote the xth row of A and ρ(x)
write an attribute associated Ax by the mapping, ρ. The algorithm randomly
chooses r1,x, r2,x, z1,x, z2,x from Zp for each x ∈ [1,m], and sets rx = r1,x + r2,x
where A is an m× ` matrix. It randomly chooses kTagj,x for each x ∈ [1,m]
and j ∈ [1, n] from Zp. Then, it randomly selects an ` sized vector ~µ of which
the first coordinate equals to α from Z`p, and sets λx = Ax~µ as the share of
Ax. It creates SK as follows
D1,x = g
λx·a1vrx , D2,x = g
−λxvrx1 g
z1,x , D3,x = (g





b)−z2,x , D6,x = g





kTagj,x)r1,x , kTagj,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ∀x ∈ [1,m]
• Decrypt(SK, CT , PK, A, S) First, the algorithm calculates constants wx such
that
∑
ρ(x)∈S wxAx = (1, 0, ...0). For each x ∈ S, it calculates
W1,x := e(C1, D1,x)e(C2, D2,x)e(C3, D3,x) · e(C4, D4,x)e(C5, D5,x),
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W2,x := e(C6, D6,x)e(C7, D7,x).
For each attribute, it calculates c0, ..., cn by the same manner of Encrypt, then
it calculates Tagx :=
∑







cj , E0)/e(D7,x, E1)
)1/Tagx
) = e(g, w)r1,xt.





The computations of W1,x and W2,x are similar to W1 and W2 of our KP-ABE in
small universe, and proved also in [Wat09]. It should be noted that W1,x/W2,x =










































j · e(w, g)r1,x·t
∑
j∈[1,n] cj ·kTagj,x .
Also,
e(D7,x, E1) = e(g
r1,x , (hc00 ...h
cn
n w

































Atti∈S(ρ(x) − Atti) = 0 since




wx = e(g, g)αa1bs2
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because W3,xW1,x/W2,x = e(g, g)
λxa1bs2 , and
∑
ρ(x)∈S wxλx = α.
6.2.2 Security Analysis
We define two semi-functional algorithms SFKeyGen and SFEnc. We remind that
since we prove the security under the semi-adaptive security model of KP-ABE, the
simulator always knows the target set S∗ for the challenge ciphertext when it creates
semi-functional keys.
SFKeyGen(MSK, PK, S∗,A) The algorithm takes as inputs the target set of at-
tribute S∗ for the challenge ciphertext and an access structure A = (A, ρ) where A is




7,x, {K ′j,x, kTag′j,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ∀x ∈ [1,m]
using KeyGen. Then, it sets
D1,x = D
′
1,x, ..., D7,x = D
′
7,x,
{Kj,x = K ′j,x, kTagj,x = kTag′j,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ∀x s.t. ρ(x) ∈ S∗
For the rest key elements, It randomly selects γx, ...γxθ from Zp for each x such
that ρ(x) /∈ S∗ and defines D1,x, D2,x, D4,x as
D1,x = D
′
1,x · g−a1a2γx , D2,x = D′2,x · ga2γx , D4,x = D′4,x · ga1γx ∀x s.t. ρ(x) /∈ S∗
and sets other elements equal to those of the normal key.
SFEncrypt(PK,M, S) For a set of attributes S, the algorithm generates a normal
ciphertext








using Encrypt. Then, it sets a semi-functional ciphertext identically with the normal




4 · gba2κ, C5 = C ′5 · ga2κ, C6 = C ′6v
a2κ





In our security proof, we utilize a hybrid model to convert a normal key to
a semi-functional key. Instead of changing a type of the key at once, we change
the key elements associated with an attribute which is not included in S∗ one-by-
one. In order to describe this process, we additionally define an semi-functional key
generation algorithm SFKeyGen′. It should be noted that the semi-functional key
generation algorithm additionally takes as input an index θ.
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SFKeyGen′(MSK, PK, S∗,A, θ) The algorithm takes as inputs an index θ, the
target set of attribute S∗ for the challenge ciphertext and an access structure A =
(A, ρ) where A is an m × ` matrix. First, to generate the semi-functional key, the
algorithm generates a normal key
D′1,x, ..., D
′
7,x, {K ′j,x, kTag′j,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ∀x ∈ [1,m]
using KeyGen. Then, it sets
D1,x = D
′
1,x, ..., D7,x = D
′
7,x,
{Kj,x = K ′j,x, kTagj,x = kTag′j,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ∀x s.t. ρ(x) ∈ S∗
For the rest key elements, we let xi denote the index of the i
th row Ax of A such





· g−a1a2γxi , D2,xi = D′2,xi · g
a2γxi , D4,xi = D
′
4,xi
· ga1γxi ∀xi s.t. i ≤ θ.
Also, it sets other elements equal to those of the normal key.








{Kj,xi = K ′j,xi , kTagj,(xi) = kTag
′
j,(xi)
;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ∀xi s.t. i > θ
It should be noted that SFKeyGen′(MSK, PK, S∗,A,Θ) is identical with SFKey-
Gen(MSK, PK, S∗,A) where Θ is the number of rows, Ax of A such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗.
GameReal This game is identical with the semi-adaptive security model. It should
be noted that all keys and the challenge ciphertext are normal in this game.
Gameδ,0 is identical with Gameδ−1,Θδ−1 where Θδ−1 is the number of rows, Ax of
A such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗ of the δ − 1th key. In this game, the first δ − 1 keys are
generated by SFKeyGen(MSK, PK, S∗,A). It should be noted that in Game0,0 all
keys are normal, but the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Gameδ,θ We let xi denote the index of the i
th row Ax of A such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗ where
(A, ρ) is an access structure for the δth key. This game is identical with Gameδ,θ−1
except the key elements for Axθ of the δ
th key. In this game, the key elements for
Ax1 , ..., Axθ are semi-functional. It means SFKeyGen
′(MSK, PK, S∗,A, θ) are used
to generate the δth key.
GameFinal This game is identical with Gameq,Θq except the message encrypted in the
CHAPTER 6. KP-ABE WITH SHORT CIPHERTEXTS 97
Table 6.2: Summary of Security Games









SFEncSFKeyGen′ with θ (= δ)
SFKeyGen (> δ)
Gameq,Θq SFKeyGen SFEnc
GameFinal SFKeyGen SFEnc with a random message
(< δ): For the first δ − 1 keys, (= δ): For the δth key,
(> δ): For all keys except the first δ keys
challenge ciphertext where q is the total number of key queries in Phase I and Phase
II. In this game, a random message replaces the message in the challenge ciphertext.
Theorem 6.2.(Informal) Our KP-ABE scheme with short ciphertexts is semi-
adaptively secure under DLIN.
Proof: This is proved by Lemmas 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. 2
Lemma 6.4. (Semi-functional ciphertext invariance) Suppose there exists a
PPT algorithm A to distinguish between GameReal and Game0,0 with a non-negligible
advantage ε. Then we can build an algorithm B breaking DLIN with the advantage,
ε, using A.
Proof: This proof is similar with the proof of Lemma 6.1. B takes (g, f, ν, gc1 , f c2 , T )
as an instance from DLIN assumption. It will simulate either GameReal or Game0,0
based on the value of T .
Setup: The algorithm selects a1, b, yv, yv1 , yv2 , yw, h0, ..., hn from Zp, and sets ga1 =
f, ga2 = ν. Then, it publishes the public parameters as follows
g, gb, gb·a1 = f b, gb·a2 = (ν)b, w = gyw , gh0 , ..., ghn ,
τ1 = f
yv1 , τ2 = ν
yv2 , τ b1 , τ
b
2 , e(g, g)
α·a1·b = e(g, f)α·b.
It also sets MSK = {gα, gα·a1 = fα, v, v1, v2}.
Init: Before it generates any private key, B requests to the adversary a target set of
attributes S∗ which will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext.
Phase I and II: To generate normal keys, B uses the key generation algorithm, KeyGen.
It is possible because B knows all public parameter and MSK.
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Challenge: When A requests the challenge ciphertext for S∗ = {Att1, ..., Attu} with
two message M0 and M1, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. Then, it generates a







′ using Encrypt. It sets the challenge
ciphertext as follows:
C = C ′ ·
(











, C3 = C
′




b, C5 = C
′





(gc1)yv · (f c2)−yv1 · T yv2
)b
, E0 = E
′
0, E1 = E
′
1, cTag = cTag
′
We let s′1, s
′
2, t denote the randomization parameters of the normal challenge
ciphertext. This implicitly sets s1 = −c2 + s′1 and s2 = s′2 + c1 + c2. Therefore, if T
equals to νc1+c2 , B has properly simulated GameReal. Otherwise, if T is a random
value, it has simulated Game0,0, also properly by letting ν
c1+c2gκ denote T . 2
To achieve semi-functional key invariance, we designed a nested duals system
encryption. In our proof of lemma 6.5, the independence of tags in the challenge key
and the challenge ciphertext is proved by n-wise independence [AL10]. In detail,
tags for an attribute ρ(x) of Ax, kTagj,ρ(x) ∀j ∈ [1, n] and a tag for the challenge























where cj is coefficients of y
j of
∏
ρ(x)∈S∗(y−ρ(x)) and S∗ is the target set of attributes
for the challenge ciphertext.




n are information theoretically hidden to the adversary.
2. Atti is not in S
∗.
In lemma 6.5, we must show they appear only to suffice key elements for ρ(x) for
the first condition. To do this, we isolate kTagj,Atti ∀j ∈ [1, n] for ρ(x) from the key
elements for other attributes by utilizing a hybrid model. In the security proof, we
show the invariance of two games which have different types of key elements for an
attribute ρ(x) in the kth key, not for all elements in the key. Also, we do not apply
this proof for the elements for attributes shared between the key and the challenge
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ciphertext. Therefore, we leave those key elements as normal type (i.e. without
any change of type from the real game) since the correlation can be detected to
the adversary by checking
∑
i∈[0,n] cikTagi,ρ(x) = cTag if ρ(x) is in S
∗ as the second
condition requires.
Lemma 6.5. (Semi-functional key invariance) Suppose there exists a PPT
algorithm A to distinguish Gamek,θ−1 and Gamek,θ with a non-negligible advantage
ε. Then we can build an algorithm B breaking DLIN with the advantage, ε, using
A.
Proof: First, B takes (g, f, ν, gc1 , f c2 , T ) as an instance from DLIN . It will simulate
either Gamek,θ−1 or Gamek,θ based on the value of T .




n, h̃0, ..., h̃n from Zp, and
sets
g = g, gb = f, v = ν−a1·a2 , v1 = ν
a2 · gyv1 , v2 = νa1 · gyv2 ,
w = fgyw , h0 = f
−y′h0gỹh0 , ..., hn = f
−y′hngỹhn




ỹhi . Then it publishes the public parameter following
g, gb, gb·a1 = fa1 , gb·a2 = fa2 , gh0 , ..., ghn , w,
τ1 = g
yv1a1 , τ2 = g
yv2a2 , τ b1 = f
yv1a1 , τ b2 = f
yv2a2 , e(g, g)α·a1b = e(f, g)α·a1 .
B generates MSK= {gα, gα·a1 , v, v1, v2}. This is possible because it knows a1 and α.
We stress that B does not require any information of the target set of attributes, S∗
for the challenge ciphertext when it sets all parameters in Setup.
Init: Before it generates any private key, B requests to the adversary a target set of
attributes S∗ which will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext.
Phase I and II: For the first k − 1 keys (< k), first it generates a normal key
(D′1,x, ..., D
′
7,x, {K ′j,x, kTag′j,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]};∀x ∈ [1,m]) where m is the number of
rows of an access matrix for the key, then, it selects γx from Zp for each x such that
ρ(x) /∈ S∗. For all rows of A, it sets
1. ∀x s.t. ρ(x) ∈ S∗
D1,x = D
′
1,x, D2,x = D
′




4,x, D5,x = D
′





7,x, {Kj,x = K ′j,x, kTagj,x = kTag′j,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]})
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2. ∀x s.t. ρ(x) /∈ S∗
D1,x = D
′
1,x · g−a1a2γx , D2,x = D′2,x · ga2γx , D3,x = D′3,x, D4,x = D′4,x · ga1γx ,
D5,x = D
′
5,x, D6,x = D
′
6,x, D7,x = D
′
7,x,
{Kj,x = K ′j,x, kTagj,x = kTag′j,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]}).
For the rest keys except the kth key (> k), B runs the key generation algorithm
to generate normal keys. It is possible since B knows all public parameters and
MSK.
We let xi denote the index of the i
th row Ax of A such that ρ(x) /∈ S∗. To
generate the kth key with the index θ, for A = (A, ρ), it first generates {kTagj,x;∀j ∈





j ∀j ∈ [1, n].
Then, using {kTagj,x;∀j ∈ [1, n], ∀x ∈ [1,m]}, it generates a normal key
D′1,x, ..., D
′
7,x, {K ′j,x, kTagj,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ∀x ∈ [1,m].
Finally, it selects γxi from Zp for each xi such that i < θ, and sets the kth key
as follows
1. ∀x s.t. ρ(x) ∈ S∗,
D1,x = D
′
1,x, ..., D7,x = D
′
7,x, {Kj,x = K ′j,x, kTagj,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} ,
2. ∀x s.t. ρ(x) /∈ S∗,




· g−a1a2γxi , D2,xi = D′2,xi · g
















T−a1a2 , D2,xθ = D
′
2,xθ







T a1(gc1)yv2 , D5,xθ = D
′
5,xθ







(gc1), {Kj,xθ = K ′j,xθ(g
c1)h̃j−h̃0ρ(xθ)
j
, kTagj,xθ ;∀j ∈ [1, n]}),
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, ..., D7,xi = D
′
7,xi
, {Kj,xi = K ′j,xi , kTagj,xi ; ∀j ∈ [1, n]}
We let z′1,xθ , z
′
2,xθ
, r′1,xθ , r
′
2,xθ
, µ′ denote randomized parameters for Axθ in the
normal key. This implicitly sets z1,xθ = z
′
1,xθ
− yv1c2 and z2,xθ = z′2,xθ − yv2c2. Also,
it sets r2,xθ = r
′
2,xθ
+ c2 and r1,xθ = r
′
1,xθ
+ c1. If T equals to ν
c1+c2 , this has properly
simulated the semi-functional key generated by SFKeyGen′(MSK, PK, S∗,A, θ− 1).
Otherwise, If T is a random value, and we denote it as νc1+c2gγxθ , this is properly
simulated the semi-functional key generated by SFKeyGen′(MSK, PK, S∗,A, θ).
Challenge: When A requests the challenge ciphertext for S∗ with two message,
M0 and M1 B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. Then, it sets cTag = c0h′0 + ...+ cnh′n.
With Mβ and cTag, it generates a normal challenge ciphertext,
(C ′, C ′1, ..., C
′
7, E0, EAtti ;∀Atti ∈ S∗).
Then, it randomly generates κ from Zp and sets
C = C ′, C1 = C
′
1, C2 = C
′
2, C3 = C
′
3, C4 = C
′





2 , C7 = C
′
7 · f yv2 ·κ·a2ν−a1·κ·yw·a2 ,
E0 = E
′
0 · νa1a2κ, E1 = E ′1 · (νc0h̃0+...+cnh̃n+yw·cTag)a1a2κ, cTag.
This implicitly sets gt = gt
′ · νa1a2κ where t′ is a randomization parameter of
a normal key. It should be noted that tags in the challenge ciphertext and the
key elements of Axθ of the k
th key do not correlate to each other because of n-
wise independence. Hence, all tags in the challenge ciphertext and the kth key are
randomly distributed and do not correlate to each other. Therefore, if T equals to
νc1+c2 , B has properly simulated Gamek,θ−1. Otherwise, it has simulated Gamek,θ,
also properly.
2
Lemma 6.6. (Semi-functional Security) Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm
A to distinguish Gameq,Θq and GameFinal with a non-negligible advantage ε. Then,
we can build an algorithm B breaking DBDH with the advantage, ε, using A.
Proof: B takes (g, gc1 , gc2 , gc3 , T ) as an instance from DBDH. It will simulate
either Gameq,Θq or GameFinal based on the value of T .
Setup: The algorithm selects a1, b, yv, yv1 , yv2 , yw, h0, ..., hn from Zp, and sets
g = g, ga2 = gc2 , v = gyv , v1 = g
yv1 , v2 = g
yv2 , w = gyw , {hi = gyhi ; i ∈ [0, n]}
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Then, it publishes the public parameters as follows
g, gb, gb·a1 , gb·a2 = (gc2)b, w, gh0 , ..., ghn , τ1 = v1
a1 ,
τ2 = (g
c2)yv2 , τ b1 , τ
b
2 , e(g, g)
α·a1b = e(gc1 , gc2)a1b.
This implicitly sets α = c1 · c2 and a2 = c2. In this setting, the simulator does not
know MSK since it does not know α.
Init: Before it generates any private key, B requests to the adversary a target set of
attributes S∗ which will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext.
Phase I and II: For generating a semi-functional key, B randomly selects ~µ1 from Zp
such that Ax · ~µ1 = 0 for all x such that ρ(x) ∈ S∗ and the first coordinate of ~µ1
equals to 1. This exists because S∗ does not satisfy an access structure of the semi-
functional key. Also, it generate a random vector ~µ2 of which the first coordinate
equals to 0. It implicitly sets α · ~µ = α · ~µ1 + ~µ2. For each x ∈ [1,m], it randomly
generates z1,x, z2,x, r1,x, r2,x, {kTagj,x;∀j ∈ [1, n]} from Zp.
Then, for normal type rows, it sets
D1,x = g
Axµ2·a1vrx , D2,x = g
−Axµ2vrx1 g
z1,x , D3,x = (g





b)−z2,x , D6,x = g





kTagj,x)r1,x , kTagj,x; j ∈ [1, n]} ∀x s.t. ρ(x) ∈ S∗
















x , D5,x = (g
b)−z2,x , D6,x = g





kTagj,x)r1,x , kTagj,x; j ∈ [1, n]}∀x s.t. ρ(x) /∈ S∗
This implicitly sets γx = c1Axµ1 + γ
′
x.
Challenge: When A requests the challenge ciphertext for S∗ with two message M0
and M1, first, B randomly selects β from {0, 1}. It, then, randomly generates s1, κ
and t from Zp and sets s2 = c3 and κ = −c3 + κ′. It, also, sets the challenge
ciphertext as follow.
C = MβT
a1b, C1 = g
bs1(gc3)b, C2 = g





, C5 = (g
c2)κ
′











′bw−t, E0 = g








If T equals to gc1c2c3 , B has properly simulated Gameq,Θq . Otherwise, a random
will be added in Mβ, and it has simulated GameFinal, also properly. 2
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Works
In this work, we introduce techniques to achieve functional encryption schemes using
the encoding frameworks. We explore encoding frameworks and contribute to them
by suggesting new techniques which results in a number of new adaptively secure
functional encryption schemes. Also, a new encoding framework was introduced for
efficient functional encryption schemes.
In particular, in Chapter 3, we introduced a new conversion technique which
results in more efficient dual schemes of functional encryption schemes for which
the adaptive security is proved from the doubly selective security. To clarify the
requirements and techniques of this conversion, we utilize the pair encoding frame-
work. Our conversion technique is applicable to all functional encryption schemes.
This is proved via doubly selective security and improves the efficiency of the pre-
vious best conversion technique.
In Chapter 4, we introduced a new compiler of the pair encoding framework.
This compiler is adaptively secure in prime order groups under static assumptions.
Prior to our work, all previous works were in composite order groups or do not
support encoding schemes which utilize the doubly selective security. Therefore,
our compiler improves the efficiency since it realizes functional encryption schemes
in prime order groups which are originally introduced in composite order groups. In
order to achieve this work, we nested the dual system encryption and generalize the
functional encryption from identity based encryption.
In Chapter 5, we presented a new encoding framework which is tag-based en-
coding. A tag-based encoding results in functional encryption schemes which are
adaptively secure in prime order groups. Also, their compilers improve the efficiency
of the most efficient compiler of the pair encoding scheme. Therefore, the resulting
schemes of our framework are more efficient than those of the pair encoding schemes
if their predicates are large. As instances of our new encoding framework, we in-
troduce a number of functional encryption schemes which include inner product
encryption and spatial encryption.
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In Chapter 6, we proposed two KP-ABE schemes which are semi-adaptively
secure. Although those schemes are semi-adaptively secure, they have desirable
properties because they allows multi-use of attributes in standard model under the
standard assumption with a good efficiency. Particularly, our KP-ABE scheme with
short ciphertexts allows a large universe of attributes. Also, the technique for our
schemes is related with our tag-based encoding in chapter 5. It shows how the
limitation of tag based encoding is easy under the weaker security model.
Through this work, we presented the core technique that modern functional
encryption shares and how we improve the previous achievements by utilizing en-
codings which formalized Waters’ dual system encryption and/or Lewko and Waters’
doubly selective security.
Future Work
All encoding frameworks we presented in this work are equipped with bilinear
maps, but there are also functional encryption schemes utilizing multi-linear maps.
Since multilinear maps allow functional encryption schemes having more desirable
functions such as functional encryption for arithmetic circuits and a homomor-
phic encryption [BGG+14, Att14b], and multilinear maps become more practical
[CLT15, AFH+16, GGH13], it may be interesting to observe the properties of func-
tional encryption schemes in multilinear maps and to achieve similar results like
encodings.
In a bilinear map, achieving functional encryption schemes in prime order groups
under simple assumptions are actively researched. There introduced versatile tools
such as dual system groups [CW13, AC16, Att15] and dual pairing vector spaces
[OT09, OT10], but achieving adaptively secure functional encryption in prime order
groups with a more plausible property such as allowing multi-use of attributes,
better expressiveness (e.g. circuit) or efficient parameters (e.g short ciphertexts)
under standard assumption still remains a difficult task.
Tighter security for functional encryption is also interesting topic. The dual
system encryption naturally permits a loss in reduction since the advantage of
the adversary linearly increases with the number of key queried by the adversary.
Improving this disadvantage of the dual system encryption is an interesting fu-
ture work. There already exist tightly secure identity based encryption schemes
[CW13, BKP14, HKS15] and an encoding approach [AHY15]. However, it is un-
clear whether this encoding is applicable for more complicated functions such as
Inner Product Encryption or ABE for tighter security. Introducing a new encoding
or instances for tighter security is interesting as complement the previous encoding
frameworks.
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The recent works show that functional encryption can be reduced in Learning
With Error (LWE) problem [BV16, GVW15, AFV11]. Schemes based on LWE
problem [Reg09] provide a long-term security since the LWE problem is known
to be difficult even under quantum computing. Also, these can provide a better
expressiveness such as circuit and homomorphism which are considered to be very
difficult in pairing based cryptography. Therefore, functional encryption with LWE
may be one of promising directions of functional encryption.
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Appendix A
A.1 A Dedicated Construction for Masked Forms
We provide a dedicated construction of Dual-P(R) which was introduced in chapter
3. The construction is derived by applying a masked form of a pair encoding P(R)
to the generic construction in chapter 4. For this construction, we assume that there
exists a masked form of P(R) which consists of ~k(α′, x,~h;~r) and ~c(y,~h; s, ~s). There-
fore, P(R) can be parsed as (u, ~dk(φu, x, (h1, ..., hn); ~̃r) and (φs, ~dc(y, (h1, ..., hn); s, ~s)
respectively when we set α′ = 0. It should be noted that the way of denoting com-
mon value in chapter 4 is slightly different from the syntax of the original pair
encoding framework [Att14a]. We follow the original notation of [Att14a] since this
difference is only needed for the security proof.
With the masked form of P(R), a functional encryption Dual-FE(P) comprises of
four randomized algorithms employing prime order groups G1, G2 and GT of order
p. In the construction, we use the subscripts of group elements to denote the group
generators to be used to generate those elements (e.g. g1, f1 ∈ G1 and g2, f2 ∈ G2).
• Setup(λ) → PK,MSK : The setup algorithm selects a bilinear group G1, G2, GT
of order p. The algorithm randomly selects g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2. Then, it
runs Param(κ) to derive n where κ is the index allocated to the function R.
It randomly generates α, a, b, yu, yv, h1, .., hn ∈ Zp and sets τ = yv + a · yu and











1 , e(g1, g2)
α}.
It also sets MSK as {g2, gα2 , g
~h
2 , v2 = g
b·yv
2 , u2 = g
b·yu
2 , f2 = g
b
2}.
• Encrypt(M,x, PK) → CTy : The encryption algorithm randomly chooses r =
(u, ~̃r) ∈ Rr and runs Enc1 to get ~k(0, x,~h;~r). Then it parse ~k(0, x,~h;~r) as u
and ~dk(φu, x, (h1, ..., hn); ~̃r). It sets the ciphertext as














• KeyGen(y,MSK,PK) → SKx : The key generation algorithm chooses a ran-
dom vector s, ~s ∈ D × Zp × Zp ×Rs and runs Enc2 to get ~c(y,~h; s, ~s). Then,
it parses ~c(y,~h; s, ~s) as φs and ~dc(y, (h1, ..., hn); s, ~s) and randomly selects









2, ~K1 = u
~z
2, ~K2 = f
−~z
2 .
• Decrypt(PK, x, y, SKx, CTy) → M If R(x, y) = 1, the algorithm computes a
reconstruction matrix Mxy
a such that
(α + φs, ~dc(y,~h; s, ~s))Mxy(u, ~dk(φu, x,~h;~r)) = αu.









Finally, the message can be recovered as C/e(g1, g2)
αu.
Correctness We already prove that a converted encoding using a masked form of a
pair encoding scheme is also another pair encoding scheme. Therefore, correctness
holds as it is shown in chapter 4.
aMxy exists since there exists a reconstruction matrix M
′
xy of the original pair encoding scheme
which satisfies (φs, ~dc(y,~h; s,~s))M ′xy(u,
~dk(φu, x,~h;~r)) = ~c(y,~h; s,~s)M ′xy
~k(0, x,~h;~r) = 0. Since
(α+φs, ~dc(y,~h; s,~s))Mxy(u, ~dk(φu, x,~h;~r)) is a component-wise operation, Mxy can be derived by
rescaling M ′xy.
